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ABSTRACT 
Systematization of Water Allocation Systems: An Engineering Approach. 
(December 2005) 
Déborah Matilde Santos Román, B.S., Universidad de Puerto Rico; 
M.S., University of Connecticut 
Chair of Advisory Committee: Dr. Ralph Wurbs 
 
The allocation of water resources is typically accomplished within the framework of 
water allocation systems (WAS).  In general, a WAS sets priorities, applies rules, and 
organizes responses to a range of water allocation scenarios.  This research presents a 
comprehensive study of water allocation strategies and provides a conceptual framework of 
principles and guidelines for designing, assessing, implementing and supporting WAS.  The 
voluminous compilation of international treaties and conventions, interstate compacts, 
intrastate administrative documentation, and scientific/engineering literature was researched 
in order to identify different water allocation strategies and mechanisms.  From this analysis 
eight fundamental areas of WAS were identified: water rights, determination of water 
allotment, administrative systems, reservoir storage considerations, system reliability, 
multiple uses, instream flow requirements, and drought management.  The systematic 
scrutiny of these eight areas at the international, interstate, and intrastate levels defined the 
conceptual framework for assessing WAS.  The Texas experience with regard to its Water 
Availability Modeling system is also reviewed with particular emphasis on the application of 
the Water Rights Analysis Package (WRAP) model in supporting water allocation efforts.  
The Lower Rio Grande WAS was used as a case study to demonstrate how the principles 
presented in the conceptual framework can be used to assess water allocation issues and 
identify alternative strategies. Three WRAP simulation studies utilizing several components 
of the conceptual framework were performed in order to assess the Lower Rio Grande WAS.  
The simulations focused on three of the major water allocation issues of the Texas Rio 
Grande: reallocation among uses, instream flow requirements, and drought management.  
The simulations showed several deficiencies in the Lower Rio Grande WAS, particularly 
regarding the size of the domestic-municipal-industrial (DMI) reserve and its effect on the 
reliability of other uses.  The simulation results suggest that water from the DMI can be 
 iv
liberated to be used by irrigators and to support environmental flows without affecting the 
reliability to municipal users.  Several strategies were proposed that can potentially improve 
the overall efficiency of the system.  Nonetheless, implementing new strategies and water 
allocation policies in the Lower Rio Grande WAS would require considerable changes in 
regulation policies. 
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CHAPTER I 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
1.1 BACKGROUND 
One of the fundamental necessities for the well-being of human societies is the 
availability of reliable sources of fresh water.  The water resources of a region play a central 
role in maintaining human health and welfare, environmental integrity, and economic 
growth.  Water is withdrawn and stored from natural systems such as rivers, lakes, and 
groundwater aquifers for a variety of economic activities, especially agriculture, industry, 
and municipal uses.  As the world population expands and living standards rise, so does the 
demand for increased exploitation of water resources.  Since water is a renewable resource, 
the primary challenge is not so much how to manage a declining resource, but how to 
respond to the scarcity resulting from the geographic and temporal mismatch between 
supply and demand.  In many regions of the world the demand for water has already 
exceeded the local supplies.  Moreover, seasonal variations in precipitation can often result 
in extended dry periods leading to drought conditions during which water supplies are 
severely limited. 
The water scarcity problem is exacerbated by competition among users and uses.  The 
usage of water by an individual or institution undeniably alters the quantity, quality, and 
reliability of the resource for other users.  This competition has often moved people to 
conflict and even violence.  Conflicts range from minor disputes among neighboring users, 
to interstate and international disagreements over the use of the resources they share.  In the 
United States (US), battles over water are played out in courtrooms, legislatures, and 
Congress; and now more than ever before, in multi-state negotiations that result in huge 
expenditures for the parties involved. 
 
_______________________ 
This dissertation follows the style of the Journal of Water Resources Planning and 
Management. 
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At the international level, history suggests that water is an increasingly salient element 
of politics, including violent conflicts.  During the 1950’s and 60’s, fighting broke out between 
Israel and Syria over the control of the waters of the Jordan River.  These military actions 
contributed to the tensions that lead to the Six Day War of 1967 (Gleick 1993).  Also, 
disputes over quantity and quality of the Colorado and Rio Grande Rivers, and most 
recently, Mexico’s incompliance of the 1944 water allocation Treaty has resulted in a long 
history of political frictions and tensions between the US and Mexico (Gleick 1988).  
Clearly, water scarcity issues and the political conflicts that may arise from such issues 
highlight the importance of developing effective policies and principles for the proper 
allocation of this limited resource. 
The allocation of water resources is typically accomplished within the framework of 
water allocation systems (WAS).  In general, a WAS sets priorities, applies rules, and 
organizes responses to a range of water allocation scenarios.  The development of WAS has 
become a central issue in water resources management, for an effective WAS can help to 
ensure peace, stability, and prosperity at the local, national, and international levels.  The 
primary objective of a WAS is to facilitate efficient use of water resources by (1) distributing 
water equitably among users, (2) protecting existing users from having their supply 
diminished by new users, (3) establishing rules for sharing limited water resources during 
drought periods, (4) protecting the long-term reliability of the resource by avoiding over-
exploitation (Wurbs 2004) and (5) adapting to changes in the societal values of water by 
accommodating new users and uses.  Accomplishing this, however, is a challenging task for 
the institutions that mediate access to water.   
WAS contain multiple overlapping legal systems and levels of water management 
policies and practices (Wurbs 2004).  The specific rules for allocating water reflect continual 
adaptations to different water needs and are molded to the hydrologic and socio-economic 
characteristics of a region.  Among nations, water is allocated by means of treaties, decrees, 
and other agreements. The principles and doctrines that have historically governed such 
agreements are commonly known as international water law.  In the US, water is allocated 
among states through interstate river compacts and other legal means. Compacts are 
negotiated agreements entered voluntarily by two or more states and, once ratified by 
Congress, they become both a legal contract and federal law.  Within states, water is 
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distributed among water supply organizations or individual users through water rights 
systems.  Two alternative doctrines have evolved as individual states resolve water rights 
issues: riparian and prior appropriation, or a combination of both.  The riparian doctrine 
establishes rights based on the ownership of land adjacent to watercourses, while the prior 
appropriation doctrine gives the right to use water in a “first in time, first in right” basis, 
determined by the date of appropriation. 
Effective water allocation and management requires an understanding of water 
availability and reliability (Wurbs 2003).  However, water availability not only relies on 
hydrological, but also on institutional considerations.  The myriad of water management 
entities and water users within an institutional setting add to the numerous complexities 
involved in creating and administering WAS (Wurbs 2004).  Computer-based decision 
support systems provide useful tools for assisting water managers in this intricate process.  
Computer simulation models can be used to evaluate water management strategies, plan 
development projects, simulate allocation under alternative water availability scenarios, 
support the negotiation of agreements, administer water rights systems, and the like.  The 
state of Texas has successfully developed and implemented a Water Availability Modeling 
(WAM) system to support the administration of its water rights permit system. The WAM 
system was authorized by the 1997 Senate Bill 1, the Brown-Lewis Water Management 
Plan.  A key component of the WAM system is the Water Rights Analysis Package 
(WRAP).  This computer model has been used to simulate water allocation and management 
scenarios in all Texas river basins, including the international Rio Grande. 
 
1.2 MOTIVATION FOR THE STUDY 
While the importance of effective water allocation is well recognized, methodologies are 
extremely disparate and somewhat obscure. Although most international treaties define 
general water allocation objectives, usually they neither clarify the allocations among 
specific users nor set priorities under emergency shortages.  Also, when the water allocation 
mechanisms in interstate compacts are vague, and thus subject to conflicting interpretations, 
they may lead to lengthy disputes and waste of resources on litigations and Supreme Court 
appeals.  The manner in which water rights systems have evolved in each state has resulted 
in a lack of uniformity in water allocation rules and policies. This lack of specificity at all 
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levels precludes selecting effective allocating mechanisms, which in turn may lead to 
inconsistencies among actions, inefficient performance, and incompliance of the system 
objectives (Frederiksen 1992; Wolf 1997).  In addition, there is an eminent lack of 
comprehensive studies regarding the development and implementation of WAS. Most 
studies related to water allocation are descriptive in nature, addressing subjects like conflict 
resolution, hydro-politics, and water law from a non-technical perspective. Also, there is a 
tendency to overlook the details of the methodologies for allocating water.  One of the major 
contributions of this research is the identification of the main concepts and critical issues in 
the fields of international and interstate water allocation, water rights systems, and decision 
support modeling. 
This dissertation is directed toward providing an enhanced understanding of the specific 
mechanisms for allocating water by systematically addressing: (1) how water allocation is 
achieved among nations, states, water management entities, and individual users, and (2) 
how computer simulation models can be used to support and facilitate water allocation 
efforts.  The dissertation presents a comprehensive study of water allocation strategies and 
provides a conceptual framework of principles and guidelines for designing and 
implementing WAS. 
 
1.3 RESEARCH SCOPE 
The purpose of this research is to develop a generalized theory regarding the 
mechanisms for allocating surface waters.  The research objectives are to: 
 
(1) Develop an improved understanding of water allocation issues and rules 
incorporated in WAS by identifying the mechanisms used for water allocation. 
(2) Formulate a systematic framework of principles and guidelines to be considered and 
alternative mechanisms that may be adopted in the implementation and 
administration of surface WAS. 
(3) Evaluate the analysis and decision-support capabilities of computer simulation 
models with a particular emphasis on the WRAP model and its application in Texas. 
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The systematic framework is structured based on a hierarchy of water management 
levels that include: 
 
(1) International river basins involving water allocation among nations 
(2) Interstate river basin compacts and other interstate allocation arrangements in the US 
(3) Intrastate water allocation based on water rights systems in the US 
 
Following this hierarchy, the voluminous compilation of treaties, compacts, and 
scientific and engineering literature was reviewed and researched from the perspective of 
eight major areas fundamental to any WAS.  The systematic scrutiny of these areas at all 
three management levels will define a conceptual framework for assessing water allocation.  
These areas are described below: 
 
(1) Water rights.  The rules governing the sharing of limited streamflow and storage 
among users are examined.  These rules are defined within the WAS to determine 
who has the right to use the water and in what priority. 
(2) Determination of water allotment. Hydrological and policy criteria for assigning 
diversion and storage quantities to water users are addressed.  Past experiences 
regarding the use of specific water allocation mechanisms are presented and 
critically reviewed. 
(3) Administrative systems. The institutional framework for water allocation may 
involve complex interactions among federal and state agencies, regional and local 
authorities, municipal and irrigation districts, and other public and private water 
supply entities. The role and jurisdiction of these institutions are discussed. 
(4) Reservoir storage considerations.  Balancing the trade-offs between using water for 
present needs and storing it for future uses is a complex task.  Approaches to assess 
reservoir storage and other operational considerations are explored. 
(5) System reliability.  Reliability is a measure of dependability and can be used to asses 
the capabilities of a stream/reservoir system to satisfy specified water use 
requirements. The dissertation explores how reliability considerations can be 
incorporated into WAS to provide a better basis for decision-making. 
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(6) Multiple uses. Water allocation involves interactions and tradeoffs between purposes 
that are sometimes complementary but often competitive.  Water uses recognized by 
WAS are outlined and the specific provisions for dealing with conflicting uses are 
studied. 
(7) Instream flow requirements. Instream flow uses such as habitat preservation, 
recreation, aesthetics, and conservation are becoming an increasingly important 
factor in water management decisions.  This research investigates strategies used to 
incorporate these non-traditional uses into the WAS scheme. 
(8) Drought management.  A key component of a WAS, particularly in arid regions, is 
to establish methodologies to respond to periods of water scarcity.  The special 
conditions defined within WAS for declaring a drought state are outlined.  This 
research evaluates the adjustments to normal water allocation rules and/or 
implementation of new rules that have been required to cope with drought 
conditions. 
 
The Rio Grande Basin is adopted as a case study for more detailed investigation.  Water 
in this arid region is over-appropriated, as demands exceed supplies. Surface water 
allocation on the Lower Rio Grande is different from the rest of Texas.  Water permits in the 
Lower Rio Grande are divided into three categories and priorities are given depending on the 
use of the water.  The region is also subject to periodic droughts, intensifying the importance 
of effective water allocation in this already complex system.  Pursuant to the 1997 Senate 
Bill 1 and other legislation, the state has progressed significantly in improving its WAS. A 
major advancement has been the integration of the WRAP model for decision support.  The 
dissertation research includes a review of the WAM system with particular emphasis on 
features adopted in modeling the treaties and compacts specifications that influence the 
Texas WAS. The WRAP model is used to test the allocation issues identified in the 
conceptual framework. The WRAP simulation study investigates various water 
allocation/management issues and strategies in the Rio Grande that are also relevant to other 
regions of the world. 
This dissertation organizes the extensive literature of strategies and approaches for 
allocating water at all three management levels. It is expected that the conceptual framework 
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and guidelines that are developed will assist in the design, development, and implementation 
of new WAS.  This format can also be used as a guide on how to systematically approach 
new water allocation issues and for future evaluations of existing WAS. Also, this 
comprehensive analysis will help identify areas where policy and institutional reform may 
be needed.  The conceptual framework may also be used to guide in the design of new water 
allocation agreements and in the revision of old ones.  The review of existing computer 
modeling capabilities will provide water management agencies helpful information for 
comparing and selecting an appropriate model to support their WAS.  Managers can also use 
the Rio Grande case study as a model for improving water allocating practices and 
integrating computer models to assist in the various phases of water allocation. 
 
1.4 ORGANIZATION OF THE DISSERTATION 
This dissertation is comprised of nine chapters.  Chapter II provides an explanation of 
the doctrines, conventions, treaties, and other rules and institutions governing water 
allocation at the international level.  Chapter III provides an overview of the main venues for 
the allocation of water among states with a special emphasis on interstate water allocation 
compacts.  A detailed description of the water rights systems adopted in the US and their 
respective water appropriation doctrines is presented in Chapter IV.  Chapter V provides 
descriptions and applications of a series of site-specific and generalized computer models 
that can support the various aspects of WAS.  A comprehensive review of the current WAS 
in Texas is presented in Chapter VI.  This chapter also explores the modeling strategies that 
have been implemented in the state to address several water allocation issues at all 
management levels.  The conceptual framework for the systematization of WAS is developed 
in Chapter VII.  The chapter breaks down each of the eight fundamental areas of water 
allocation, discusses issues, and analyses the strategies and mechanisms used to address such 
issues within the structure of WAS.  The significance of several of the fundamental water 
allocation areas identified in the framework is demonstrated in Chapter VIII by means of a 
computer simulation case study.  The Rio Grande Basin provides an excellent case study, as 
water allocation is governed by international treaties, interstate compacts, and within Texas, 
by two distinct water right systems.  The research summary and conclusions are presented in 
Chapter IX. 
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CHAPTER II 
 
INTERNATIONAL WATER ALLOCATION 
 
Almost half of the world’s land surface lies within a basin shared between at least two 
countries and about forty percent of human population inhabit international basins (Wolf et 
al. 1999).   International rivers are those that run through or between more than one state.  
Transboundary rivers can be successive (i.e. run through the states) or contiguous (i.e. 
forming the common boundary).  The legal and political implications of utilizing such water 
resources are delicate and complex.  Around the world almost all easily accessible national 
resources have already been developed or are in the process of being developed.  As a result, 
the cost of new projects per cubic meter of new water available will continue to increase 
(World Bank 1992).  International water bodies are usually the only resources of water that 
could be developed economically since often they have not been considered in the past due 
to a lack of agreement and the political complexities and risks were considered too high for 
the unilateral development of the resource (Biswas 1999).   
Water is a non-substitutable resource that is becoming more polluted and scarce as 
population grows and standard of living rises. Its scarcity either temporal or geographical 
leads to intense political pressures.  Furthermore, water demands are often conflicting and 
since river basins do not follow legal or political boundaries, institutions are often incapable 
of meeting the administrative challenges that arise. As a result, the potential for conflict and 
even violence is ever present.  Nonetheless, historically there are more instances where 
water has been a catalyst for agreement than for war (Wolf 1998).  Even though violence has 
not been the norm for resolving water conflict among nations, water has been a critical 
factor of political instability, economic insecurity, and human suffering.  As more stress is 
put upon international water resources, the ability for nations to peacefully resolve conflicts 
over internationally distributed water resources will increasingly be a factor in stable and 
secure international relations. However, international water law is still poorly developed, 
vague, and without any effective enforcement mechanism.  This Chapter presents a review 
of the legal doctrines, principles, conventions, and international institutions that define 
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international water law and the mechanisms for the resolution of conflicts among states.  It 
also presents a summary and discussion of international water allocation treaties. 
 
2.1 DOCTRINES, PRINCIPLES AND CONVENTIONS 
The political mechanisms used to allocate water among riparian countries are known as 
international water law. Modern international water law is the result of an evolutionary 
process in legal doctrine related to historical, agricultural, and navigational uses of 
transboundary freshwater resources.  Prior to the industrial revolution, water uses were more 
related to navigational activities and old legal doctrines were more concerned with riparian 
countries ensuring proper water flow and preventing harm to their neighbors (Teclaff 1967).  
The doctrine of “sic utere tuo ut alienam non laedas” (use your property in such a way that 
it does not injure another) was usually observed.  This doctrine aims to prevent any state 
from using or allowing the use of transboundary waters in a way that may harm the territory 
or water rights of their bordering states (Eckstein 2002).  After World War I and with the 
advent of industrialization water demands have shifted to non-navigational uses such as 
agriculture, industrial, municipal, and more recently, sporting, and conservation among 
others (Lien 1998).  Since that time, organs of international law have tried to provide a 
framework to guide in the allocation of water among increasingly intensive water users.  
However, these principles of customary law developed by advisory bodies and private 
organizations can be better categorized as guidelines, also called “soft law”, and are usually 
not intended to be legally binding (Cano 1989, Wolf 1999, Beach et al. 2000). 
In early years international law basically consisted of bilateral treaties among bordering 
countries for defining political borders, flow control, agricultural development, and the 
reallocation of water for growing population demands and industries.  As a result, 
international law was plagued with incongruent and ambiguous legal principles devised and 
interpreted to fit specific interests (Wolf 1997; Eckstein 2002).  According to Wolf (1997), 
such principles are mostly based either on hydrography or chronology.  Hydrographic 
concerns refer to the relative location of the countries with respect to where the aquifer or 
river originates and how much of that territory falls within a certain state.  Chronology on 
the other hand, refers to who has been using the water the longest. 
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Historically, extreme doctrines developed first (Housen-Couriel 1994).  For instance, it 
is not unusual for upstream states to initially claim the doctrine of “absolute sovereignty” 
(hydrography), which argues that a state has absolute rights over all the waters flowing 
through its territory (Lipper 1967).  On the other hand, downstream states initially claim the 
doctrine of “absolute riverain integrity”, which asserts that every riparian state should be 
guaranteed the natural flow of the river crossing its territory (Eckstein 1995).  Neither of 
these doctrines has reached acceptance in the international water politics setting. Another 
extreme position concerning the chronography of water usage is the doctrine of “historic 
rights” (similar to the prior appropriation doctrine).  According to this doctrine, older users 
have the right to use the water in a “first in time, first in right” basis (Wolf 1997). 
With time, more moderate and therefore more feasible doctrines developed.  Moderated 
principles allow for the sharing of the benefits of the water resources by accepting some 
limitations to both the countries sovereignty and the river’s integrity.  The doctrine of 
“limited (or restricted) territorial sovereignty” recognizes the right of a country to make use 
of transboundary water resources while agreeing not to cause harm to any other riparian 
state (Lien 1998).  The doctrine of “equitable and reasonable utilization” states that states 
should utilize an international watercourse in such a way that is beneficial and takes into 
account the interests of the other watercourse states.  Most recently, the doctrine of 
“community of co-riparian states” has emerged in which integrated river basin development 
transcends national boundaries and the international basin is developed and managed as a 
unit (Dellapenna 1994b, Correia and Silva 1999). 
The doctrines and principles of international water law are defined within the context of 
international conventions, treaties and customs of law.  International conventions in general 
establish rules that are recognized by the participant states, provide insight to the conception 
of international law held by nations, and it is also where general practices are accepted as 
law.  International custom refers to the most basic and generic concepts that can be used to 
identify rules of international law as they are usually observed in treaties and other 
agreements (Utton 1991).  For instance, even though water treaties are non-binding among 
non-signatory states, they indicate that the principle of limited sovereignty is usually 
preferred in international practice. 
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2.2 INTERNATIONAL RULES AND CONVENTIONS 
International multilateral conventions, although fewer than bilateral treaties, bear 
evidence that the needs of co-riparians must be considered and reflect which position of law 
different nations are willing or not willing to take.  Several international efforts have been 
made to develop an official international doctrine of water allocation.  In 1966 the 
International Law Association (ILA), a private international organization, developed the 
Helsinki Rules in order to bring uniformity to the international water law field.  The basic 
goal was to provide for the equitable allocation of the waters of an international drainage 
basin (Caponera 1985).  Article V states 11 factors (e.g. climatic, historical, economic, etc.) 
that should be taken into account in determining “reasonable and equitable apportionment”.  
The concept of “beneficial use” of water was also addressed (Housen-Couriel 1994).  In 
addition, other principles were also included such as no reservation of future uses by an 
individual state, no inherent preference of one category over another, and existing economic 
activities should be considered equitable and reasonable unless established otherwise 
(Eckstein 2000).  However, even though the principle of limited sovereignty is clear 
throughout the Rules, most of the concepts used such as “reasonable and equitable share” are 
vague and were considered more aspirational than practical (Utton 1991). 
Overall, the Helsinki Rules prompted more controversy than advancement.  In 1970 
when the United Nations (UN) considered the Rules, objections were raised that took more 
than two decades to resolve (Wolf 1997).  For instance, some states argued that the drainage 
basin approach was an infringement to their territorial sovereignty, while other states felt 
that the drainage basin was the most “rational and scientific” approach given the many 
complexities of transboundary water systems (Biswas 1993).  Nevertheless, and despite their 
soundness, the Helsinki Rules have received little recognition as official codifications of 
international water law being quoted only once on an international binding agreement (i.e. 
the Mekong River Agreement). 
In 1970 the UN General Assembly started an effort to review the status of international 
water law.  It was not until 1997 that the UN Convention on the Law of the Non-
Navigational Uses of International Watercourses was submitted and signed by many 
countries.  Even though it is primarily directed at reducing pollution, the Convention, is the 
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most recent and authoritative formulation of allocation rules for international rivers, yet it is 
still pending ratification.   
The Convention is intended to be a framework agreement for the use, management, and 
preservation of transboundary water resources.  It is consists of thirty seven articles which 
are divided in seven parts. The most important provisions regarding water allocation are 
contained in Part II in which the three most relevant principles of customary law are 
confirmed: equitable utilization, prevention of significant harm, and prior notification of 
planned measures.  Although these doctrines are well-known, the fact that they have been 
accepted by a diplomatic and democratic conference establishes its status as recognized 
principles of international law (Utton 1991, McCaffrey 2001, Eckstein 2002).  Article VI of 
the Convention gives a list of factors that must be taken into account when determining 
equitable utilization of the resource and Article IX requires riparian states to share 
information in a regular basis regarding the conditions of the watercourse.  Even though 
these guidelines can be useful in defining reasonable use, as McCaffrey (2001) points out, it 
would be nearly impossible for a state to ensure this principle since it is more appropriate for 
implementation through a joint commission, a court, or a third party.  Left without an 
enforcement mechanism, the article’s utility is questionable.   
In Article VII the Convention establishes the obligation not to cause significant harm.  
This is particilarily difficult when the dilemma is to ensure the equitable right of a country to 
use the water without causing appreciable harm to a possibly well established older economy 
of another riparian country downstream. For this article to be approved, several flexibilities 
had to be included.  First, the “obligation” not to cause harm was defined not as an absolute 
but as due diligence (i.e. best efforts) to use the resource in such a way as not to cause 
significant harm.  Second, it defines the concept as a process in which significant harm is 
avoided as far as possible while reaching equitable utilization.  
The major controversy revolves around which concept, equitable utilization or obligation 
not to cause significant harm, should have prevalence over the other (McCaffrey 2001). It is 
understood that the Convention text gives prevalence to equitable utilization, but in order to 
be approved, the Convention included enough text to satisfy all groups, creating some 
confusion on which section of the Convention applies in what situation.  Moreover, the 
Convention does not go as far as it should have in some areas like defining methodologies 
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for water allocation, environmental protection, and water conservation (UN 1997).  
Therefore, it is left to the ability and desire of states to use the Convention guideline 
principles as a framework to design and implement more specific allocation agreements and 
practices (Eckstein 2000). 
Beginning in 1996, the ILA undertook the task of reformulating the Helsinki Rules in 
order to incorporate international environmental and human rights law.  In August 2004, the 
ILA approved the Berlin Rules on Water Resources.  The Berlin Rules intend to cover 
subjects not reflected by its predecessor the Helsinski Rules and the UN Convention on the 
Law of the Non-Navigational Uses of International Watercourses.  The Berlin Rules 
summarize a new paradigm of international water law that focuses on ecological integrity, 
sustainability, public participation, and minimization of environmental harm.  Subjects 
related to water apportionment and allocative and enforcement mechanism are borrowed 
from the Helsinski Rules with some revised provisions from the UN Convention.  In general, 
most recognized bodies of international law provide little practical guidelines for allocations, 
which are in essence the cause of water conflicts (Wolf 1997). 
 
2.3 INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTIONS 
Ameliorating water conflicts and political tensions resulting from water disputes will 
increasingly involve sophisticated mechanisms of dialogue and cooperation.  Legal and 
institutional capacities that can deal with the international dimension of these situations are 
limited, but progress has been made (Wolf 2001).  This institutional framework is needed to 
promote good relations among riparian nations and provide for improved water resources 
management.  There is no comprehensive global institution for the management of 
transboundary waters.  Instead, several organizations within the UN such as the World Bank, 
UN Environment Programme (UNEP), UN Development Programme (UNDP), and UN 
Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) have dealt with issues related 
to internationally shared waters.  However, these efforts have been initiated and fueled more 
by individuals within the organization than by the institution’s objectives or commitment 
(Nakayama 1997). Several partnerships between these agencies also exist such as the Global 
Water Partnership and the World Water Council that aim to coordinate efforts for water 
development and policy improvement.  Nonetheless, none of these agencies have the power 
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within their mandates to implement mechanisms for conflict resolution or enforcement 
(Wolf 2001).   
Perhaps the only international organ with any kind of leverage for resolving disputes 
over international waters is the International Court of Justice (ICJ).  The general functions of 
the ICJ are to settle, in accordance with international law, the legal disputes submitted to it by 
states, and to give advisory opinions on legal questions referred to it by duly authorized 
international organs and agencies.  Cases in the ICJ are entered into voluntarily and only 
recognized nations can bring their cases to the Court consideration. Other political entities 
such as ethnic or minority groups would have no representation.  However, the contribution of 
the ICJ in transboundary water allocation disputes is limited since there is no practical 
mechanism to enforce the Court’s decisions, with perhaps the exception of extreme 
circumstances. Therefore, a politically strong nation could completely ignore the Court’s 
ruling with little or no repercussions (Wolf 2001).  The ICJ has been used only once to 
intervene in a water related conflict for the apportionment of the Gabcikovo-Nagymaros 
project in the Danube River.  In 1992 the case was submitted to the Court and in 1997 the 
Court ruled that Hungary and Slovakia must comply with their 1977 water treaty in financing 
and operating a major reservoir project.  Hungary however, disregarded the Court’s ruling and 
proposed a different plan that was clearly disadvantageous to Slovakia.  In response, Slovakia 
has returned to the Court in search for resolution but the conflict is yet to be resolved. 
 
2.4 INTERNATIONAL TREATIES 
In the absence of detailed and clear water law and adequate enforcing institutions, the 
allocation mechanism that has been used by riparian nations more often and with greater 
success, has been bilateral and multi-lateral water treaties.  Historically, thousands of treaties 
have been signed regarding international uses of water, the majority of which have been 
related to navigation.  During the last hundred years, an increasing number of treaties have 
been signed that deal with non-navigational uses of water.  Some of the water management 
issues covered in treaties are hydropower, flood control, boundary delineation, water 
allocation, and more recently, pollution control.   
There has been a general misunderstanding and ignorance of the magnitude of the 
problem of allocating the water of international rivers. Most of the literature has been 
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plagued with hypothetical and unscientific facts based on old and questionable studies from 
the 1970s (Biswas 1999).  It was not until 1999, when Wolf et al.’s work was published, that 
the overall magnitude and seriousness of the situation began to be understood. There are 
approximately 261 international river basins from which 145 international water treaties 
have been signed during the last 50 years.  For the most part, these water treaties establish 
general goals of cooperation and equitable apportionment to maintain amicable relationships 
between riparian countries. Yet, specific guidelines for allocation, enforcement, and conflict 
resolution are lacking. 
Only 54 international water treaties have some definition for water allocations.  About 35 
have clear specifications for allocation.  Table 2.1 presents a summary of international water 
treaties with clearly specified allocations.  Some of the allocation mechanisms utilized in the 
treaties are: equal portions, fixed annual or daily amounts or flows, storage allocations, 
minimum flows, allocative schedules or formulas dependent on current flows, “needs-based” 
allocation, and baskets of benefits in exchange for water (e.g. hydropower, money, etc).  Some 
of the treaties establish joint commissions with the responsibility of determining the 
allocations and/or approving water rights and projects in the transboundary basin.  
Water treaties have been the venue that water sharing countries have used the most to 
compensate for the gaps in detailed water law and adequate institutional framework. Most 
water allocation treaties pre-date water law conventions, thus establishing their own legal 
basis.  In addition, several treaties have established their own institutional support by 
creating joint administrative commissions for the management and planning of international 
basins and the resolution of future conflict.  However, the big picture is still that the legal 
management of transboundary waters remains conceptually deficient (Frederiksen 1992, 
Wolf 2001). Most of international water allocation treaties lack provisions for monitoring, 
information sharing, enforcement, conflict resolution, and/or incentives for compliance and 
cooperation. More importantly, less than a fourth of the treaties delineate a specific 
allocation mechanism (i.e. 35 of 145 treaties) which is usually the core of conflict.   This 
lack of specificity could be the result of the vagueness of international water law, the lack of 
an effective enforcement institution or both.  Nonetheless, the international treaty appears to 
offer the most effective venue for providing effective allocation and management of 
international waters. 
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CHAPTER III 
 
INTERSTATE WATER ALLOCATION 
 
In the United States, a state has broad authority, under the Constitution, of all the waters 
within its borders limited only by a federal navigation servitude and the Congressional 
power under the Commerce Clause to control navigation.  Nonetheless, a state has no direct 
authority over a neighboring state’s water and when exercising its authority over an 
interstate stream, a state cannot dismiss the interests of downstream states.  Determining 
how much water from an interstate stream a state is entitled to is not an easy task and 
jurisdiction over this type of disputes resides outside the states themselves. 
There are three venues for the allocation of water among states: congressional 
apportionment, judicial adjudication, and interstate compacts. The congressional or statutory 
apportionment occurs when the allocation of water is determined by Congressional action 
and it has been rarely used for interstate water apportionment. When a state determines that 
there is clear and convincing evidence that its rights to use its share of interstate waters have 
been curtailed or diminished, the state has the right to resort to litigation in the Supreme 
Court under the doctrine of equitable apportionment. Finally, the most common and perhaps 
the preferred method for interstate water allocation is the interstate compact. Compacts are 
legal agreements between states that are also ratified as federal law.  This Chapter provides 
an overview of these three venues with special emphasis on interstate water allocation 
compacts. 
  
3.1 CONGRESSIONAL APPORTIONMENT 
The United States Congress has the power to apportion water of navigable rivers among 
states, in furtherance of commerce or where waters are to be released from storage in federal 
reservoir projects. Where Congress has exercised its constitutional power over waters, courts 
have no power to substitute their own notions for the apportionment (Arizona v. California 
1963).  Congressional allocation has occurred twice, in the allocation of the Colorado River 
and the Lake Tahoe and Truckee and Carson rivers.  Although the waters of the Colorado 
River were originally allocated by the Colorado River Compact of 1921, it did not resolve 
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differences over allocation among the lower basin states (Arizona, California, and Nevada).  
For years Arizona thwarted California’s attempts to develop the river for fear of California 
taking a disproportionate share of the lower basin supply.  Finally in 1963, the Supreme 
Court held that Congress, in passing the Boulder Canyon Project Act of 1928, divided the 
waters of the river among the lower basin states. This action by the Court recognized that 
Congress may act when the other apportionment mechanisms of compacts and judicial 
adjudications have failed, are unavailable, or are not used (Getches 1997, Tarlock et al. 
2002).  In 1990, Congress passed the Truckee-Carson-Pyramid Lake Water Rights 
Settlement Act, which specifies how the waters of Lake Tahoe and the Truckee and Carson 
rivers are to be apportioned between California and Nevada.   
There are two major aspects that make Congressional apportionment to be considered an 
inefficient method of water allocation.  Its major shortcoming is that it is highly unlikely that 
members of Congress will have the specialized knowledge necessary to deal with water 
disputes.  The second aspect is that Congressional decisions are mostly based on political 
reality rather than legal, social, and economical reasons. Therefore, it is better for the states 
to determine water apportionment by voluntary agreement rather than having a 
congressional majority decide for them since many of the Congress members may have little 
interest on the region or may base their decision on mere political interests (Copas 1997). 
 
3.2 JUDICIAL ADJUDICATION 
The Supreme Court has original jurisdiction in all cases in which a state is a party.  The 
Supreme Court’s original jurisdiction has been invoked in disputes over the waters of the 
Arkansas, Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware, Laramie, Mississippi, North Platte, Pecos, 
Republican, Rio Grande, Vermejo, and Walla Walla Rivers (Tarlock et al. 2002).  When a 
state feels it has been wronged or deprived of its fair share of the waters, it can file a 
complaint and follow the required hearing and motions (e.g. to suppress, dismiss, etc.). If the 
complaint survives these procedures, the respondent state must file an answer.  Typically, 
the Court appoints a special master (usually a retired federal judge or a distinguished water 
lawyer) to hear and evaluate the evidence. The special master prepares findings of fact and 
conclusions of law and recommends a decree which the Court is free to follow or disregard. 
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The Supreme Court has developed its own common law in exercising its jurisdiction 
over interstate water disputes by applying either the doctrine of “equitable apportionment” to 
surface water or the commerce clause to groundwater (Sporhase v. Nebraska 1982).  
Equitable apportionment is a regulatory doctrine fashioned by the courts to assure a balance 
between states by “dividing the pie”, that is, an interstate stream between the states that 
share its waters.  The basic tenet of this doctrine is that “equality of right”, not of quantity, 
should govern.  This simply means that the states stand “on the same level… in point of 
power and right under the constitutional system” (Kansas v. Colorado 1907).  Thus, this 
doctrine prevents any state, simply because it is upstream, bigger, more economically 
advanced, or more aggressive in litigation, from taking more than its fair share of the river.  
The courts are called to settle disputes among states in such a way that it recognizes equal 
rights to all states by establishing justice and demanding “delicate adjustments” of the 
interests of the states (Kansas v. Colorado 1907; Nebraska v. Wyoming 1945). In other 
words, even though equitable apportionment respects territorial authority, it limits the water 
use within the state in order to accommodate for the competing needs of the water sharing 
states (Utton 1988). 
When dealing with water disputes the Supreme Court is not bound by the laws of the 
individual states or by their allocation doctrines.  The Court however, may use the states 
system as a source of principles for water allocation.  For instance, when all states prescribe 
to the doctrine of prior appropriation, priority becomes the “guiding principle” in the allocation 
among competing states, but state law is not controlling (Colorado v. New Mexico 1982).   
The ruling of the Court overrules the states law and the overall criterion of allocation is 
equitable apportionment not prior appropriation.  The factors that might justify deviation 
from priority include: physical and climate conditions, rate of return flows, economy of 
established uses, availability of storage, practical effect of wasteful uses, comparison 
between damage upstream due to curtailed uses and benefits downstream (Getches 1997).   
In cases involving riparian states, the Supreme Court has used several guiding principles 
of riparian law such as giving greater importance to instream uses than to consumptive uses 
by protecting base flow and keeping the status quo among similar users (Tarlock et al. 
2002).  For the most part, the Court tries to avoid intervention in intrastate allocation, and 
has often taken a “mass allocation” approach.  In these cases, the Court awards each state a 
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quantity of water to be distributed by the state’s allocation system (Getches 1997).  In 
addition to the basic two state law systems, the Court has developed its own body of federal 
law applicable to reserved federal and Indian lands water rights, especially in the west 
(Muys 2003). 
Historically, the Court has been reluctant to take jurisdiction in water allocation disputes 
for a number of reasons concerning the vagueness of allocating standards, need for 
supervision, massive amount of technical data and the Court’s lack of expertise on the 
subject, as well as the staggering expenses of litigation and of paying a special master.  It has 
been argued that to educate the Court to a point where it could make an informed decision 
requires too many resources to be truly efficient (Copas 1997).  Moreover, even when the 
Court reaches a satisfying solution to a water dispute there are no other mechanisms of 
enforcement and avoidance of future conflict.  
Since the only alternative available to states under the equitable apportionment doctrine 
is more litigation, states would have an incentive to cheat because further litigation is 
ungainly to the other states, especially if they have been already in full-scale judicial action 
(Copas 1997).  Moreover, the Court will not pursue any suit unless it is “justifiable”.  
According to the Court, a justifiable complaint is one that involves an “invasion of rights of 
serious magnitude….established by clear and convincing evidence” (Connecticut v. 
Massachusetts 1931).  In other words, the Court will not intervene for cases of water 
development for future projects or cases where no harm has yet been done.  This approach is 
more remedial as it intends to promote states to reach agreements on their own instead of 
battling each other in Court.   A more beneficial approach is for the states to reach a 
voluntary agreement, since there is no guarantee that the Court will protect existing 
economic conditions when making a decree.  In addition, the burden of proof requirements 
established by the Court are such, that the conflict must be allowed to “ripen” to the point 
where the political and economical costs of reaching a satisfying adjudication may be 
deemed too high to pursue (Sherk 1994). 
 
3.3 INTERSTATE COMPACTS 
Interstate compacts are negotiated agreements entered into voluntarily by two or more 
states.  The United States federal government can also be a party to an interstate compact to 
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represent the government needs for federal lands, Indian rights or other national interests 
(Tarlock et al. 2002). These are called federal-interstate compacts (Grant 1991). Once 
ratified by Congress, they become both federal laws and contracts among signatory parties.  
States form compacts to allocate debt, establish an authority for the operation of an 
interstate port, clear jurisdictional questions, establish cooperative services, provide for the 
allocation and management of water resources and related projects, and the extradition of 
felons (Girardot 1989).  Interstate water compacts are formed for a variety of purposes 
besides water allocation, including storage, flood control, pollution control, and 
comprehensive planning and management.  Compacts have become the most common venue 
for transboundary water allocation between states, especially among western states. They 
have been used to allocate interstate waters twenty-two times by an agreed “equitable 
apportionment” between states that otherwise might have required Supreme Court 
adjudication.  In addition, four federal-interstate compacts have been signed for water 
allocation purposes.   
The advantage of compact water allocation lies in its legal and political characteristics 
that allow it to adapt to the unique needs of a particular basin and the regional philosophy of 
water appropriation.  They can also be used to create permanent administrative entities for 
the management of the compact or the region’s water resources as a whole.  Another great 
virtue of compacts is that they allow parties to allocate unappropriated water, thus making a 
“present appropriation for future use” which is crucial to long term water planning and 
management (Getches 1997).  Since judicial adjudication is bound by justifiable cause and 
harm, it cannot equitably apportion unused water (Grant 1991).  Also, the flexibility inherent 
in the opportunity to fashion the agreement encourages compromise between states and the 
creation of unconventional and creative solutions to the ever changing challenge of 
supplying water for the future.   
A Congressional authorization usually starts the process of negotiation among states 
pursuing an interstate water agreement. The states then appoint one or more representatives 
for the negotiations which are often assisted by a federal representative.  If an agreement is 
reached, the governor and legislature of each state must ratify the compact. The final step, as 
required by the Constitution, is Congressional approval by enactment of legislation.  As 
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compacts become federal law, they supersede state law and any law inconsistent with it must 
give way (Grant 1991). 
Table 3.1 presents a summary of the interstate and federal-interstate water 
apportionment compacts, the signatory states, and their major allocative and conflict 
resolution mechanisms.  Compacts that allocate water among signatory parties vary in their 
terms, from allocating storage to dividing the actual flow in the stream.  Flow can be 
apportioned by determining a percentage of the streamflow for each state (Table 3.2), 
requiring the delivery of a fixed quantity of water at a specific point on the stream (Table 
3.3), or some proportion determined from a hydrologic model (e.g. Pecos River) (Table 3.2).   
The allocation mechanisms adopted in these compacts determine the distribution of risks 
and losses in periods of low flows (Bennett and Howe 1998).  For instance, under the fixed 
allocation rule, an upper state is required to deliver a minimum quantity of water or to 
sustain a minimum flow rate to the downstream state, therefore absorbing the entire loss 
during droughts.  However, under a percentage allocation rule, states both on the upper and 
lower portions of the basin share the losses and gains during periods of low and high flows.  
Some states that follow the fixed allocation approach have avoided this risk inequality by 
adopting limited flow guarantees (e.g. South Platte River Compact). Instead of promising a 
given quantity of water no matter the circumstances, in the case of insufficient flows, the 
upstream state commits to implement specific actions to reduce consumption (McCormick 
1994).  In this way the upper state takes the initial risk of low supplies but beyond some 
critical point, the risk is shared.   
States following a proportion rate approach use hydrologic models as the basis of their 
allocation.  The end result is similar to the percentage allocation but the division of water 
obeys a schedule that varies with the streamflow instead of being a fixed percentage.  This 
proportion rates are specified in the compact and were determined from the modeling 
techniques available at the time of the compact formation.  The reasoning is that the states 
share the risks of dry years equally as it is represented in the model.  Even though it may 
appear that this methodology is more scientific and should be a better representation of the 
general hydrologic conditions than determining a quantity of water from mere observations, 
the reality is that models can be proved inadequate later and the method is not better than the 
model used and the available data (McCormick 1994).  This has been the case in both  
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Table 3.1. Summary of Water Allocation Compacts
Interstate 
Agreements States Year
Allocation 
Method
Administrative 
Agency 
Created?
Conflict 
Resolution 
Mechanism
Animas-La Plata 
Project Compact
New Mexico 
Colorado
1963 
1995
Equal Priority 
of demands - 
Not real 
allocation
No None
Arkansas River 
Compact
Arkansas 
Oklahoma 1970
Flow - 
Percentages Yes Arbitration
Arkansas River 
Compact
Colorado 
Kansas 1948
Flow -      
Fixed 
Quantities
Yes
Arbitration by 
federal 
representative
Arkansas River 
Compact
Kansas 
Oklahoma 1965
Storage  -  
Fixed 
Quantities
Yes None
Bear River Compact
Wyoming    
Idaho         
Utah
1978
Flow - 
Percentages    
Storage - Fixed 
Quantity
Yes Voting
Belle Forche River 
Compact
South Dakota 
Wyoming 1949
Flow -   
Percentages No None
Big Blue River 
Compact
Kansas 
Nebraska 1971
Flow -      
Fixed 
Quantities
Yes
None - Court 
Enforcement 
Encouraged
Canadian River 
Compact
New Mexico 
Texas 
Oklahoma
1950
Storage    
Fixed 
Quantities
Yes None
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Table 3.1. Continued
Interstate 
Agreements States Year
Allocation 
Method
Administrative 
Agency 
Created?
Conflict 
Resolution 
Mechanism
Colorado River 
Compact
Arizona 
California 
Nevada 
Colorado      
New Mexico    
Utah        
Wyoming
1922
Flow -        
Fixed 
Quantities
No Voting 
Costilla Creek 
Compact
Colorado     
New Mexico 1922
Unique 
allocation for 
irrigation rights
Yes None
Klamath River 
Compact
Oregon 
California 1957
Unique 
allocation - 
priorities by 
use when 
insufficient 
flow
Yes Arbitration
La Plata River 
Compact
Colorado      
New Mexico  1922
Flow - 
Percentage 
(below 
minimun flow)
No None
Pecos River 
Compact
New Mexico 
Texas 1948
Flow 
Percentages - 
based on model
Yes None
Red River Compact
Arkansas 
Lousiana 
Oklahoma 
Texas
1978
Flow - 
Percentages 
Storage -      
Percentages
Yes Voting
Republican River 
Compact
Colorado 
Kansas 
Nebraska
1942 Flow - Fixed Quantities No None
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Table 3.1. Continued
Interstate 
Agreements States Year
Allocation 
Method
Administrative 
Agency 
Created?
Conflict 
Resolution 
Mechanism
Rio Grande 
Compact
Colorado     
New Mexico 
Texas
1938
Flow 
Percentages - 
based on model
Yes None
Sabine River 
Compact
Lousiana     
Texas 1953
Flow - 
Percentages Yes Voting
Snake River 
Compact
Idaho     
Wyoming 1949
Flow -   
Percentages No Voting
South Platte River 
Compact
Colorado 
Nebraska 1923
Flow -       
Fixed Quantity 
(minimun flow 
at border)
No None
Upper Colorado 
Basin Compact
Arizona 
Colorado      
New Mexico   
Utah
1948
Flow - 
Percentages 
Storage -      
Fixed 
Quantities
Yes None
Upper Niobrara 
River Compact
Nebraska 
Wyoming  1962
Storage  -  
Fixed 
Quantities
No None
Yellowstone River 
Compact
Montana 
Wyoming      
North Dakota
1949 Flow -   Percentages No Voting
Delaware River 
Basin Compact* 
Delaware 
Pensylvania 
New Jersey 
New York
1961
Allocation by 
the 
Commission
Yes
Voting 
(Empowered 
Commision)
Susquehanna River 
Compact* 
Maryland     
New York 
Pennsylvania
1970
Allocation by 
the 
Commission
Yes
Voting 
(Empowered 
Commision)
*    Federal-interstate Compacts  
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Table 3.1. Continued
Interstate 
Agreements States Year
Allocation 
Method
Administrative 
Agency 
Created?
Conflict 
Resolution 
Mechanism
Appalachicola-
Chattahoochee-Flint 
River Basin 
Compact*
Alabama     
Florida     
Georgia
1997
Commision is 
to determine 
allocation 
formula
Yes
None - Court 
Enforcement 
Encouraged
Alabama-Coosa-
Tallapoosa River 
Basin Compact*
Alabama 
Georgia 1997
Commision is 
to determine 
allocation 
formula
Yes
None - Court 
Enforcement 
Encouraged
*    Federal-interstate Compacts  
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instances when the proportion model approach has been used (i.e. Pecos and Rio Grande 
River Compacts) and conflicts over compact compliance have prevailed among water 
sharing states.   In the case of the Pecos River, twelve years were spent interpreting the 
allocation formula specified in the compact that required New Mexico to deliver to Texas 
the same amount of water as in the 1947 river conditions.  
 This problem however, is not exclusive to proportional model compacts.  Water supplies 
estimates in compacts are often inaccurate.  For instance the Rio Colorado Compact is a 
fixed allocation compact that apportions 7,500,000 ac-ft/yr of water to the lower states of the 
basin (i.e. Arizona, California and Nevada).  It is now apparent that the annual flow estimate 
of 1922 of 16,000,000 ac-ft was too high and the mean annual flow is actually about 
13,500,000 ac-ft (Getches 1985). Nevertheless, upper basin states are obligated to deliver the 
amount specified in the compact even at the risk of having available far less water than 
originally expected. Other compacts present other unique water allocation mechanisms. For 
instance, the Costilla Creek Compact establishes priorities among irrigation ditches 
regardless of state lines. Also, the Klamath River Compact establishes a system of priorities 
according to type of use when flows are insufficient. 
Storage allocations in compacts are usually used to limit the amount of water that can be 
stored by the upstream state.  In these cases the downstream states assumes the risk of low 
water supply since it will only be entitled to whatever flow is left after the upstream state has 
refilled its storage.  Storage allocation compacts are usually used where the flow regime 
does not match consumption patterns so storage is needed to ensure that the upstream state 
will enjoy its share of the resource. 
Compacts implement and enforce water allocation following one of two basic 
approaches.  The first is a prescriptive approach that provides guidelines and delimits scopes 
of the arrangements to control the use of the water and the activities of the water 
management agencies.  In other words, the agreement itself becomes the enforcement 
mechanism to apportion the resource. The second approach is the establishment of an 
interstate commission or agency (Carriker 1985, Copas 1997).  About two thirds of all 
interstate water allocation compacts create compact commissions. These commissions are 
composed of representatives from the parties entered in the compact (i.e. states and/or the 
federal government).  Generally, the purpose of such commissions is to accumulate 
 39
information, facilitate communication, and negotiate during changing circumstances (Copas 
1997).   
There is a difference in power and structure among commissions created by interstate 
compacts and those created by federal-interstate compacts.  In the case of the former, water 
the functions of interstate compact commissions are usually more limited, basically because 
states have been reluctant to delegate their sovereign prerogatives to an entity they cannot 
fully control (Grant 1991).  On the other hand, federal-interstate compacts (e.g. Delaware 
and Susquehanna River Basin Compacts) have established commissions with extensive 
planning, regulatory, and enforcement powers.  
The Apalachicola-Chattahoochee-Flint and Alabama-Coosa-Tallapoosa River Basin 
Compacts are a very unique type of compact.  They both create commissions prior to the 
allocative agreement in order to provide for the necessary conditions for developing a water 
allocation formula among the compact signatory states.  In addition, the compacts mandate 
the commissions to gather the necessary data, resources and research for developing the 
formula and empower them to further enforce the management and administration of the 
basins water resources.  Allocative decisions however, required unanimous voting of the 
commission.  Nonetheless, after the states spent millions of dollars and repeatedly extended 
decision deadlines, the states were not able to reach or ratify any allocative agreement and 
the Apalachicola-Chattahoochee-Flint Compact expired on August, 2003.   
It is interesting to notice that the difference in power given to compact commissions 
occur in the context of the differences between eastern and western allocation philosophies.  
The authority given to the Delaware and Susquehanna River Commissions makes sense in 
the east with its urban areas and relative abundance of water.  In the west however, compacts 
were negotiated to ensure the state’s power over a scarce resource (McCormick 1994). 
Therefore, the nature of water rights in the west is defined in terms of property and any 
attempt to restrict vested rights beyond the state’s law could be interpreted as 
unconstitutional.  
Even in interstate basins with water allocation compacts in place, disputes are not 
uncommon.  The fact that compacts are consensual in nature presents a dilemma.  If the 
states cannot agree, there is no compact.  Therefore, conflict resolution is one of the major 
aspects of compact drafting, approval and enforcement.  At any point, a state may claim that 
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another compact sharing state is failing to comply with the compact specifications, or may 
disagree on how the language used in the compact is construed.  Disputes among signatory 
parties can be brought to the Supreme Court for resolution, but as previously discussed; this 
process is usually lengthy and very expensive.  For this reason, some compacts define 
methodologies for conflict resolution.  If a commission has been established by the compact, 
it is usually the first forum for resolving disputes.  If there is no commission, other state 
water officials can be involved in conflict discussion, but the process lacks formal structure. 
The most common mechanisms for conflict resolution are voting and arbitration 
(McCormick 1994, Grant 1991).   
Voting can occur among commission members or, in the case of no commission, among 
state officials in order to use a majority criterion to reach a decision.  This however, is a 
major drawback when there are only two signatory parties or when unanimity is required.  
Several compacts have non-voting federal representatives and some of those allow these 
members to vote when a tie needs to be broken (e.g. Yellowstone and Snake River 
Compacts).  In reality only the Delaware River Basin Compact gives its commission enough 
power to make and enforce independent decisions through voting when conflicts arise.  This 
commission has the power to allocate the waters of the basin among the signatory states in 
accordance with the Supreme Court’s doctrine of equitable apportionment and impose penal 
sanctions to compact violators (Muys 2003, Copas 1997).  This is not the case in most 
compacts where the states have retained the power of veto in conflicts concerning allocation.  
Due to the political nature of the process and the long tradition of distrust regarding matters 
of water (especially among western states), the voting mechanism is usually ineffective for 
resolving major disputes (McCormick 1994). 
Traditionally, the only alternative to voting has been Supreme Court litigation.  
However, in recent years arbitration has become a popular alternative for conflict resolution.  
Arbitration is similar to litigation in that a neutral party serves as a decision-maker once 
sufficient evidence of facts and law has been presented.  The attractiveness of arbitration is 
that arbitrators can be selected based on their knowledge on the subject and therefore their 
decision should be better than that of a judge with no experience in the field.  It is also 
believed that the process is less expensive and faster than litigation (Girardot 1989). 
However, some critics argue that even though arbitration is a reasonable alternative to the 
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problem, arbitration of water compact disputes are as expensive as legal litigation and that 
arbitrators are sometimes perceived to be more concerned with reaching a settlement than 
enforcing the legal rights of the parties (McCormick 1994).  As a result, Supreme Court 
litigation still appears to be the preferred mechanism for the definite resolution of conflict 
over compact allocation.  This situation stresses the importance of language and 
methodology clarity in compact scripting in order to avoid future conflict.  It has been 
argued that some compacts have only been ratified by the involved parties because difficult 
points have been deliberately defined ambiguously in order to reach a faster agreement 
(Tarlock et al. 2002). 
Conflict may also occur between federal water development projects and non-federal 
projects operating under state law.  Moreover, most compacts were created and ratified prior 
to major federal environmental legislations such as the Clean Water Act and the Endangered 
Species Act and are environmentally outdated.  Therefore, it is inevitable that disputes 
between federal and non-federal water uses will continue to arise under many compacts 
(Muys 2003).  The Constitution states that in the case of irreconcilable conflict between 
federal and state law, federal law must prevail.  Therefore, in order for a compact to be 
comprehensive it should encompass federal water rights.   
Approximately half of interstate water compacts provide allocations for federal uses and 
it is likely that the others would be so interpreted (Muys 2003).  Even though most compacts 
include this recognition of federal water rights, most of them do not include the federal 
government as a signatory party.   For this reason federal-interstate compacts such as the 
Delaware River Basin Compact of 1961, by having the federal government as a signatory 
party, had made provisions for a regional approach linking federal and state planning and 
imposing significant constraints on both the state and federal government.  Based on the 
experience in the Delaware River Basin, the National Water Commission (1973) 
recommended the federal-interstate compact approach as the preferred institutional strategy 
for water resources planning and management in multi-state water sharing regions. 
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CHAPTER IV 
 
INTRASTATE WATER ALLOCATION SYSTEMS 
 
The water resources stored in rivers, lakes and other reservoirs must be shared by a 
multitude of uses and users.  As water use increases and water allocation systems (WAS) 
evolve, rules are also developed to govern the sharing of the limited resource.  These rules 
are defined within the WAS to determine who has the right to use the available water and in 
what priority, in order to protect existing users and accommodate new ones.  The core 
principle is to codify arrangements that maximize the efficient use of water.  These rules, 
however, do not occur in a vacuum nor are created by a solitary act of governmental will.  
They are the result of an evolutionary process of judicial rule-making (i.e. court decisions), 
also known as “common law”, and legislative action.  The cumulative product of this legal 
process and the statutory and administrative arrangements that define water rights are known 
as water rights systems. 
 
4.1 WATER RIGHT SYSTEMS 
In the United States (US), water rights systems (WRS) have been created to administer 
and regulate the use of water.  WRS define the terms and conditions that must be met in 
order to claim the legal right to use water.  There is no national WRS in the US.  Instead, 
each state has its own approach and set of rules for recognizing legal water rights.  In the 
case of surface water rights, two principal doctrines demarcate the legal boundaries in which 
WRS operate. These legal doctrines are riparianism and prior appropriation.  Traditionally, 
western states have followed variations of the prior appropriation doctrine while eastern 
states have applied rules from the riparian doctrine in their regulatory systems.  Some states 
use other variations referred to as hybrid or dual WRS, as they combine elements from both 
doctrines. 
 
4.2 RIPARIAN RIGHTS 
The core principle of the riparian doctrine is that only the owners of lands abutting a 
watercourse are entitled to use the water.  The rights of a riparian owner include: access to 
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the water, wharfing or building piers into the water, use of the water, consumption of the 
water, and acquisition of accretions and ownership of the subsoil of non-navigational 
streams.  The riparian owner has the right to ingress or egress his/her land by the way of the 
water and to build wharfs to ensure that right.  A riparian right also includes the entitlement 
to consumptive and non-consumptive uses of water.  Consumptive water uses include animal 
husbandry, extraction of minerals, industrial processing, intensive recreation (i.e. 
overcrowding and polluting), irrigation, municipal or private owned water systems, as well 
as any other use with social or economic value.  Non-consumptive uses are those that do not 
significantly alter the quantity or quality of water.  Among the most common non-
consumptive uses recognized by law, are navigation, fishing, hunting, and swimming 
(Dellapenna 1991c).  In order to ensure access to water, the riparian owner can claim 
ownership over any alluvium that accrues to his/her land.  Finally, although with some state 
variations, a riparian permit holder may claim ownership over the stream’s bed and 
sedentary shellfish.  In the case of navigational waters, access to the subsoil is a public right 
and thus property is effectively subject to provide easement for public use (Tarlock et al. 
2002).  A riparian proprietor also has the rights to fish, to have water remain unpolluted, and 
to protect its banks from erosion (Getches 1997).   
A riparian owner can impound water only if the reasonable uses of other riparians are 
not impaired.  Accordingly, releases from the storage facility should be done in such a way 
that the flow of the stream is not unreasonably altered.  Since the riparian doctrine developed 
in the more humid regions of the country, rainfall and streamflows were usually sufficient to 
supply nearly all human needs.  The riparian “common-law” recognized the right of a 
riparian owner to have access to an undiminished streamflow, but strictly for domestic 
purposes. As population and demands for water increased, this limitation on water use was 
dimmed unreasonable and the doctrine came to be divided into two theories: natural flow 
and reasonable use. 
 
4.2.1 Natural Flow and Reasonable Use Theories 
The natural flow theory establishes that riparian owners can use as much water as 
needed for domestic uses (i.e. household, livestock, gardening, etc.) while keeping the 
bordering stream or lake at normal levels.  When dealing with other uses that are necessary 
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for the advancement of civilization such as manufacturing, irrigation, and the like, a strict 
adherence to the natural flow theory does not seem appropriate.  Consequently, the courts 
developed the concept of reasonable use.  The basis for this theory is that maintaining the 
normal levels of lakes and streams is not justifiable when the water may be used for 
beneficial purposes that would result in greater benefits without causing unreasonable 
damages to other riparians.  In other words, the limits of an individual water right are 
determined by the impact of the water use on others and do not necessarily prohibit a 
reduction in streamflow (Carriker 1985).   
There is, however, a preference for “natural” uses over other uses which the courts 
referred to as “artificial”. The term “natural” was first used for referring to domestic uses 
and “artificial” for those uses that produce comfort and prosperity (e.g. irrigation, 
manufacturing, mining, etc.).  As explained above, natural uses would be subject to the 
natural flow theory and artificial uses to reasonable use.  However, reasonable use also 
reflects a preference for “artificial” uses that have a more “natural” definition as is the case 
of agriculture (Getches 1997; Dellapenna 1991c; Tarlock et al. 2002).  For example, in some 
states, permits required for other riparian uses are not required for agricultural uses (e.g. 
Kentucky and Wisconsin). 
In the riparian common law, the concept of reasonable use does not have a precise 
definition.  It is a criterion for decision which is strictly relational, and the court usually uses 
it to decide whether one use is “more reasonable” than a competing or interfering use.  
Several riparian statutes use terms such as “equitable portion” or “reasonable-beneficial use” 
but those terms are usually defined in similar terms as the more traditional definition of 
reasonable use (ASCE 1997). The factors that are used to determine the reasonableness of a 
water use depend on the interests of the riparian owner, other riparians that could be 
affected, and the general public.  Some of the factors that may be taken into consideration as 
stated in the Restatement (Second) of Torts (1979) are: purpose of use, suitability of the use 
to the watercourse, social and economic value of the use, extent and amount of the harm 
caused, and protection of existing users and uses.  Nevertheless, and despite the endorsement 
given by the Restatement (Second), temporal priority does not appear to be a relevant factor 
in determining reasonableness (Davis 1982). 
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Reasonable use gives flexibility in the face of changing conditions of water use and 
supply by considering the social and economic value of the use.   Once a right is granted it 
also provides certain degree of protection from unreasonable uses of water.  However, some 
complexities arise due to a lack of specificity and its dependency to objectivity.  Some 
critics point to the fact that the system restricts the use of the water to riparian owners and 
uses, ignoring the possibility that better use may be made at other places by riparian and 
non-riparian owners (Carriker 1985; Tarlock et al. 2002). Another criticism of this theory is 
concerned with the uncertainty that arises from the process of defining reasonable use for 
non-domestic purposes.  Since the needs of other riparian users have to be considered in 
order to determine the reasonability of a use, when a riparian desires to commence or 
enlarge its water use, even riparians with long nonuse of their rights could cause the new use 
to be considered unreasonable with respect to their rights.  This situation creates a need for 
litigation in order to establish a riparian’s entitlement to use water. Litigation adds further 
complications since courts have been incapable of applying the law uniformly as their 
decisions vary in a case-by-case fashion.  This situation may discourage development 
because industries may refuse to locate in an area for fear of having their water rights 
diminish or curtailed for some unforeseen reason.  Riparianism also lacks an effective 
method to deal with water shortages.  Even though it is based on equity, it does not provide a 
method to determine how much a riparian user should reduce his/her water use. 
 
4.2.2 Transfer and Loss of Riparian Rights 
Given the fact that property is the basic paradigm of riparian common law, one must 
expect that riparian water rights are not transferable apart from the land to which those rights 
are attached.  However, there is no reason to believe that the economically most productive 
use of water will always be exclusive to those lands contiguous to waterbodies.  Almost 
every riparian state has accepted at least some kind of transferring of riparian rights to non-
riparian areas.  Most courts, however, have not recognized full transferability; instead they 
have developed complex rules that vary from state to state.  The most common means by 
which riparian rights can be transferred are: conveyance, condemnation, and prescription 
(Dellapenna 1991c). 
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Conveyances are deeds to riparian lands that deal with the transfer of the riparian rights.  
Rights can be transferred by selling or leasing the entire or a portion of the riparian land. 
Also, the right to use the water may be expressly reserved by a riparian landowner in 
conveying part of a riparian parcel to another (Getches 1997).  If the rights are severed from 
the land by conveyance and granted to someone else, no subsequent owner of the land 
should have the right to use the water other than for domestic uses.  However, the extent to 
which conveyances can be used to transfer water rights to non-riparian users varies from 
state to state and is usually ambiguous (Dellapenna 1991c).  Since a conveyance binds the 
grantor to the grantee and not the grantee to the rest of the riparian owners, it is very 
problematic to define the extent of such rights, especially for consumptive uses of water.   
Under the riparian theory, municipal water supply systems have no special right to use 
the water.  However, public water supply authorities do have the right to condemn (claim) 
water for the public common good.  Most states have statutes that give authority to condemn 
water rights or even property rights of a riparian land for this purpose even when neither 
municipal water use constitute a riparian use nor conveyance of water to non-riparian land is 
accepted (Peck and Weatherby 1994).   
Prescription is a means by which a water right can be either gained by an upstream 
claimant or lost by the current downstream holder. Similar to the adverse possession laws, a 
prescriptive right can be gained if: (1) the claimant has been in continuous, open, and 
notorious use of a water body for a prescribed time period, and (2) the claimant’s use of 
water actually deprives the downstream user of water to which he/she is entitled over the 
specified time (Tarlock et al. 2002). This type of right, however, cannot be obtained if the 
downstream user files a complaint before the prescribed time has elapsed. 
Given the fact that the right to use water in a riparian system is attached to the ownership 
of land, it cannot be lost through simple non-use.  Since use does not create the right, disuse 
cannot suspend it.  Even in the case of conveyance or grant of riparian rights, the riparian 
land owner can still have the right to use water if there remains enough water for both users.  
Therefore, as long as a person owns riparian land he/she has the right to use water 
indiscriminately for domestic uses and/or invoke reasonable use for other non-natural uses 
(Dellapenna 1991c). 
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4.3 REGULATED RIPARIAN RIGHTS SYSTEMS 
For many years the riparian common law was able to satisfy the water demands of the 
eastern states.  But recent decades have seen increasingly frequent and severe water 
shortages due to recurring droughts and increasing demands.  Analysts of the situation of 
riparian states have concluded that the application of pure riparian rights creates 
uncertainties and confusion as to impede the settlements of problems arising during water 
shortages (Carriker 1985; Dellapenna 1985; Tarlock et al. 2002).  Given the limitations of 
pure riparian rights, about half of the states east of Kansas City have developed new 
regulatory permit systems based on some riparian principles. These new systems are seen by 
some analysts as minor modifications to riparian common law and by others as an intent to 
follow appropriation.  However, as recognized by most specialists in the field, it is a 
fundamentally different approach to water law (Dellapenna 1994a; Davis 1982; ASCE 1997). 
The transition from pure riparianism to regulation started in the 1950s by legislative 
statutes that created permit requirements and administrative structures.  To date, 16 of the 30 
original riparian states have comprehensive regulatory statutes for their water allocation 
(Iowa, Maryland, Wisconsin, Delaware, New Jersey, Kentucky, Florida, Minnesota, North 
Carolina, Georgia, New York, Connecticut, Arkansas, Massachusetts, Mississippi, Virginia, 
and Alabama).  The purposes of the statutes include: conserving water, promoting beneficial 
and/or efficient use, assuring consistency of the use with the public interest, establishing 
comprehensive planning, preserving minimum streamflows, promoting flood control, and 
allocating water during shortages (Dellapenna 1991b). 
Possibly the most significant innovation under the regulated riparianism is the 
requirement of a permit from an administrative agency in order to be entitled to use the 
water.  Some states exclude some uses from having to apply for a permit leaving conflicts 
with those uses to be resolved in court much like traditional riparian rights.  For example, 
Arkansas requires permits only for the building of dams and diversion of surplus water.  
Other uses are just required to be registered.  Only in the case of a water shortage the 
administrative agency will determine priorities in a systematic way.  In the states were uses 
are regulated by permits, the rights of competing users are determined by the terms of the 
permits and not by the riparian characteristics of the use or by judicial action. 
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Regulated riparianism has some similarities with the original riparian system.  For 
instance, permit applications are judged according to some criteria of reasonable use.  The 
concept of reasonable use, however, is applied differently.  The major concern of the 
administrative agency is that the intended use is in accordance with the state’s general water 
policy and other permitted uses.  Uses in non-riparian lands are not considered unreasonable.  
Also, permits can be made subject to public values such as instream needs and preferences 
for certain types of use.  Permits are also issued for a determined period of time so when the 
period expires the reasonability of the use can be reexamined (Maloney et al. 1972).  
Transferability of permits is also encouraged during the validity period. 
Even though in practice most regulatory states do not discriminate against non-riparian 
users, it is surprising to see how few of their regulating statutes address this subject 
explicitly.  Some states like Florida provide for permits to divert water even beyond the 
watershed boundaries, while others only allow diversions to non-riparian lands within the 
same basin.   
Almost all regulatory states have preferences for different types of uses and they even 
exempt some uses from the permit requirement.  Although such exemptions are usually 
reserved for domestic purposes, many states also exempt small scale agricultural uses or 
diversions withdrawing less than some specific amount of water per day (ASCE 1997).  
Most states have priority schemes for uses that apply either when the permit is issued or at 
times of water shortages.  In general, regulatory systems give higher priority to direct human 
consumption, then agriculture, and then other uses (e.g. Maryland).  Other states like 
Arkansas adopted schemes that prioritized minimum streamflows over non-domestic uses.  
The reason for these preferences is rarely questioned.  Other than subsidizing some 
economic activities they also follow some social or political compromise or to reduce 
administrative costs.  In the case of permit exemptions for non-domestic uses such as 
agriculture, even if they are small scale activities, cumulatively these exemptions can 
amount to large quantities of water.  This practice however, is contrary to the purpose of 
using water efficiently and makes coping with water scarcity a much difficult task 
(Dellapenna 1991b). 
Another advancement of regulatory systems is the creation of administrative state 
agencies for the management and enforcement of the permits systems.  In addition, the 
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agencies are responsible for supervising and promoting the development and conservation of 
the state’s water resources.  Most states have chosen to delegate these functions to an 
already existing or purposely created centralized statewide agency.  Only Florida has chosen 
to delegate the power and responsibilities of administering the regulated system to five 
regional water management districts (Dzurik 1996). As opposed to traditional riparianism 
where decisions of reasonableness are decided by judicial decree, during the permit granting 
process the reasonableness of the use is determined by the agencies’ interpretation of the 
legislative statute.  Although the most important terms of the permits are set by legislation, 
other terms are devised by the agencies.  Some of those terms can include: monitoring and 
recording requirements, protection of minimum flows, rate of flow of diversion, total 
quantity to be diverted (i.e. size of the permit), place of the diversion, and other conservation 
measures (ASCE 1997).   
The agencies also have the responsibility to supervise and enforce the terms of the 
permits.  When a user is found to be in noncompliance with the terms of his/her permit or a 
false statement is found in the application for a permit, formal penalties are needed to ensure 
the success of the system.  Some of the most common enforcement measures authorized in 
the statutes are: civil penalties, criminal fines, suspension or revocation of the permit, cease 
and desist orders, administrative fines, civil liabilities, and imprisonment (Dellapenna 1997). 
Dellapenna (1997) recognized that the question is not whether regulated riparianism in 
an ideal system, but rather if it is a better alternative.  In traditional riparianism, the decision 
as to how water will be used lies in the hands of the actual users, and if conflicts emerge, 
they would resort to judicial action.  In the case of regulatory systems, the state bestows the 
decision making power to a public agency.  A major driving force behind the creation of 
these types of agencies is the long-term protection of the resource since through regulation, 
depletion of the natural resource may be avoided. Without regulation, users do not feel the 
need to use the resource in a wisely manner that would secure long-term use.  Instead, the 
mindset is to obtain the greatest benefit at the present time.  Another advantage of the 
regulatory riparian scheme is that permits can provide some security in the case of 
investments.  Once a permit is granted, the right to use the water has been recognized and 
cannot be curtailed save for cases of water shortage, noncompliance or termination of the 
permit’s period of validity.  In riparian law there is no such security since a water user is 
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always at risk of having his/her water right scrutinized and modified, and even deemed 
unreasonable in relation to other uses.  If anything else, regulation of riparianism has 
strengthened the concept of water as a public resource while reducing the recognition of 
private property rights in water (i.e. abolition of unused water rights, time-limited permits, 
authority of administrative agency, etc.) (Cox 1994).  Finally, since one of the purposes of 
regulatory agencies is to provide comprehensive planning, problems can be approached in a 
proactive manner, instead of the reactive nature of solving disputes in court. 
The administrative approach of regulated riparianism has substantial economic and 
socio-political costs.  Economic costs include salary for staff, monitoring, enforcement, and 
potential litigation among others.  These costs are sometimes reduced by exempting minor 
uses from the permit requirements.  However, as explained above, minor uses may represent 
large quantities of water and exempting them may have a major impact in the effectiveness 
of the administrative system in managing the resource.  Therefore, care should be taken in 
the evaluation of the tradeoffs between supervision costs and unregulated uses.   
Poor management decisions represent a different type of cost that is more difficult to 
assess.  If economic criteria are used to assess decisions, then those uses that result in greater 
economic benefits are favored.  However, this does not necessarily mean that the favored 
alternative is the most socially responsible decision.  In addition, the bureaucratic and 
political nature of the process raises questions regarding the integrity of the process.  
Nevertheless, the system has seemed to work fairly well in responding to serious water 
shortages in several of the eastern states (Iowa Natural Resource Council 1978; Ausness 
1983). 
 
4.3.1 Allocating Water to Permit Rights 
Once a right is considered reasonable, the observed natural supplies (e.g. flow, storage) 
are used to define the water allocation.  Each regulated riparian system has its own 
methodology for determining how much water is available for allocation but they usually 
follow the simple equation: 
 
Qavailable=  Streamflow – Min streamflow standard   (Eq. 4.1) 
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The local available streamflow (Qavailable) is determined by the measured streamflow 
minus the portion of flow required for ensuring a minimum flow (Min streamflow standard) (Eheart 
2002).  Also, the incoming streamflow available for withdrawal at the spot is further reduced 
by the streamflow required by downstream users.  The pass-by flow is determined based on 
the number of users downstream, their priorities, and their likelihood of being adequately 
supplied by other tributaries (Eheart 2002). 
Individual water permits can be defined using different allocation methodologies.  For 
instance, the fixed flow method assigns each user a constant withdrawal rate limited by the 
minimum streamflow standard.  The assigned rates vary from user to user and are usually 
dependent on the calendar time and stream conditions.  A drawback of this method is that it 
does not tell the user how his/her withdrawal rate should be reduced during droughts thus 
giving upstream users some unfair advantage.   
Another allocation technique is prioritization.  As water permits are granted, priorities 
can be assigned according to type of use, economic benefit or any other criteria.  Any given 
user can withdraw water as long as all other users’ withdrawals with higher priorities and the 
minimum flow standard have already been satisfied.  When flows are insufficient, users 
forego withdrawals according to their priorities.  Problems with this approach arise in areas 
of high usage of water where setting a priority criteria and establishing sizes of permits and 
operational rules is practically impossible (Dellapenna 1997).  Furthermore, in humid areas 
it would be extremely difficult to establish priorities among users who may have been 
sharing the same stream for many generations.   
Perhaps the allocative method most consistent with traditional riparianism is the flexible 
permit system.  In this approach, the user’s allowable withdrawal increases or decreases 
continuously with the available streamflow.  The allotted withdrawal is a fraction of the 
available streamflow and it fluctuates in proportion with it.  Since it is based in homogeneity 
no permit has priority over any other and during scarce water periods no user is entirely 
deprived of water.  This scheme, even though it appears fair, may not be economically 
efficient since equally reduced amounts of water do not necessarily mean equally distributed 
losses.  Also, this method can allocate more water than needed during high flows, which 
could be seen as an encouragement to waste water that could be used for new users (Eheart 
2002). Thus, this method should also include a maximum withdrawal limit to avoid abuse. 
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The most important aspect of permit allocation is how to determine the size or total 
amount of the permit.  The permit allocation can involve determining a maximum 
withdrawal, a withdrawal ratio, or both.  According to the more traditional riparian practices, 
the size of the permit is determined by the riparian “need” as requested by the riparian and 
compared to the “needs” of the other right holders.  In more regulated riparian systems, 
instream flow uses are also considered as valid uses of water or as minimum flows to be 
protected from withdrawal (Cox 1994).  Historical uses may also be evaluated as well other 
political considerations.   
The riparian size method determines the size of the allocation based on the “size” of the 
riparian land.  The essential principle is that the right to use the water is intertwined with the 
value of the riparian land.  Usually under this method the size of the allocation is 
proportional to the length of the riparian water front owned by the water right holder.  
Although this methodology may seem appropriate for agricultural purposes, it is not so for 
other types of operations where the size of the land has no relation with the economic 
implications of the use.   
Conversely, the operational size method defines the allocation accordingly to the 
operational size of the user. For instance, for municipal uses the size would be determined 
by the population and for industrial uses the allocation size can be proportional to some 
measure of the products.  The historical use method sizes allocations in accordance with the 
historical water consumption of the user or the type of use.  However, care must be 
exercised to prevent ineffective usage of water when seniority is used for the sole purpose of 
securing a larger allocation.   
Other methodologies are ad hoc, following no particular allocative criteria.  The 
allocations are made in a case-by-case basis according to the judgment of an agency, 
council, or other specially appointed administrative body.  Although this approach is more 
flexible than the other alternatives, it presents the potential for unfair decisions based on 
political and personal interests (Eheart 2002). 
When storage is available for enhancement of the water supply there are two options to 
incorporate these benefits into the WRS.  First, the agency can assign or sell a fixed or 
seasonally varying rate that, by been dependent on storage releases from a reservoir, will 
have a higher reliability than the natural flow.  Otherwise, the agency can assign or sell a 
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portion of the storage to users, each of whom will operate his/her portion as a small 
reservoir.  A water permit will be required to refill the right holder’s portion of the reservoir.  
When an entire reservoir is owned by an individual user, precautions must be taken, much 
like reasonableness, to avoid entire stream segment from been depleted by the reservoir 
(Eheart 2002). 
 
4.3.2 Duration of Permit Rights 
Another important aspect of regulated riparian systems is the duration or period of 
validity of the water right.  Most regulated systems establish time limits for their permits.  
Determining an optimal period of validity for a water right is a difficult task.  Short permit 
durations discourage economic growth because the riparian water holder may not have 
sufficient time to recover his/her investment.  On the other hand, long permit durations make 
accommodating new users and uses more difficult and may further complicate management 
during drought periods (Eheart 2002). 
In essence, the challenge is finding an appropriate period of time that would enable 
water right holders to accomplish their goals while preventing earliest users from 
monopolizing water usage.  Yet, prior literature shows that states do not follow a particular 
methodology for establishing permit durations as it is mostly an arbitrary exercise.  For 
instance, four states have issued perpetual water rights (New York, Delaware, Virginia, and 
Kentucky), but for the most part states grant permits of 50 years or less.  Florida grants 
permits for 20 and 50 years to private and public entities, respectively.  These durations were 
adopted from the Maloney, Ausness, and Morris Model Code, which assumed, with little 
evidence, that these periods would be appropriate (Maloney et al. 1972; Dellapenna 1997).  
Mississippi established a 10 year expiration period, but it also provides the possibility of an 
unspecified longer period for public entities.  Other states like Maryland and Wisconsin have 
permit durations of only 3 years and even yearly reviews that could result in permit 
modification or cancellation.  The statutes of Connecticut, Massachusetts, New Jersey and 
Minnesota do not specify permit durations, instead administrative agencies determine the 
duration of each permit, and in Minnesota the agency can also cancel a permit for the 
protection of public interest. 
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4.3.3 Transferability of Permit Rights 
In recent years, most regulated states have allowed voluntary transfers of water permits 
either on a permanent or a temporary basis.  These provisions are based on market principles 
and have been referred to as permits trading or water rights markets.  The basic principle is 
that greater economic efficiency accrues if permit trading is allowed (Wong and Eheart 
1983; Wollmuth and Eheart 2000).  Even though this type of trading is structured to operate 
with minimal supervision, the water rights administrative agency should always be the final 
referee in any permit transfer and should have the authority to disapprove any particular 
trade (ASCE 2002). 
It is understood that voluntary transfers can allow water to go from low-value uses to 
high-value ones.  In addition, water rights transfers can also provide incentives for efficient 
water use and conservation.  As a result, market-based programs have been wildly accepted 
as incentives for environmental protection (U.S. Congress 1988; Stavins 1989).  
Nonetheless, even where markets are allowed they have not been widely used usually 
because potential traders have chosen not to trade (ASCE 2002).  In cases were the 
administrative agency gets more involved in promoting water markets, water right holders 
have been more comfortable and willing to participate and the outcome have been quite 
productive (Eheart 2002).  However, allowing water transfers means relinquishing some 
control over the location of withdrawal points which could result in having points on the 
stream where water is being heavily diverted.  This can negatively impact water users not 
involved in the trading.  It is therefore encouraged that the agency undertakes simulation 
exercises of possible trading scenarios beforehand in order to assess the effects of water 
market trading on the aquatic environment and on other water right holders (ASCE 2002). 
 
4.4 PRIOR APPROPRIATION RIGHTS 
The prior appropriation doctrine was developed to serve the practical demands of the 
19th century’s westward expansion in the US.  The previously established riparian system 
did not allowed to transport water from the stream to other locations outside the abutting 
lands.  As a result, a statutory system developed where water rights were granted according 
to the time a person applies a particular quantity of water to a beneficial use (Getches 1997).  
The date of appropriation determines the right’s priority.  If water is insufficient to meet all 
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needs, earlier users (senior appropriators) will obtain all their allotted water while those who 
appropriated later (junior appropriators) may see their allotment diminished or cut off 
completely. 
Water in western states is considered a public resource, not a private commodity.  The 
government uses its power to regulate the uses of water in order to allocate and conserve the 
resource for the benefit of its citizens.  Only those who apply water to a beneficial use can 
claim the right to use it.  The property where the water is applied to beneficial use does not 
need to be adjacent to the natural source and in most states is not even required to be within 
the same basin. 
The traditional elements for claiming the right to use water under an appropriative 
system are: the intent to apply water to a beneficial use, an actual diversion of water from a 
natural source, and the application of the water to a beneficial use within a reasonable time 
(Getches 1997).  One who diverts water for flood control is not an appropriator since the 
diversion was not made with the intent to be applied for any use.  Therefore intent has to be 
proved for a permit application.  In Colorado, where no permits are required, proof of intent 
is necessary for claiming an appropriative date.  Some states require water to be physically 
diverted in order to have an appropriation, but others recognize not-diverting uses as valid 
appropriations.  Some methods for diverting water are: dams, reservoir, canals, ditches, 
flumes, pipes, pumps, and even water wheels (Getches 1997).  In states where a physical 
diversion from the stream is not required appropriation can be recognized if intent to 
appropriate to a beneficial use, notice to others, and actual application to beneficial use are 
clearly established.  When a right is granted states usually give a maximum time period, 
usually five years, for the construction of any diverting facility and the application of water 
to beneficial use. Otherwise the appropriative date (i.e. priority) can be lost. 
The most important step in perfecting or acquiring an appropriation is applying the water 
to a beneficial use.  The concept of beneficial use emerged from the desire to protect the 
resource from being wasted.  Water uses that are considered beneficial are determined by 
state statute and vary from state to state.  However, just because a use is listed as beneficial 
does not mean it will be deemed beneficial under all circumstances as the concept of 
beneficial use is continually refined through the judicial process (Beck et al. 1991a).  
Historically, the range of beneficial uses was limited to the more traditional consumptive 
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uses. For instance, all prior appropriation states consider domestic, agricultural, municipal, 
and industrial uses to be beneficial.  Other consumptive uses specified as beneficial on state 
laws are stock-watering and mining.  Almost all states have now accepted some non-
consumptive uses such as recreation and aesthetics as beneficial.   
In addition of being used to define the right to use water, beneficial use is used to 
establish the amount of water an appropriator is entitled.  The amount of water that can be 
taken is limited to the amount that is actually required for optimum beneficial use (Getches 
1997).  For example, the quantity of water required to irrigate a field should not include the 
portion required to compensate for losses due to inefficient water conveyance and/or 
inadequate technology. 
Following the 1960s, major concerns regarding environmental issues such as water 
quality and ecosystems preservation became a driving force in policy.  Kansas was the first 
state to amend its appropriation statute to accommodate for instream flow requirements in 
the 1980s.  Since then, other nine states (Alaska, Colorado, Idaho, Montana, Nebraska, 
Oregon, Utah, Washington, and Wyoming) have also provided statute protection for 
minimum instream flows.  Arizona, Nevada, and Texas have recognized instream uses as 
beneficial and now allow appropriations for recreation and wildlife and consider 
environmental impacts on flow reduction when issuing permits.  However, the efficacy of 
these efforts in a prior appropriation system is often questioned since they appeared to have 
come too late.  For instance, legislation for allowing appropriation for instream flow uses in 
the mid 1980s in Texas came after most of the state’s waters were already appropriated and 
little water remained for environmental flows (Kaiser 2004).  Therefore, the question is not 
whether instream needs are recognized within the permit system but how secure a minimum 
streamflow or instream use right is under a particular state’s regime (Beck et al. 1991b). 
 
4.4.1 Allocating Water to Permit Rights 
All prior appropriation states have statutory systems to allocate water and all of them, 
except Colorado, have detailed administrative procedures for implementing the water 
allocation function of the doctrine (Carriker 1985; Tarlock et al. 2002).   Only Colorado 
relies on the judicial system charged with administrative powers instead of an agency to deal 
with the details of water allocation (Goplerud 1991a, Getches 1997).  Before the institution 
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of these agencies water was allocated by the users and disputes were resolved by 
adjudication in court.  The purpose of these administrative systems is to provide a 
methodology for allocating the resource and to regulate water rights.  These are usually state 
agencies or water control boards with mixed executive and judicial powers to adjudicate water 
rights.  However, their decisions are always subject to judicial review by the state’s court. 
The permit is usually the only method to acquire an appropriative right (except in 
Colorado).  A permit can be obtained by filing an application to the administrative agency.  
Most permit systems will approve the permit if the applicant follows all the prescribed 
procedures, the state engineer determines that unappropriated water is available, and the 
appropriation is not detrimental to the public welfare.  Following the filing of an application 
a notice of the filing is published and a hearing is appointed to properly address any 
objections to the allocation.  If all the requirements are met, the time of the application filing 
will become the priority date and a permit is issued.  A permit is not a water right until all 
conditions on how the water right is to be exercised are met.  These conditions must be met 
within a sensible time frame for the permit to retain its validity.   
For most permits to be approved the agency most evaluate if: water will be applied to 
beneficial use, unappropriated water is available, no harm will be done to prior 
appropriators, the means of diversion are adequate, and the proposed use is not contrary to 
the public interest.  In addition, some states also require evidence of the financial ability of 
the applicant to complete the proposed work (Getches 1997).   
The requirement of available unappropriated water is handled differently as some states 
are stricter than other in preventing overappropriation. On many streams water diversions far 
exceed the available streamflow. This occurs when junior rights downstream are dependant 
on return flows from upstream seniors or when junior rights are only entitled to use water 
during periods of high flows or low senior usage. Overappropriation is a sensitive subject in 
the arid west and proving that there is no unappropriated water is a demanding task.  
Historically, when courts were confronted with doubts regarding the estimates of water 
availability, they typically decide in favor of appropriation.  However, as demands increase and 
most streams are already overappropriated this approach is considered inefficient and 
administrative agencies tend to deny the permits in such cases (Goplerud 1991a). 
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The concept of public interest or public trust is very important during all phases of the 
permit process.  Public interest is not only considered when dealing with matters that may be 
a menace to public health, but also to protect planned uses or development of the resource.  
It can also be used to establish preferred uses of water.  This is not to be confused with 
priority.  Priority is related to the chronological order of water acquisition, while preferred 
uses refer to the relative value of a particular use that is considered during the evaluation 
period.  In some cases, granted permits have been revoked when courts have found that the 
administrative agency did not responsibly consider the effects of the permits on the public 
interest (National Audubon Society V. Superior Court 1983).  If an applicant is granted a 
permit, meets all institutional requirements, carry out any construction works needed for the 
diversion, and applies the water to beneficial use within a reasonable time, his/her water 
right is perfected and vested.  When a right is perfected a license or certificate of 
appropriation is issued much like a deed that defines the extent of a property right to use 
water. 
The administrative agency also enforces the conditions of the established rights based on 
the priority order of the appropriators.  In most states, the overall supervision of the system 
is the responsibility of the state engineer.  Different states have different hierarchies of 
enforcement divisions (Goplerud 1991a).  A commissioner or water master is usually the one 
who physically distributes the proper quantities of water, at the right times, and to the proper 
users.  The commissioner opens, closes, adjusts, and locks the diversion points or headgates.  
In times of low flows or high usage, the headgates are closed starting with the lowest 
priorities to ensure that senior appropriators have access to their entitled water quantity 
(Getches 1997).  If streamflow increases, the commissioner opens the gates so that junior 
appropriators can use the water.  The commissioner also regulates reservoir storage and 
reports water usage and streamflows to the state engineer. 
 There is a distinction between immediate use or direct flow rights and subsequent use or 
storage rights.  A direct flow water permit is not entitled to store any water from the stream 
save for water conservation purposes that do not cause harm to others (Getches 1997).  The 
storage right is not perfected until the water is applied to beneficial use either by the entity 
storing the water (e.g. reservoir owner) or by some joint appropriator (e.g. irrigators).  
Storage rights are governed by the same rules of priority as the direct flow appropriations.  
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However, storage gives the system more flexibility for distributing water among right 
holders therefore improving the overall system reliability (Wurbs 1993).  For instance, 
exchanges among junior rights holders with storage rights and senior right holders with no 
storage rights can help maximize the effectiveness of water use on a stream.  Senior users 
can allow juniors to use water in times of senior low usage in exchange for the juniors letting 
the seniors store water for later use.  There are limits, however, in how much water can be 
stored in a year.  Different states have different rules on how much water can be used to 
refill storage right.  Usually, permit holders are allowed to fill its reservoir capacity just once 
in a given year.  They are also allowed to retain their storage for future use during “dry 
years” (Getches 1997). 
 
4.4.2 Transfer of Prior Appropriation Rights 
Water rights can be transferred or reallocated voluntarily among water users subject to 
certain limitations.  In general, for a reallocation to take place the water right must have been 
beneficially used and must continue to be beneficially used after the reallocation.  In 
addition, the reallocation must not injure other appropriators and must be in the public 
interest.  Thus, reallocations usually require administrative, or in some cases judicial or 
legislative approval (Anderson et al.1991). 
Changes that may occur as part of a water right reallocation may take several forms. For 
instance, changes in place of use or storage, source of supply, time of use (e.g. seasonal, 
intermittent, or continuous), point of diversion or return, purpose of use, or a combination of 
changes.  A common type of change that has occurred in western states since the 1980’s is 
the reallocation of irrigation water rights to municipal, industrial, and environmental use.  
This trend has been the result of the diversification of the states economies, explosive urban 
growth, industrial development, and the consideration of environmental and recreational 
issues. 
Although a water right reallocation may be for beneficial use, the change or changes that 
accompany the reallocation may cause harm to existing appropriators.  Changes in use can 
alter stream conditions and impair the beneficial uses of other appropriators, especially 
juniors. Appropriators, however, have a vested right to have stream conditions maintained 
substantially as they existed at the time of their appropriations (Anderson et al.1991).  
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Therefore, courts typically apply what is known as the “no harm” or “no injury” rule, which 
basically states that a water right reallocation that includes a change is allowed as long as it 
does not injure the rights of junior appropriators.  The no injury rule has been statutorily 
adopted in all prior appropriation states except Alaska (Anderson et al.1991).  In general, 
injury may occur by depriving an appropriator of the initial quantity or quality of water or by 
increasing the appropriator’s obligations to seniors.  Some examples of changes that may 
cause harm to other appropriators are: (1) change in the point of diversion so as to deprive 
the junior of water or return flows, (2) in a losing stream, changing an upstream senior right 
downstream of a junior right can burden the junior due to seepage looses, and (3) a change 
in the place of storage resulting in greater loss of water by evaporation where the burden of 
the additional loss is placed upon a junior. 
The fact that a reallocation is likely to result in injury to other appropriators does not 
necessarily mean that the reallocation will be denied.  Courts or administrative agencies can 
still approve the reallocation by imposing conditions.  If it is impossible to impose 
conditions so as to mitigate or prevent injury, the reallocation will be denied.  However, if 
conditions can be imposed the reallocation must be approved subject to such conditions 
(Anderson et al.1991).  Conditions might include: (1) reduction in quantity or flow rate of 
the reallocated water, (2) time limits on the use of water, (3) designation of a location of use, 
(4) adjustment in the means of or point of diversion, and (5) conditions to maintain quality. 
One alternative to facilitate water rights reallocation is the use of temporary 
reallocations.  Temporary reallocations are expressly permitted for specified periods, 
commonly not exceeding one year. At the end of that period, the water right automatically 
reverts to the original appropriator.  These transactions are also subject to the no harm rule 
and require administrative approval.  However, temporary reallocations are subject to a more 
relaxed administrative process (Anderson et al.1991).  It is important to note that temporary 
reallocations and approval does not result in the creation of a vested right. 
Another method for reallocating water rights is through water markets. Water marketing 
refers to ways of facilitating reallocations and conservation through market-like transactions.  
Essentially, water marketing is the buying and selling of water rights in the manner in which 
one would buy or sell any commodity. A common transaction may involve a sale, lease, or 
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exchange of a water right or an agreement not to exercise a water right (Musick 1989).  
These transactions are also bounded by the no harm rule. 
Kaiser (1996) summarizes several types of water market transactions.  Some of these 
transactions are: (1) sale of a water right, (2) institutional transfers, (3) option contracts, (4) 
subordination agreements, (5) conservation transfers, and (6) water banks.  A state-vested 
water right may be sold or leased to different users and uses subject to state agency or court 
approval.  In institutional transfers the actual water right is not sold but only the right to use 
the water.  The option contract is typically used by cities to deal with dry years.  A city may 
negotiate a dry-year option contract with a senior water right holder to acquire the right to 
use the water only during dry years. Subordination agreements refer to the buying of the 
priority date of a water right.  This is typically done by junior appropriators who are seeking 
a higher priority.  A user can acquire water in conservation transfers by financing a water 
project in exchange for the water that will be conserved as a result of the project.  A water 
bank provides a means for transferring surplus water rights.  The original water rights 
holders retain their permanent right and only sell (or lease) to the bank the right to use the 
water.  This water can be used temporarily by other users with critical water needs. 
Supporters of water markets argue that this approach gives flexibility to reflect changes 
in value system as compared to complicated political formulas.  The water market strategy 
provides a means for redistributing water without building new physical systems or forcing 
reallocations through litigation or additional regulation, as well as promote economic 
efficiency (Tarlock 1987; Carter et al. 1994; Tarlock et al. 2002).  Kaiser (1996) pointed out 
that water markets may be useful as a drought management tool, as a means to provide water 
to growing cities and for environmental and recreational needs, to promote efficient water 
use and encourage conservation, to provide an alternative to new reservoir construction, and 
to promote political and social harmony. 
On the other hand, other investigators have pointed out that a perfect market for water 
cannot exist since there are few sellers and they could have the power to strategically 
manipulate the market behavior or even monopolize it (Griffin and Characklis 2002).  Also, 
since water markets are subject to the no harm rule, unlike any other form of marketable 
commodity, water cannot be fully owned as it is subject to public interests (NRC 1992).  
When a water transaction occurs, the impacts of those changes spread well beyond the seller 
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and the buyer.  In other words, there are community and moral aspects of water transfers 
regarding third-party effects (Sax 1994) and water’s ecological role that a market approach 
cannot fully satisfy (Freyfogle 1996).  In spite of these concerns, most opponents of water 
marketing have favored the concept of a regulated water market (Anderson et al.1991; 
Oggins and Ingram 1990; NRC 1992; Sax 1994).  Proponents of this strategy sustain that 
water marketing is what prior appropriation needs to become a flexible doctrine capable of 
adapting to meet new social values by creating economic incentives for conservation and 
reallocation. 
 
4.4.3 Loss of Prior Appropriation Rights 
There are two basic ways of losing a water right in a prior appropriation system.  
According to appropriative statutes a water right can be lost due to abandonment or 
forfeiture (Roe and Brooks 1989).   
Since appropriative rights are dependant on beneficial use for its continued validity, 
when beneficial use ceases so does the right.  A court or water agency can rule a cessation of 
a water right due to abandonment when a voluntary or intentional relinquishment of the 
water right occurs.  Proving intent of non-use however, is usually a difficult task.  Because 
of this, loss of water rights by forfeiture is more common (Goplerud 1991b).   
Forfeiture, which does not require intent, can be invoked for failure to use water or for 
non-beneficial use (wasteful use).  However, forfeiture cannot be invoked if the 
circumstances causing the non-usage were beyond the control of the water right holder.  
Forfeiture can also be an automatic action.  Some states have made statutory modifications 
to establish a period of non-use that will cause a right to be forfeited.  For instance, in New 
Mexico, after a period of four years the government issues a notice of non-use.  If the non-
use continues over one additional year, the right is automatically forfeited.   
Water rights could also be lost due to prescription when a claimant who has been harmed 
by the wrongful usage of another water user claims rights over the offender’s water right.  
Nevertheless, the concept of prescriptive use or adverse possession has lost favor over the 
years as many states are in the trend of abolishing prescriptive rights.  Since the only way of 
obtaining this kind of rights is to take the water rights away from someone else, it is 
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understood that this kind of rights predation should not be necessary in the presence of a 
comprehensive permit system (Goplerud 1991b). 
 
4.5 DUAL SYSTEMS 
There is no one definition fitting all hybrid systems, for each state has its own mixture of 
elements from each doctrine. Several states that originally followed the riparian system later 
converted to a system of appropriation.  This shift occurred since prior appropriation was 
recognized as being more suitable for allocating water rights. Because of the aridity of the 
west, increasing demands to divert water for mining, irrigation, industrial and municipal uses 
could not be resolved satisfactorily with the reasonable use theory.  However, the states also 
had to recognize the continued validity of vested riparian rights.  These states are California, 
Oregon, Washington, Kansas, Nebraska, North Dakota, Oklahoma, South Dakota, and 
Texas.  For coastal western states and central states located between higher elevation and 
arid lands, neither the riparian system nor appropriation was entirely fitting (Getches 1997).  
Hence, they continue to recognize both types of rights and adapted to accommodate uses of 
water under the two rather inconsistent systems. 
Giving the difficulties of coordinating the vestigial riparian rights with appropriative 
rights, western states have sought to further restrict riparian rights.  Legislatures have 
abolished unused riparian rights and courts have tried to reconceptualize them in order to 
narrow their reach and move toward their elimination.  Some courts’ actions have involved 
narrowing the concepts of riparian land and reasonable use as well as exploding the theories 
of abandonment, forfeiture, and prescription (Getches 1997). 
When conflicts arise between user and/or uses who claim the same type of right, 
resolution is straight-forward.  For solving conflicts between riparian rights an ad-hoc 
application of the reasonable use theory would be used and for prior appropriators the “first 
in time is first in right” rule would apply.  However, when conflict arise between an 
appropriative right and a riparian, judges and administrators face a problematic task due to 
the entirely different basis for decision-making of both systems.  Coordination of such 
differences can only be obtained by treating one of the systems as primary and the other as 
an exception to the primary rights system (Dellapenna 1991a).  Some dual system states treat 
prior appropriation as the primary WRS (Kansas, North Dakota, Oregon, South Dakota, 
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Texas, and Washington) while others treat riparian rights ahead of appropriators (California, 
Nebraska, and Oklahoma). 
Most hybrid WRS recognized prior appropriation as their primary system.  Those 
riparian rights that have survived are usually treated as priority rights with a priority date set 
by the date the state made the formal transition from riparian to prior appropriation.  
Dellapenna (1991a) grouped the dual system states into three groups according to the 
transformation doctrine they applied to move away from the riparian doctrine: the California 
doctrine, the Colorado doctrine, and the Oregon doctrine.   
California was probably the first western state to face problems regarding water 
allocation.  Given the fact that settlements in California exploded as a result of the gold rush, 
water appropriation for mining purposes on federal lands became a custom.  Parts of the 
riparian lands however, were privately owned.  The California Supreme Court developed a 
ruling theory to solve disputes among water users that stated that appropriators are 
subordinate to the rights of a settled riparian but superior to any riparian settled after the 
appropriation.  Disputes among riparians would be resolved by reasonableness of use 
without taking in consideration temporal priority.  The state of Washington also follows this 
doctrine for dealing with both types of water rights.   
The Colorado doctrine recognizes few rights for the owner of riparian lands.  These 
rights however, regard to non-consumptive uses of water.  Disputes over non-consumptive 
uses of water are resolved according to the reasonable use theory.  Nonetheless, the courts 
do not accept riparian theory for consumptive uses. Instead, they apply the pure 
appropriative doctrine.  Some variations of this doctrine are followed by Colorado, Idaho, 
Wyoming, Arizona, New Mexico, Utah, Montana, and Nevada.  States such as Texas, 
Kansas, Nebraska, Oklahoma, North and South Dakota, and Oregon have dual WRS that 
follow the Oregon doctrine.  The mixture of appropriative and riparian rights of these mixed 
climate states is characterized by statutory actions to abolish unvested riparian rights and 
adopt appropriative allocative systems.  The legislation would set a cut-off date by which all 
vested riparian rights must be claimed through beneficial use.  New claims to water after the 
appointed date would be recognized only through appropriation. 
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CHAPTER V 
 
COMPUTER WATER ALLOCATION MODELS 
 
The complexity and magnitude of many water resources problems require the assistance 
of computer models in order to obtain reliable and timely solutions.  Computer models have 
been used extensively in both practical engineering applications and academic research to 
help solve a multitude of water related problems. Although developing efficient computer 
models is commonly costly and time consuming, it can be argued that it is a worthwhile 
effort as they facilitate and expedite the analysis of problems that would otherwise be too 
complex or simply too tedious to analyze by manual computations. 
Computer models are typically divided into two categories, simulation and optimization 
models.  A simulation or descriptive model is a simplified representation of a real-world 
system used to predict its behavior under a given set of conditions (Wurbs 1993).  Typically, 
these models apply mass balance principles to track the movement of water through a 
river/reservoir system and are able to accurately represent the operation of the system.  A 
pure simulation model is not intended to prescribe the best or optimum solution to a specific 
problem when flexibility exits in the operation of a system.  Prescriptive optimization 
models have the added capability of automatically finding the optimum solution for a 
particular problem subject to a series of operational objectives and constraints. Labadie 
(2004) provides a state-of-the-art review of optimization techniques used in river/reservoir 
system management and describes their mathematical basis. 
A computer model may be developed as a site-specific or generalized model.  Site-
specific models incorporate the unique characteristics of a river/reservoir system into the 
computer code.  Site-specific models may be very detailed and efficient, but applying the 
model to a system other than the one for which it was developed is rather difficult.  The 
general trend in recent years has been to shift away from site-specific models to generalized 
models (Wurbs 2004).  Generalized models have enough flexibility to be readily applied to 
any river/reservoir system.  The specific characteristics of a system are described in an input 
data file or input directly in the program interface, thereby eliminating the need for writing 
or modifying computer code every time a different system needs to be modeled. Generalized 
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models have been continually growing in number and expanding their modeling capabilities.  
Several public-domain computer models are available for a variety of river/reservoir systems 
analysis applications.  The U.S. Bureau of Reclamation has prepared a hydrologic modeling 
inventory for the United States which can be accessed via the internet at: 
http://www.usbr.gov/pmts/rivers/hmi/. This website also contains an on-line literature 
database. 
The utility of computer models is undeniable, yet it must be recognized that they are 
only predictive tools and do not provide flawless solutions.  The successful application of a 
computer model always relies on the ability of the user to accurately describe the system and 
to interpret the output data.  In addition, model results are highly dependent upon the quality 
of the input data.  The series of simplifying assumptions incorporated in the model must be 
carefully considered when interpreting the results.  Moreover, careful inspection of the 
model results is always required to ensure the validity of the model.  In other words, human 
expertise is imperative for the proper building, tuning, application, and interpretation of any 
computer model.  Another significant limitation is that models can sometimes be so 
elaborate that only specialized personnel can use them and understand their results.  Thus, 
the usefulness of the model may be drastically reduced if the results are not clearly conveyed 
to the public, government officials, politicians, or any other party involved in a decision 
making process. 
A myriad of computer models and applications can be found in the water resources 
literature (Yeh 1985; Wurbs 1993; Labadie 1997 and 2004).  Regarding water allocation 
systems (WAS), one of the most valuable modeling applications is generating viable new 
alternatives to solve water allocation problems.  The series of alternatives may form the 
basis of negotiations to determine a new allocation.  During the WAS planning and design 
stages, simulation models can allow decision makers to evaluate the physical and economic 
impacts of alternative allocation policies, demand levels, and institutional restrictions.  Once 
a WAS is established, computer models may be used to simulate the management of the 
water resources of a river basin within its hydrological and administrative setting.  Some 
models have been primarily developed to assist in the implementation, assessment, and 
enforcement of WAS.  In general, this type of model simulates existing operating rules by 
tracking sequences of hydrologic input through the current system.  These models are also 
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excellent planning tools since by considering alternative scenarios of water use, they can 
simulate potential water management alternatives.  The remainder of this Chapter provides 
descriptions and applications of a series of site-specific and generalized models that can 
support the various aspects of WAS. 
 
5.1 SITE-SPECIFIC MODELS 
Some examples of site-specific models that have been developed primarily for water 
allocation purposes are presented in this section.  Dolan and DeLuca (1993) described the 
application of the Missouri River Model for the upper Missouri River basin of Montana.  In 
general, this hydrologic model simulates a monthly water budget considering four primary 
system components: irrigation, municipal, dam and reservoir operation, and streamflow.  
The model was used by the Montana Department of Natural Resources and Conservation to 
help assess the hydrologic and economic impact of accepting new applications for reserving 
water for instream uses and new consumptive uses.  A series of hypothetical water allocation 
alternatives representing future development scenarios that would increase water 
consumption and different water allocation strategies were evaluated.  The allocation 
strategies were basically rearrangements in the priority that would be assigned to each use.  
Model results provided information regarding the magnitude of streamflow reductions that 
could occur under each alternative and the economic and environmental impacts associated 
with such reductions.  The results were used to inform interested parties of potential impacts 
that could occur as a result of the decisions made regarding the new water reservation 
requests. 
The Applied Research Institute-Jerusalem (ARIJ) published a report on the development 
and application of the Jordan valley Water Allocation (JOWA) model (ARIJ 2000).  The 
model divides the Jordan Valley region into sub-regions belonging to the bordering 
countries of Jordan, Palestine and Israel, and thus, performs the water allocation based on 
the resources available in each sub-region, each country and the entire region.  Water is 
allocated using a linear optimization algorithm that minimizes the cost of allocation to the 
different demanding sectors.  The model constraints are, for the most part, mass balance 
considerations.  Moreover, the model allocates water based on priority, thus introducing a 
hierarchy of water allocation.  The water use sectors considered in the model (from highest 
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to lowest priority) are domestic, tourism, industrial and agricultural.  The model also allows 
water transfers.  If the main supply in one sub-region does not satisfy its demand, 
supplementary supplies from other sub-regions will try to make up for the deficit by 
transferring water.  However, the model also takes into account the cost of water 
transportation.  The authors warned that since the cost value is the corner stone of the 
allocation process care should be taken when estimating these values. 
Letcher et al. (2004) described a modeling tool based on optimization of economic-
hydrologic criteria to assess water allocation issues in the Namoi River basin in Australia.  
The basin was divided into similar regions in terms of water policies and production type.  A 
network flow model was used to establish the connectivity of the system.  Individual model 
components (i.e. agricultural production, hydrology, policy, and extraction models) were 
developed for each region.  The hydrologic model simulates daily flows at a node given a set 
of climatic time series inputs.  This daily flow is fed through the policy model, which 
calculates yearly volumes of water available in a region based on the policy scenario.  These 
volumes are input to the agricultural production model which optimizes choice of 
investment based on economic and hydrologic factors.  The optimization routine is driven by 
a dynamic programming formulation and it is subject to mass balance and economic 
constraints.  Water use decisions from the agricultural production model are fed to a daily 
extraction model that translates yearly use into daily water use. This daily water use is 
extracted from the simulated flows and the resulting ‘‘extracted flow’’ is routed to the next 
node downstream.  Streamflow and regional farm profit are calculated at each node allowing 
to investigate the environmental and economic costs and benefits of policy changes in the 
basin. 
Ringler and Huy (2004) also developed an economic-hydrologic model to assess water 
allocation strategies for the Dong Nai River basin in Vietnam. The model was developed as 
a node-link network representing the spatial relationships between the physical entities in the 
basin.  The objective of the model is to maximize the annual net profits from water uses in 
irrigation, households and industries, and hydropower generation subject to hydrologic and 
economic constraints and the governing water allocation rules.  The model performs a water 
balance for reservoirs, streams, and crop fields; calculates benefits from water uses; and 
implements the institutional rules.  Water supply is determined through the water balance; 
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while water demand is determined within the model based on functional relationships 
between water and productive uses. Water benefit functions were developed for the major 
water uses subject to physical, system control, and policy constraints.  Minimum instream 
flows are included as flow constraints. Water supply and demand are balanced based on the 
objective of maximizing economic benefits to water use. 
Although actual allocations are not entirely based on economic efficiency, the models 
described in Letcher et al. (2004) and Ringler and Huy (2004) may be useful to identify 
system deficiencies and to prompt for institutional reforms that could result in a more 
efficient water allocation. 
 
5.2 GENERALIZED MODELS 
The analysis capabilities of a generalized computer model can be applied to 
essentially any river/reservoir system.  In addition to simulating the system, these 
models typically include data management programs and tools that help interpret, 
summarize, and display model results.  One practice that has gained popularity in recent 
years is to create Graphical User Interfaces or GUI’s.  The GUI facilitates the interaction 
between the user and model during the model building process and typically provides 
added capabilities for displaying results in graphical or tabular formats. Various 
generalized models are well documented and tested and have gained wide acceptance in 
the water resources community. 
 
5.2.1 AQUARIUS 
AQUARIUS is a computer model developed jointly by the Colorado State University 
and the USDA Forest Service for the temporal and spatial allocation of water among 
competing uses in a river basin (Diaz et al. 2000). AQUARIUS is an object-oriented model 
with a GUI where the system is represented as different types of water components such as 
reservoirs, diversions, junction points, and demand areas connected as a network.  The 
mathematical connectivity of the components is derived automatically from the linkage of 
the objects in the network, which in turn reflects the hydraulic connectivity of the system.  
The model is driven by an economic efficiency operational criterion that calls for the 
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reallocation of stream flows until the net marginal returns in all water uses are equal (Brown 
et al. 2002).  The model first finds an initial solution that serves as the starting point of a 
sequential optimization procedure.  This procedure consists of a succession of quadratic 
approximations of the nonlinear objective function until the optimal solution is reached.  The 
economic criterion is used because economic demands have traditionally played a key role in 
water allocation decisions.  However, actual allocations may have institutional constraints that 
impede achieving the economical efficiency modeled by AQUARIUS.  Therefore, as with 
other previously mentioned models, the results may not be representative of the actual WAS 
but may be helpful in suggesting potential strategies to achieve a more efficient allocation. 
AQUARIUS is free for government agencies and for teaching and research purposes and it is 
available in the internet at http://www.fs.fed.us/rm/value/aquariusdwnld.html. 
 
5.2.2 Environmental Policy and Institutions for Central Asia (EPIC) Model 
Mckinney and Karimov (1997) reported on the development of a policy-oriented water 
allocation model known as the EPIC model.  The model is an interface between the 
Geographic Information System (GIS) software ArcView and the mathematical optimization 
software GAMS.  A mathematical model based on a network representation of the basin is 
used for water allocation and GAMS is used to solve this model.  The original goal was to use 
the model as a screening tool to identify good water management alternatives for the rivers of 
the Aral Sea basin in Central Asia, but with the appropriate input data the model may be 
applied to other basins.  The model objectives include maximizing flows to the Aral Sea, 
maximizing satisfaction of water demands, maximizing hydropower production, minimize 
concentration of salts in the system, and equalizing the distribution of water deficits.  Some of 
the constraints for the model include mass balance, groundwater pumping limits, canal 
diversion capacities, and minimum flows. The model is based on a multiobjective decision 
framework in which weights are used to set the relative priority of each objective.  This 
approach allows evaluating multiple water allocation alternatives and analyzing the tradeoffs 
between conflicting objectives.  The authors concluded that the model provides a useful tool to 
develop a much needed regional water resources strategy in the Aral Sea basin.  The model, 
documentation, and sample data may be obtained free of charge in the internet at: 
http://www.ce.utexas.edu/prof/mckinney/papers/aral/EPIC/EPICmodel.html. 
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5.2.3 MIKEBASIN 
The MIKEBASIN software package, developed by the Danish Hydraulic Institute 
(DHI), couples ArcView with network flow hydrologic modeling to facilitate the integrated 
analysis of river basins (DHI 2001).  The model uses a GUI which allows MIKEBASIN to 
use all functionality of ArcView.  MIKEBASIN defines water allocation rules based on local 
and global priorities.  Local priority rules model the distribution of water from a node on the 
river to users immediately connected to it, which is useful for modeling riparian rights.  
Alternatively, global priorities can be used to model prior-appropriation rights since they 
allow water to be allocated according to rules that can affect any node in the system.  In 
addition, the model has the ability to define overall rules that can be used to maximize 
benefits, allowing provisions to represent the public interest (e.g. instream flow 
requirements).  Jha and Das Gupta (2003) applied this model to the Mun River in Thailand 
for evaluating basin performance and recommending optimal allocation practices.  This 
study demonstrated the usefulness of the model in establishing a decision basis for policy 
makers and managers regarding optimal allocation of water resources. 
 
5.2.4 MODSIM-DSS 
MODSIM-DSS, developed by Colorado State University, is a decision support system 
that incorporates the physical, hydrological, and institutional aspects of river basin 
management.  The model’s object-oriented GUI allows to easily create a node-link network 
representing the spatial relationships between the physical entities in the basin.  Non-storage 
nodes can represent river gages, return flow sites, and river confluences.  Demand nodes 
represent diversions and instream flow requirements.  Pertinent reservoir physical and 
operational characteristics are incorporated in reservoir nodes.  Links may represent natural 
or artificial flows.  MODSIM-DSS solves a minimum cost network flow problem to find the 
required water and storage allocation to competing demands based on specified priorities 
and operating rules (Wurbs 1993; Dai and Labadie 2001).  The model can use a monthly, 
weekly, or daily computational time step.  MODSIM-DSS considers reservoir operations 
targets, consumptive and instream flow demands, evaporation and channel losses, reservoir 
storage rights and exchanges.  The model also has a stream-aquifer module that allows to 
calculate reservoir seepage, infiltration, river depletion due to pumping, and aquifer storage 
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(Dai and Labadie 2001).  Graham et al. (1986) used an earlier version of the model to simulate 
the allocation of water supplies in the Rio Grande basin following the prior appropriation 
water rights doctrine and interstate compact agreements.  More recently, the model has been 
applied to the Nile River in Africa (El-Beshri and Labadie 1994) and the Piracicaba River in 
Brazil (Azevedo et al. 2000) for evaluating innovative water allocation schemes. The model 
may be downloaded free of charge at: http://modsim.engr.colostate.edu/download.html. 
 
5.2.5 OASIS 
The Operational Analysis and Simulation of Integrated Systems (OASIS) program, 
developed by HydroLogics (http://www.hydrologics.net/), simulates the routing of water 
based on a linear optimization algorithm.  The program uses an operations control language 
(OCL) for defining operating rules. OCL is a programming language patented by 
HydroLogics similar to a scripting or macro language.  OASIS’s GUI provides user-friendly 
controls to build, modify, and run the model and to view model results. Operating rules are 
expressed as goals or constraints.  The user indicates which goals have a higher priority by 
assigning relative weights to each goal.  OASIS obeys all constraints and tries to meet 
competing goals.  The developers refer to this approach as a goal-seeking behavior which 
differs from most modeling approaches in that competing goals are not modeled as a 
complex set of “if-then” type rules.  An excellent capability of OASIS is the OCL views 
other programs (ex. databases and other simulation models) as external modules and allows 
to import and export data between them.  Both OASIS and the external modules can run 
simultaneously and react to each other. 
 
5.2.6 RiverWare 
RiverWare is an object-oriented river/reservoir simulation model with multiobjective 
modeling capabilities (Zagona et al. 2001).  The model was developed at the Center for 
Advanced Decision Support for Water and Environmental Systems at the University of 
Colorado under joint sponsorship by the U.S. Bureau of Reclamation and the Tennessee 
Valley Authority.  In this model, basin components are represented as objects and 
categorized by object-type.  Each object is modeled according to the physical processes and 
operating rules associated with its object-type.  Operating rules are expressed separately 
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through a special rule language that allows the use of mathematical functions, loops, and 
logical statements.  A syntax-directed editor with a series of operations and functions is 
provided to guide the construction of syntactically correct rules (Zagona et al. 2001).  Thus, 
operating rules can be easily created and modified to customize the model.  The rules can 
also be prioritized which allows the simulation of water allocation based on prior 
appropriation.  RiverWare can perform pure simulation runs or it can use rule-based 
simulation and optimization.  Pure simulation and rule-base simulation are used to provide 
descriptive solutions to “what if” scenarios.  When multiple conflicting objectives need to be 
evaluated, the optimization routines can provide prescriptive solutions. RiverWare’s 
optimization capabilities make it suitable for screening and evaluating multiple water 
allocation schemes.  Wheeler et al. (2002) applied this model for the Colorado River basin.  
The model was used to explore the effects of changes in several water management policies 
including gradual reductions in California’s dependency on other states unused water, water 
reallocation between purposes, and inadvertent overrun withdrawals.  The authors concluded 
that the flexibility of this model offers hope of a less litigious process for reaching 
compromise among participating parties. 
 
5.2.7 The State of Colorado’s Stream Simulation Model (StateMod) 
StateMod is a river/reservoir system simulation model with water allocation simulation 
capabilities.  This model was adopted as the water management modeling tool in the 
Colorado’s Decision Support System (CDSS) developed by the Colorado Water 
Conservation Board and the Colorado Division of Water Resources.  StateMod follows the 
prior appropriation doctrine of water allocation and it can use a monthly or daily time step.  
The model recognizes five types of water rights: direct flow, instream flow, reservoir 
storage, well, and operational. StateMod consists of four major modules: baseflow, 
simulation, report, and data check. In the baseflow module, the effects of human intervention 
with the river system (i.e. historic diversions, return flows, well pumping, and reservoir 
storage, releases, evaporation, and seepage) are removed in order to estimate the natural 
streamflow condition in the system.  The impact of new or modified water rights may be 
assessed by comparing the simulation results with the natural streamflow condition.  The 
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StateMod model, users guide, and sample data may be downloaded free of charge at: 
http://cdss.state.co.us/ftp/statemod.asp. 
 
5.2.8 WaterWare 
WaterWare is an integrated, model-based information and decision support system for 
water resources management developed by Environmental Software and Services, an 
Austrian consulting firm. WaterWare is an object-oriented model that integrates databases, 
GIS, models, and analytical tools into a common framework. The model includes a number 
of simulation and optimization models and related tools, such as a daily rainfall-runoff and 
water budget model, irrigation water demand model, a dynamic an stochastic water quality 
models, groundwater and transport model, and a water allocation model.  The latter is based 
on a heuristic (genetic algorithm) module that finds cost-efficient water allocation strategies.  
The model computes a daily water budget for all nodes in the river network and provides 
monthly, seasonal, annual, and sectoral demands summary statistics. Model documentation 
and sample applications are available in the internet at: http://www.ess.co.at/WATERWARE. 
 
5.2.9 WEAP 
The Water Evaluation and Planning (WEAP) model, is a water balance accounting 
model that allocates water from surface and groundwater resources.  WEAP is developed by 
the Stockholm Environment Institute (http://www.weap21.org).  This model may be used as 
a policy analysis tool for evaluating water management options taking into account multiple 
and competing water uses.  A network flow model is used to establish the connectivity of the 
river/reservoir system.  WEAP operates on a monthly time step and uses a linear 
optimization algorithm to optimize the supply of demands and instream flow requirements, 
subject to supply priorities, mass balance and other constraints.  The model also contains a 
pollution mass balance routine which evaluates loadings and treatments of pollutants on 
receiving water bodies.  Hydropower generation and water delivery costs are also 
incorporated in the model.  WEAP may be used to address several water resources issues 
including reservoir operations, water rights and allocation priorities, pollution tracking, and 
benefit-cost analysis.  Lévite et al. (2003) applied the model to assess alternative water 
allocation scenarios in the Olifants River basin in South Africa.  The authors concluded that 
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WEAP is a user-friendly model that is useful for the rapid assessment of water allocation 
decisions and for locating the regions of the basin where water scarcity problems are likely 
to occur. 
 
5.2.10 WRAP 
The Texas Water Availability Modeling (WAM) System has facilitated the assessment of 
hydrological and institutional water availability and reliability through the use of the Water 
Rights Analysis Package (WRAP) model.  The model is used for planning purposes and for 
evaluating water right permit applications.  WRAP is a generalized model, developed at 
Texas A&M University, designed to simulate a river basin under a priority-based WAS 
(Wurbs 2005).  WRAP evaluates the ability of the river/reservoir system to meet demands 
during a hypothetical repetition of historical hydrology.  The spatial connectivity of the 
system is modeled as a set of control points. The computational algorithms are based on the 
location of each control point related to the others as defined in the input data.  Simulation 
results include regulated flows (i.e. physical flows at a location), reservoir storage contents, 
diversions, water right shortages, unappropriated flows, reliability indices, and other 
variables (Wurbs 2003).  WRAP has been used to simulate water allocation and 
management in all Texas river basins, including the international Rio Grande basin (TCEQ 
2005b).  The WRAP modeling capabilities will be described in more detail in Chapter VIII. 
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CHAPTER VI 
 
WATER ALLOCATION IN TEXAS 
 
6.1 HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF WATER RIGHTS IN TEXAS 
The current surface water allocation framework in the state of Texas is the result of an 
evolutionary process guided by political transitions, court decisions, and legislation.  Water 
rights in Texas have been granted under Spanish, Mexican, Republic of Texas, and State of 
Texas laws.  In essence, the riparian doctrine was first introduced, then the prior 
appropriation doctrine was adopted and coexisted with riparianism, and finally the riparian 
rights were merged into the prior appropriation system. 
During the Spanish and Mexican rule, grants of land and the water rights of property 
owners were governed by civil law.  In 1840, the Republic of Texas adopted the English 
common law, and with it acquired the English riparian doctrine which was somewhat 
different from the Spanish.  Between 1840 and 1895 extensive tracks of public lands were 
transferred to private owners.  Riparian owners were granted with the right to use water for 
irrigation and other purposes.  However, as early as 1868, the Texas Supreme Court 
indicated that riparian rights did not apply to the drier parts of the state and suggested 
legislation to impose the prior appropriation system (Dellapenna 1991a, Templer 2001).  
The prior appropriation doctrine became effective with the enactment of the appropriation 
statutes of 1889 and 1895. 
Subsequently, the Texas courts and legislature began to restrict the scope of riparian 
rights.  In 1913, a water code was adopted that extended appropriation laws to the entire 
state and barred riparian rights on lands that passed to private owners after July 1, 1895 
(Dellapenna 1991a).  Pre-existing riparian rights, however, were honored.  Between 1895 
and 1913 water rights could be obtained by simply filing a sworn statement with the county 
clerk and describing their use. Under this simplistic system, water-rights claims often 
overlapped and people claimed more water than the stream could possibly supply (Templer 
2001).  After 1913, a much more elaborate administrative procedure has been followed 
which involves filling an application and obtaining a permit from a centralized state agency. 
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Although prior appropriation was the official allocation doctrine after 1895, riparian 
rights were not totally eliminated.  Having mixed types and often conflicting water rights 
and the fact that there were many unrecorded water rights (for which there was no record of 
the amount of water that was diverted) greatly hindered the coordination and management of 
the state’s surface waters. The 1950’s drought prompted the state legislature to tackle this 
situation and in 1967 the Water Rights Adjudication Act (WRAA) was enacted.  The 
objective of the WRAA was to require a recording of all water rights claims, to limit those 
claims to actual use, and to provide for the adjudication and administration of water rights 
(Wurbs 2004).  All unrecorded water right claims were required to be filed by 1969.  Over 
11,600 unrecorded claims were filed and they were limited to the maximum amount of water 
used between 1963 and 1967 (Templer 2001).  Most claims were for riparian rights since 
most appropriative rights were already recorded.  More than half of the claims were rejected 
since they did not show water use during the established period (Wurbs 2004).  The 
approved permits were also subject to cancellation for non-use.  During this adjudication 
process, all riparian rights were merged with the prior appropriation system forming the 
current permit system applicable to all of Texas save for the Lower Rio Grande. The process 
started in 1968 and was completed in the 1980’s. 
 
6.2 TEXAS WATER RIGHTS SYSTEM 
The Texas Water Code of 1963 is based on the prior appropriation doctrine.  Under this 
doctrine, water rights are granted on a “first come – first served” basis and older water rights 
have priority during times of shortage.  A water right permit is required in Texas in order to 
use surface water. Anyone can submit an application to the Texas Commission on 
Environmental Quality (TCEQ) to obtain a permit.  As of August 2005, there were 9,464 
active water rights permits and 130 pending applications (TCEQ 2005b).  Water rights 
permits are held by cities, river authorities, water districts, public and private agencies, and 
individual citizens.  The permits with the largest amounts of water are usually held by cities 
and river authorities.  These entities hold the water right permit and sell water to their 
customers who are not required to hold a water right. 
Water rights permit applications are carefully scrutinized by the TCEQ before the permit 
is granted.  The TCEQ approves the application if there is unappropriated water available, a 
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beneficial use is contemplated, water conservation will be practiced, existing water rights are 
not impaired, and the water use is not detrimental to the public welfare (Wurbs 2004).  The 
TCEQ examines the proposed monthly water demand and the monthly river flows or 
reservoir levels over a period of time.  The availability of unappropriated water requirement 
is satisfied if the historical record suggests that most of the water being requested will be 
available most of the time it will be needed.  The TCEQ follows three rules of thumb to 
determine if there is enough water to meet the demands of a new permit (TCEQ 2005a): 
 
(1) For most users, if the record shows that at least 75% of the water can be expected to be 
available at least 75% of the time, the TCEQ will usually issue the permit. 
(2) For municipalities, the TCEQ will issue a permit only if the record shows that 100% of 
the water can be expected to be available 100% of the time, unless a backup source is 
available. 
(3) For a municipality that has access to a backup supply, the TCEQ may decide to issue a 
permit to use water that can be expected to be available less than 100% of the time. 
 
The requirement of beneficial use is easily satisfied in most applications.  The Texas 
Water Code lists beneficial uses, in order of priority, as follows: domestic & municipal, 
industrial, irrigation, mining, hydroelectric, navigation, recreation and pleasure, and others 
(Texas Water Code §11.024).  The only real inquiry is whether the volume of water 
requested is excessive in light of the intended use (Caroom 1997).  Notice that water 
appropriation for environmental uses is not considered a beneficial use.  However, since 
1985 the TCEQ is required to consider the impacts of new water permits on aquatic, 
terrestrial and riparian habitats, as well as bay and estuary inflows (Texas Water Code 
§11.047, §11.150, §11.152).  The water conservation requirement promotes the efficient use 
of water and avoidance of wasteful use. The TCEQ may deny an application if the applicant 
has not provided evidence that reasonable diligence will be used to avoid waste and achieve 
water conservation (Caroom 1997). Computer modeling is used to determine whether new 
water uses will affect existing senior water rights under a variety of hydrologic conditions 
(see Section 6.5).  If the model results indicate that senior rights may be impaired, the TCEQ 
may deny the application or set restrictions on the new diversion. The public welfare 
 79
requirement can include consideration of environmental, social, and economic impacts of the 
proposed water use. 
A water right permit authorizes the applicant to use a specific amount of water in the 
manner described in the application.  The permit allows the user to impound that water, 
divert it, or both.  Impoundment rights specify the location of the users dam and the capacity 
of the reservoir.  Diversion or “run-of-the-river” rights specifies the diversion location and 
the rate at which water can be diverted.  Most permits are issued in perpetuity, but they can 
be cancelled if water is not used over a 10 year period.  Two types of short term permits are 
also available: term and temporary.  The rationale for these permits is to maximize the use of 
water in basins where waters are fully appropriated but not yet being fully used (TCEQ 
2005a).  Term permits are typically issued for agricultural, mining, and industrial uses for a 
period of 10 years.  Temporary permits are valid for up to three years and are commonly 
issued for road construction projects. 
Some water uses are exempted from the permitting process.  For example, water can be 
used without a permit for domestic and livestock (D&L) purposes if the water is diverted by 
persons living adjacent to a stream.  Persons can also store in their property up to 200 ac-ft 
of water for D&L uses. The right to use water for these purposes is a property right attached 
to the land.  State water can also be used without a permit for wildlife management, fish and 
shrimp farming, drilling and extracting oil, sediment control in surface coal mines, and for 
emergency purposes by fire departments and other similar services (TCEQ 2005a). 
Once approved, a priority date is assigned to the water right which corresponds to the 
time of the application filing.  The priority date governs the water allocation sequence.  In 
essence, if water is insufficient to meet all needs, earlier users (senior appropriators) will 
obtain all their allotted water while those who appropriated later (junior appropriators) may 
see their allotment diminished or cutoff completely. Special stipulations, however, were 
added to this basic priority system in order to handle water rights that do not have priority 
dates.  For instance, the allocation sequence begins with D&L uses. These uses are 
considered senior to any kind of appropriated water right.  Conversely, holders of short term 
permits are junior to all other users. 
With regard to the protection of water rights, there are two basic mechanisms that are 
adopted: the honor system and watermaster programs.  Most of the state relies on the honor 
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system, which assumes that users will abide to the water allocation rules without 
supervision.  One advantage of this system is that there is no ongoing cost for enforcing the 
law.  However, it is difficult for users to know how much water they must let pass for 
downstream senior users and how much they can divert or impound.  In case of illegal 
diversions, water right holders can resort to civil courts, or they can report them to the 
TCEQ.  The TCQE can set up a temporary streamflow monitoring program to stop the 
unauthorized water use but it cannot restore the water that was illegally used by others 
(TCEQ 2005c).  Under a watermaster program, streamflows, reservoir levels, and water use 
in a basin are continually monitored to ensure proper use of the water.  The watermaster is 
an officer appointed by the TCEQ which coordinates the allocation process and has the 
authority to enforce the law. Under this system, all water releases and diversions must be 
pre-authorized and if an illegal diversion is discovered the watermaster can lock up the 
diversion pumps of the infractor.  Another benefit is that watermasters are usually able to 
settle disputes, thereby avoiding costly litigation.  Two watermaster programs operate in 
Texas, one in the Rio Grande basin and the South Texas watermaster which serves the San 
Antonio, Guadalupe, Nueces, and Lavaca basins. 
 
6.2.1 Lower Rio Grande Water Allocation System 
The allocation process of the Texas share of the waters of the Lower Rio Grande basin is 
significantly different from that of the rest of the state.  The primary difference is that the 
allocation sequence is governed by water use type instead of priority date.  In accordance 
with a court decision in the Lower Rio Grande Valley Water Case, water uses are divided 
into three groups: 1) domestic, municipal, and industrial (DMI), 2) Class A irrigation, and 3) 
Class B irrigation.  DMI uses have the highest priority followed by the irrigation uses. Of the 
total agricultural land in the Lower Rio Grande Valley supplied by the Rio Grande, 86% was 
assigned with Class A rights and the remaining 14% with Class B rights.  Each water right is 
limited by its permitted annual diversion amount and by the water available in storage. Once 
the available storage has been allocated, the Rio Grande Watermaster makes daily requests 
to the International Boundary and Water Commission (IBWC) to make the necessary 
releases to satisfy the needs of the water right holders.  The Watermaster keeps record of 
water releases and storage allocated to each water right account. 
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Every month, the IBWC informs the Rio Grande Watermaster of the total volume of 
water allocated to the US in the international Amistad and Falcon Reservoirs.  The storage 
allocation between Mexico and the US is explained in Section 6.4.  The monthly allocation 
procedure of the US share of the water is depicted in Figure 6.1 and summarized below 
based on the 1977 Texas Administrative Code, Title 30 – Chapter 303 (30 TAC – 303).   
Out of the total volume in storage available to the US 4,600 ac-ft is considered dead 
storage.  The remaining storage constitutes the usable storage.  From the usable storage, 
225,000 ac-ft is reserved for DMI uses.  That is equivalent to one year's average diversions 
for all municipal demands below Amistad for Texas users (TCEQ 2005d).  The size of the 
DMI reserve has not been updated since 1986.  Since then, the number of DMI rights has 
grown to approximately 320,000 ac-ft and thus a reevaluation of the DMI reserve size may 
be warranted (Griffin and Characklis 2002).   
After the DMI allocation, the total end-of-month account balances for all Class A&B 
water right accounts are deducted.  Next, 75,000 ac-ft are allocated to an operating reserve 
(OR).  The OR provides for water loses due to evaporation, seepage, and conveyance; for 
emergency requirements; and for adjustments in storage that may be necessary in the 
provisional IBWC computations.  If water is still available after all deductions, the surplus is 
distributed among the Class A&B rights.  The storage is allocated in proportion to permitted 
annual diversion amounts, but Class A rights receive 1.7 times as much water as that allotted 
to Class B rights.  Consequently, Class B rights suffer greater shortages on water-short years.  
If the OR is less than 75,000 ac-ft but greater than zero, then that amount will be allocated to 
the OR.  If, however, the OR is less than zero ac-ft, a negative allocation process is adopted in 
which water is deducted from the Class A&B accounts until the OR is restored to 48,000 ac-ft. 
Some additional stipulations regarding water rights account balances and permits are as 
follows: 
 
(1) Account balances cannot exceed 141% of their annual permitted storage capacity. 
(2) Accounts are reduced to zero if water has not been used in two consecutive years. 
(3) No allocations are made to water right holders that do not specify place of use. 
(4) Accounts are reduced to zero due to non-payment in a one year period. 
(5) Water rights may be cancelled if not used over a period of ten consecutive years. 
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FIGURE 6.1. Monthly Allocation of the US Share of Conservation Storage in the 
Amistad and Falcon Reservoir System 
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6.2.2 Texas Water Markets 
Water markets represent an alternative means of acquiring the right to use water. Water 
marketing refers to ways of facilitating reallocations through market-like transactions.  
Although water right holders do not have the actual title to the water, a water right can be 
sold, leased, or transferred to another person. 
The Rio Grande has been over-appropriated for many years with no new rights for 
additional water use being granted (Wurbs 1997).  However, water market transactions are 
frequently used in this region to help resolve water supply needs.  The most common 
transaction has been municipalities buying water rights from agricultural users, with 
municipalities acquiring in the order of 10,000 ac-ft of additional rights per year (Griffin and 
Characklis 2002).  One important specification in these transactions is that, in accordance 
with the 30 TAC – 303, if a Class A water right will be acquired for a DMI use it has to be 
converted to 50% of the existing water right.  If it is a Class B right, it has to be converted to 
40% of the existing water right. 
Another common transaction is a temporary (one year) lease of water.  These 
transactions are also known as contractual sales of water.  Contractual sales account for a 
great deal of market activity with 20,000 to 80,000 ac-ft changing hands annually (Griffin 
and Characklis 2002).  In contrast to permanent water sales, contractual sales are only 
approved for same-type use of water.  Other possible transactions are the dry-year option 
contracts and the transfer of conserved water (TWDB 2005).  The dry-year option contracts 
are typically used by municipalities to increase their water supply during times of drought.  
This allows municipalities to meet their needs during droughts and the water right holder 
gains financial benefits from the contract while keeping the right to use the water during 
normal periods.  The transfer of conserved water option is typically used by industries or 
municipalities to acquire water by financing the modernization of irrigation systems in 
exchange for the right of using the water that is being conserved. 
As opposed to the Rio Grande region, water market transactions are not so common in 
the rest of Texas.  In 1993, the Texas Legislature established a statewide water bank, 
managed by the Texas Water Development Board (TWDB), with the intention of 
encouraging and facilitating water marketing (Wurbs 1997).  However, usage of the water 
bank has been sparse. Griffin and Characklis (2002) identified four reasons for this trend.  
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First, they pointed out that water scarcity is not as big of an issue in the eastern basins of 
Texas as it is in the Rio Grande.  The second reason is that Texas does not have the 
appropriate infrastructure to convey water from water-rich to water-short basins.  Third, 
since protection of water rights is based on the honor system, people are hesitant to buy 
something they can take for free or buy something that can be easily taken away from them.  
Finally, the authors suggest that the presence of river authorities hinders water markets 
because they tend to purchase water rights from lesser public and private water districts in 
order to extend their domains within their licensed service areas which results in a 
monopolistic power that makes water marketing infeasible.  Further information regarding 
water markets in general can be found in Chapter IV, Section 4.1.2.2, and in Chapter VII, 
Section 7.2.1. 
 
6.3 INTERSTATE RIVER COMPACTS 
Interstate river compacts are negotiated agreements entered into voluntarily by two or 
more states.  Compacts have become the most common venue for transboundary water 
allocation between states, especially among western states.  The primary purpose of 
interstate compacts is to provide a means for the equitable allocation of water between 
states. Interstate compacts typically create compact commissions composed of 
representatives from the parties entered in the compact (i.e. states and/or the federal 
government) to administer the compact.  The different types of interstate compacts, their 
legal basis, and their allocation and conflict resolution mechanisms are expounded in 
Chapter III, Section 3.3.  The State of Texas participates in five interstate river compacts that 
allocate the waters of its major interstate rivers; the Canadian, Pecos, Red, Sabine, and Rio 
Grande rivers (Figure 6.2). 
 
6.3.1 Canadian River Compact 
The Canadian River Compact is an interstate compact between Texas, New Mexico, and 
Oklahoma. In essence, the compact divides the waters of the basin and it sets maximum 
amounts of conservation storage allowed to each state (Texas Water Code – Chapter 43).  
Oklahoma is allowed free and unrestricted use of all the Canadian River waters in the 
portion of the basin that lies in Oklahoma.  New Mexico is allowed free and unrestricted use  
 85
 
FIGURE 6.2. Texas Interstate Rivers 
 
 
of the runoff generated in the drainage basin of the Canadian River in New Mexico below 
Conchas Dam, however it cannot store more than 200,000 ac-ft in the reservoirs below said 
dam.  The compact states that the water that Texas is allowed to store can only be used for 
municipal, household, livestock, and small scale self-subsistence irrigation uses.  The right 
of Texas to store water is limited to 500,000 ac-ft, until Oklahoma has been provided with 
300,000 ac-ft of conservation storage.  These values exclude storage on reservoirs in the 
North Canadian River for Texas and Oklahoma, and east of the 97th Meridian for Oklahoma.  
Once Oklahoma has received 300,000 ac-ft, the limit for Texas switches to 200,000 ac-ft 
plus whatever amount of water Oklahoma has in conservation storage during the same time 
period.  In other words, the amount of water that Texas can store in excess of 500,000 ac-ft 
is the same amount of water that Oklahoma is storing over 300,000 ac-ft. 
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The Canadian River Compact Commission (CRCC) administers this compact and 
performs an annual accounting of water stored in each state to determine compact 
compliance.  For example, to verify if New Mexico is in compliance with Texas the actual 
amount of storage in Texas reservoirs is divided by 350,000 ac-ft and its converted to a 
percentage.  The 350,000 ac-ft value represents the amount of water that Texas normally has 
in storage during an average runoff year and with New Mexico complying with the compact 
(CRCC 2004). 
Some legal issues have emerged over the years between the Canadian River Compact 
signatory states.  In 1987, Texas and Oklahoma filed suit in the US Supreme Court against 
New Mexico alleging violations of the compact.  The final resolution of the suit occurred 
seven years later in 1994.  The resolution included a finding that New Mexico violated the 
compact and required a repayment of water to Texas for past compact violations, and a 
payment of $200,000 to both Texas and Oklahoma (CRCC 2004).  More recently, Oklahoma 
has been considering filing suit in the US Supreme Court regarding the construction of the 
Palo Duro Reservoir in the North Canadian River Basin in Texas.  Oklahoma asserts that 
they have a higher priority than Texas for using the water from this reservoir and that Texas 
is using the water for purposes other than those authorized by the compact.  The CRCC is 
still trying to resolve this matter without litigation (CRCC 2004). 
 
6.3.2 Pecos River Compact 
The Pecos River Compact is an interstate compact between Texas and New Mexico 
created in 1948.  Basically, the compact requires New Mexico to maintain water deliveries 
to Texas of an amount equivalent to what was reaching the state line under the 1947 natural 
conditions. The compact also created the Pecos River Compact Commission (PRCC), which 
has the responsibility to adopt rules and regulations, perform water supply studies, keep 
track of streamflows, storage, diversions, and water use, and oversee the deliveries of water 
from New Mexico to Texas, among others.  The most prominent specifications of the 
compact include the following (Texas Water Code – Chapter 42): 
 
(1) New Mexico cannot deplete the flow of the river below an amount which will give to 
Texas a quantity of water equivalent to that available under 1947 conditions. 
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(2) Of the water salvaged in New Mexico (i.e. water made available for beneficial use) 
through the construction and operation of water projects, 43% is apportioned to Texas 
and 57% to New Mexico. 
(3) Any water salvaged in Texas is totally apportioned to Texas. 
(4) The unappropriated flood waters are apportioned 50% to each state. 
 
For years, Texas considered New Mexico to be deficient in living up to the terms of the 
contract and in 1974 filed suit.  The US Supreme Court ruled in June 1987 that New Mexico 
owned Texas 340,000 ac-ft of water for the period between 1950 and 1983, and ordered the 
New Mexico repay with deliveries of 34,000 ac-ft of water a year for ten years (Hayter 
2005).  The Court also appointed a River Master to perform the annual accounting of water 
deliveries to Texas. Since completion of the litigation, New Mexico has taken measures to 
comply annually with the Pecos River Compact. New Mexico spent approximately $40 
million appropriated by their legislature to take existing water rights out of production to 
ensure water deliveries to Texas (PRCC 2004). 
 
6.3.3 Red River Compact 
The Red River Compact is an interstate compact between Texas, Oklahoma, Arkansas, 
and Louisiana created in 1978.  The compact divides the Red River basin into five reaches 
and establishes specific allocations for topographic sub-basins within each reach (Texas 
Water Code – Chapter 46).  Article IX of the compact creates the Red River Compact 
Commission (RRCC) for the administration of the compact.  The RRCC has the power to 
adopt rules and regulations governing the operation of the compact and to enforce its terms. 
 
6.3.3.1 Red River – Reach I 
Reach I includes the Red River and tributaries from the New Mexico-Texas state border 
to Denisom Dam and it is divided into four sub-basins.  Sub-basin 1 and 3 are entirely within 
Texas; Sub-basin 2 is entirely within Oklahoma; and Sub-basin 4 includes all of Lake 
Texoma and the Red River from the Texas-Oklahoma boundary to Denisom Dam.  The 
compact apportions the water in each Sub-basin as follows: 
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• The annual flow within Sub-basin 1 is apportioned 60% to Texas and 40% to 
Oklahoma. 
• Oklahoma has free and unrestricted use of the water within Sub-basin 2. 
• Texas has free and unrestricted use of the water within Sub-basin 3. 
• Oklahoma and Texas are apportioned 200,000 ac-ft, which include existing 
allocations and uses.  Additional quantities are allocated 50% to each state. 
 
6.3.3.2 Red River – Reach II 
Reach II begins at Denisom Dam and continues until the river reaches the Arkansas-
Louisiana state boundary.  All the tributaries that contribute to the flow of this portion of the 
river are also included in Reach II.  This reach is divided into five sub-basins. 
Sub-basin 1 is completely within Oklahoma.  The compact states that Oklahoma can 
have unrestricted use of the water in this sub-basin.  Similarly, Texas has unrestricted use of 
the water in Sub-basin 2, which lies entirely within the said state.  Sub-basin 3 is divided 
almost in half between Oklahoma and Arkansas and they both have free and unrestricted use 
of the water within their states.  However, Oklahoma is required to allow 40% of the total 
runoff generated below certain dams to flow into Arkansas.  The waters from Sub-basin 4, 
which is primarily composed of the Sulphur River Basin, are apportioned 100% to Texas. 
Sub-basin 5 is the portion of the Red River from Denisom Dam to the Arkansas-
Louisiana state boundary excluding all tributaries included in the other sub-basins.  In this 
sub-basin, all four states are entitled to 25% of the water, so long as the flow of the river at 
the Arkansas-Louisiana border is 3,000 cfs or more.  If the flow is between 1,000 and 3,000 
cfs, Texas, Oklahoma, and Arkansas are required to allow 40% of the total weekly runoff 
from Sub-basin 5 and 40% of undesignated water flowing into Sub-basin 5 to flow into 
Louisiana.  However, this does not entail any state to release stored water.  If the flow is less 
than 1,000 cfs, Texas, Oklahoma, and Arkansas are required to allow 100% of the total 
weekly runoff from Sub-basin 5 and 100% of undesignated water flowing into Sub-basin 5 
to flow as required to maintain 1,000 cfs.  Other special provisions regarding minimum 
flows and exceptions to the allocation rules are also included in the compact. 
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6.3.3.3 Red River – Reach III 
The majority of Reach III lies in Texas and Louisiana at and it is divided into four sub-
basins.  Sub-basins 1 and 2 lie entirely within Texas and Arkansas, respectively. Sub-basin 3 
is divided between Texas and Louisiana.  Sub-basin 4 lies entirely within Louisiana.  The 
compact apportions the water in each Sub-basin as follows: 
 
• Runoff from Sub-basin 1 is apportioned 60% to Texas and 40% to Arkansas. 
• Runoff from Sub-basin 2 is apportioned 60% to Arkansas and 40% to Louisiana. 
• Texas and Louisiana have unrestricted use of the water of Sub-basin 3 within their 
respective boundaries.  Conservation storage is allocated 50% to each state. 
• Louisiana has unrestricted use of the water of Sub-basin 4. 
 
6.3.3.4 Red River – Reaches IV and V 
Reaches IV and V lie entirely within Arkansas and Louisiana, respectively.  Reach IV is 
divided into 2 sub-basins.  The waters of Sub-basin 1 are apportioned 100% to Arkansas, 
and the waters of Sub-basin 2 are distributed 60% to Arkansas and 40% to Louisiana.  Other 
provisions regarding minimum flow requirements are also stated in the compact.  Reach V 
lies entirely within Louisiana and said state is entitled to 100% of the flows in that reach. 
 
6.3.4 Sabine River Compact 
The Sabine River Compact is an interstate compact between Texas and Louisiana 
created in 1953.  In essence, the compact apportions the waters of the Sabine River 50% to 
Texas and 50% to Louisiana, regardless of the origin of the water (Texas Water Code – 
Chapter 44).  The compact also requires a minimum streamflow requirement of 36 cfs at the 
point where the river touches for the first time both Texas and Louisiana.  With regard to 
reservoirs constructed in the portion of the river that flows along both states, the compact 
establishes that the storage is to be divided in proportion to their contribution to the cost of 
storage. 
The compact also created the Sabine River Compact Administration (SRCA).  The main 
functions of the SRCA include adopting the rules and regulations of the compact, collect and 
analyze streamflows, storage, diversions, and water use data, and maintain an account of the 
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water used by each state.  The SRCA also has the duty of investigating any violation of the 
compact and report recommendations to officials in the affected state. 
Currently, Texas' uses in the Sabine River basin are such a small proportion of its total 
share of the Sabine water that the compact imposes little more than a theoretical limitation 
that may become applicable at some point in the future (Caroom 1997). 
 
6.3.5 Rio Grande Compact 
The Rio Grande Compact is an interstate compact between Colorado, New Mexico, and 
Texas, approved by Congress in 1939 (Texas Water Code – Chapter 41).  The main purpose 
of the compact is to apportion equitably the waters of the Rio Grande above Fort Quitman, 
Texas, among the signatory states.  A depiction of the Rio Grande Basin is shown in Figure 6.3. 
 
 
 
FIGURE 6.3. Rio Grande River Basin (source: Wurbs 1997) 
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The compact also established the Rio Grande Compact Commission (RGCC) to 
administer the terms of the compact.  A critical responsibility of the RGCC is to maintain 
and operate a series of stream gaging stations and keep the flow records required for 
carrying out the compact allocations as explained below. 
The allocation mechanism in this compact is based on a series of tables that indicate the 
water deliveries that Colorado and New Mexico are obligated to make. The tables establish 
relationships between the annual flows at one or more inflow index gaging stations and the 
quantity of water that needs to be delivered downstream.  An example of this mechanism is 
presented in graphical format in Figure 6.4. This figure represents the obligation of New Mexico 
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FIGURE 6.4. Example of Rio Grande Compact Allocation Mechanism. Relationship 
between Annual Flows at Otowi Index Supply (Upstream) and Delivery Obligations at 
San Marcial Index Supply (Downstream) 
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to deliver water in the Rio Grande at San Marcial (downstream index station) during each 
calendar year as a function of the annual flow quantity at the upper index station (Otowi 
Index Supply).  Similar relationships are established for different river reaches.  Another 
important aspect of the compact is the system of debit and credit accounts.  Debits are the 
amounts by which actual deliveries fall below scheduled deliveries, while credits are the 
amounts by which actual deliveries exceed scheduled deliveries.  Both credits and debits are 
determined in annual cycles and they accrue over time.  The compact does however set 
maximum limits for the accrued debits and sets stipulations for the repayment of accrued 
debits from reservoir storage.  For example, during the month of January, the Texas 
representative at the RGCC can demand of Colorado and New Mexico releases from storage 
to the amount of the accrued debits of said states at a practical rate. 
 
6.4 INTERNATIONAL ALLOCATION OF THE RIO GRANDE 
The Rio Grande defines the boundary between Texas and Mexico from Ciudad Juarez/El 
Paso to the Gulf of Mexico.  The Rio Grande waters are shared in accordance with two 
international treaties: the 1906 Convention between Mexico and the United States for the 
distribution of waters of Rio Grande, and the 1944 Treaty for the Utilization of the Waters of 
the Colorado and Tijuana Rivers and of the Rio Grande.  The 1906 Convention apportions 
the waters of the river reach between Ciudad Juarez/El Paso to Fort Quitman, Texas.  The 
1944 Treaty defines the allocation of water between Fort Quitman and the Gulf of Mexico. 
 
6.4.1 Allocation of the Rio Grande above Fort Quitman (1906 Convention) 
The 1906 Convention allocates the waters of the Rio Grande in the international reach 
above Fort Quitman between Mexico and the US (Figure 6.3).  Basically, Mexico is granted 
60,000 ac-ft of water annually, without cost, from the US.  The water is to be delivered at 
the Acequia Madre or Old Mexican Canal in accordance with a monthly schedule.  The 
Convention establishes provisions for “extraordinary drought” or serious accident to the US 
irrigation system.  Under such conditions water deliveries to Mexico are to be reduced in the 
same proportion as deliveries to the US.  Elephant Butte Reservoir in New Mexico is the 
primary storage facility for providing this water.  The delivery of this water, however, does 
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not entail recognition of claims to that water on the part of Mexico.  This Convention has 
worked relatively well since its inception (Combs 2004). 
 
6.4.2 Allocation of the Rio Grande below Fort Quitman (1944 Treaty) 
The 1944 Treaty allocates the waters of the Rio Grande in the international reach from 
Fort Quitman to the Gulf of Mexico between the two countries (Figure 6.3).  The treaty 
allocates the water that reaches the Rio Grande based on a series of allocation rules outlined 
in the treaty.  In general, the rules allot all or a portion of the water reaching the main stream 
to each country based on the geographical origin of the flows (i.e. Rio Grande tributary sub-
basins).  The allocation rules set in Article 4 of the treaty are summarized here as follows:   
 
Water allocated to Mexico: 
(a) All waters reaching the Rio Grande from the San Juan and Alamo Rivers as well as 
their return flows from irrigated lands. 
(b) Half the flow in the main channel of the Rio Grande below the lowest major 
international dam (Falcon Reservoir). 
(c) Two-thirds of the flow reaching the main channel of the Rio Grande from the 
Conchos, San Diego, San Rodrigo, Escondido and Salado Rivers and Las Vacas 
Arroyo. 
(d) Half of all other flows not otherwise allotted occurring in the main channel of the 
Rio Grande, including contributions from all the unmeasured tributaries. 
 
Water allocated to US: 
(a) All the waters reaching the main channel of the Rio Grande from the Pecos and 
Devils Rivers, Goodenough Spring, and Alamito, Terlingua, San Felipe, and Pinto 
Creeks. 
(b) Half of the flow in the main channel of the Rio Grande below the lowest 
international dam (Falcon Reservoir). 
(c) One-third of the flow reaching the main channel of the Rio Grande from the 
Conchos, San Diego, San Rodrigo, Escondido, and Salado Rivers and Las Vacas 
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Arroyo, provided that this third shall not be less as an average amount, in cycles of 5 
years, than 350,000 acre-feet annually. 
(d) Half of all other flows not otherwise allotted in the main channel of the Rio Grande, 
including contributions from all the unmeasured tributaries. 
 
The Treaty also makes provisions for paying water deficits. In the event of 
“extraordinary droughts” or serious damage to the hydraulic systems on the Mexican 
tributaries that may impede the delivery of the annual 350,000 acre-feet, deficiencies 
existing at the end of a 5-year cycle can be made up in the following 5-year cycle with water 
from the same measured tributaries.  If the conservation capacities assigned to the US in at 
least two of the major international reservoirs are filled with waters belonging to the US, a  
5-year cycle is considered terminated, all debits fully paid, and a new 5-year cycle 
commences. 
The Treaty also authorized the construction of two international dams (Amistad and 
Falcon) for flood control, water conservation storage, and streamflow regulation for the 
benefit of both countries.  Falcon, located approximately 275 river miles upstream from the 
mouth of the river, was completed 1953.  Amistad was completed in 1969 and it is located 
approximately 299 river miles upstream of Falcon.  Amistad is the second largest reservoir 
in Texas and Falcon is the fifth.  These reservoirs are operated as a system by the IBWC.  
The IBWC is the administrative body created by the Treaty for overseeing treaty compliance 
and operating the international reservoirs. According to the IBWC, the combined 
conservation storage capacity in these reservoirs is 5,804,706 ac-ft (3,151,242 ac-ft in 
Amistad and 2,653,464 ac-ft in Falcon).  It was the determined by the IBWC that the 
conservation storage in the reservoirs was to be divided between the two countries in 
accordance with their monetary contribution to the construction project: in Amistad, 56% to 
the US and 44% to Mexico; and in Falcon, 59% to the US and 41% to Mexico. 
The IBWC operates the reservoirs according to the operational rules set forth in Article 8 
of the Treaty.  These rules are summarized as follows: 
 
(1) Storage of upstream reservoirs (Amistad) shall be maintained at the maximum 
possible water level, consistent with flood control and other uses. 
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(2) Inflows to the reservoirs must be credited to each country. 
(3) When the conservation pool of a particular country is full, any water in excess of that 
needed to keep it full shall pass to the other country given that it has unfilled 
conservation capacity.  An exception to this rule is that one country may decide to 
temporally use the conservation capacity of the other country in any of the upper 
reservoirs, provided that if a flood or spill occurs this country will be charged for 
that amount and all inflows shall be credited to the other country until the flood 
discharge or spill ceases or until the capacity of the other country is filled with its 
own water. 
(4) Losses in storage are charged in proportion to the ownership of the water in storage. 
(5) Releases from reservoirs are proportionally divided between the countries unless it is 
otherwise approved by the IBWC in case the other country is not using them. 
(6) Either country can avail itself of its share of stored or diverted water as long as it is 
for a beneficial use. 
 
Evidently, water accounting is an integral part of the reservoir system operation.  The 
IBWC keeps records of reservoir inflows, releases, evaporation, and storage, and assigns 
them to each country.  The IBWC schedules releases requested by each country and deducts 
them from their total water allocation.  This procedure allows the IBCW to compute the 
amount of water that each country has in storage at any time and provides the basis for 
evaluating if the countries are in or out of compliance with the established agreements.  
Other IBWC functions include planning and regulation of water quality and sanitation 
activities, flood control, and resolution of conflicts. 
 
6.5 WATER AVAILABILITY MODELING IN TEXAS 
In 1996, the state of Texas experienced a severe drought that caused serious losses in 
crop and livestock production and decreases in surface and groundwater that affected public 
water supplies and water-based recreational activities (Wilhite and Svodoba 2000).  These 
losses were estimated at nearly $5 billion.  This drought turned water resources management 
into the primary public concern and therefore, the number one issue on the 1997 state’s 
legislature agenda.  The 1997 Senate Bill 1 (SB1) addressed a wide range of issues and 
 96
concerns including state, regional, and local planning for water conservation, water supply 
and drought management; administration of state water rights programs; interbasin transfer 
policy; groundwater management; water marketing; state financial assistance for water-
related projects; and state programs for water data collection and dissemination.  SB 1 
defined a new direction for Texas water management.  Water resources were now to be 
planned and administered with a regional, “bottom up” approach.  Previous to SB1, the 
TWDB performed all the water planning process.  SBI created 16 Regional Water Planning 
Groups (RWPG) that represent all local interests and develop regional water plans for water 
conservation, management, and mitigation for the next 50 years (Masloff 2002).  The 
TWDB oversees the planning process and provides administrative and technical support to 
the RWPG (Wurbs 2005). 
SB1 addressed a wide range of water management issues and authorized funds to expand 
the water availability modeling capabilities for the entire state.  An integral part of the SB1 
was the creation of Texas Water Availability Modeling (WAM) System.  The WAM System 
is used to develop the RWPG and TWBD planning studies and to support the TCEQ water 
rights permit program.  The WAM system consists of the following components: 
 
(1) The Water Rights Analysis Package (WRAP) model. 
(2) Databases for existing surface water rights, water use, streamflows, and other 
pertinent data for the 23 Texas river basins. 
(3) Geographic Information System (GIS) tools for determining hydrologic parameters 
and establishing the river/reservoir system connectivity. 
(4) Program management and complete documentation of the WAM System. 
 
The WRAP model is the principal tool of the WAM System.  WRAP is a generalized 
model, developed at Texas A&M University, designed to simulate a river basin under a 
priority-based WAS (Wurbs 2003).  The WRAP model provides the flexibility to simulate 
alternative water availability and management scenarios (e.g. new water right permits, 
changes in operating practices, addition of water supply facilities, limited water supplies) 
and evaluate the system-wide effects of such alternatives.  WRAP evaluates the ability of the 
river/reservoir system to meet demands during a hypothetical repetition of historical 
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hydrology represented by monthly sequences of naturalized flows (unregulated flows) and 
reservoir evaporation rates.  The spatial connectivity of the system is modeled as a set of 
control points.  The computational algorithms are based on the location of each control point 
related to the others as defined in the input data.  Model input includes the priority date and 
authorized annual water use for each water right, monthly water use distribution coefficients, 
return flow specifications, and pertinent reservoir storage data.  Key simulation results 
include regulated flows (i.e. physical flows at a location), reservoir storage contents, 
diversions, water right shortages, unappropriated flows, and reliability indices, (Wurbs 
2003).  WRAP has been used to simulate water allocation and management in all Texas river 
basins (TCEQ 2005b).   
 
6.5.1 WAM Applications to International and Interstate WAS 
The multiple features of the WRAP model allowed considering the peculiarities of 
interstate and international river basins, where water allocation is influenced by treaties or 
compacts, to the extent necessary to assess water availability in Texas. Generally, 
compliance with the respective treaty or compact is assumed, especially for the assessment 
of long-term availability.  In the WRAP model, inflows at the various control points are 
defined as naturalized flows.  Naturalized flows represent the natural flows that would have 
occurred in the absence of the water users and water management facilities and practices.  
When incorporating inflows, the streamflow of transboundary rivers at the points of 
diversion are adjusted so that only Texas water allotment is available to Texas water right 
holders.  If historical data showing deviations from the treaty/compact specifications is 
available, the naturalized flows can be further adjusted to account for the deficits or surplus 
in water available to Texas.  Some specific modeling strategies used to incorporate the 
treaty/compact provisions in the WRAP models are discussed below. 
The Canadian River Compact states that the right of Texas to store water is limited to 
500,000 ac-ft, until Oklahoma has been provided with 300,000 ac-ft of conservation storage 
(section 6.3.1).  However, as of 1993, the actual Oklahoma storage was 12,091 ac-ft and 
there are no plans to substantially increase this storage capacity (Espey Consultants Inc. 
2002).  Therefore, the total storage available to water rights in Texas is limited to 500,000 
ac-ft.  The actual storage amount authorized to water rights in Texas is 509,111 ac-ft.  For 
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modeling purposes, the additional 9,111 ac-ft are subtracted from one water right that 
accounts for more than 98% of the conservation storage. 
The Pecos River Compact apportions the Pecos River waters between New Mexico and 
Texas (section 6.3.2).  Texas’ share of water delivered under the Pecos River Compact is 
based on the flow measured at the streamflow gage on the Pecos River near Red Bluff, New 
Mexico.  Therefore, the historical flow at the Stateline gage has been adjusted to reflect the 
over/under deliveries as documented in the historical accounting records from the TCEQ and 
the Pecos River Commission for the period that compact accounting has been in place 
(1952-2000). Unadjusted records were used for the 1940-1951 period (R. J. Brandes 
Company 2005). 
The Red River Compact has specific provisions for different reaches of the river system.  
Several modeling strategies were implemented in the Red River WAM model (Espey 
Consultants Inc. 2002).  For instance, the waters of Subbasin 1 (Reach I) are apportioned 
60% to Texas and 40% to Oklahoma.  To account for this, only 60% of the naturalized 
inflows computed in WRAP’s hydrology data program (WRAP-HYD) were incorporated 
into the WRAP allocation model (WRAP-SIM).  In the case of Subbasin 2 (Reach I), the 
entire flow is allocated to Oklahoma.  However, historical records indicate that Oklahoma 
does not utilize all the flow, and thus, some water reaches the Texas portion of the subbasin.  
This amount of water was computed based on drainage area ratios and were input in the 
model using flow adjustment factors. The flow adjustment option in WRAP allows 
additional inflows to be added as a time-series at pertinent control points.  In the case of 
Subbasin 5 (Reach II), the flows at certain diversion locations are adjusted to maintain the 
instream flow requirements set forth in the compact as a function of certain streamflow and 
storage conditions (section 6.3.3.2).  These conditions are defined in WRAP as triggers that 
activate the instream flow requirements in the simulation.  Reaches III, IV, and V are not 
included in the model since they are completely within co-riparian states and do not 
contribute flows to Texas. 
The Sabine River Compact apportions the Sabine River waters equally between Texas 
and Louisiana, and it requires a minimum streamflow requirement of 36 cfs at Texas-
Louisiana Stateline.  The division of water is simulated in WRAP using instream flow and 
target option features (Brown & Root Services 2001).  The 50/50 instream flow requirement 
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is set at the mouth of the river at Sabine Lake and applies to all water rights downstream of 
Toledo Bend Reservoir.  Return flows are also subject to the 50/50 split.  The 36 cfs 
minimum flow requirement at the Stateline is set senior to all downstream water rights.  This 
requirement does not involve any releases from storage and only applies to water rights with 
priority dates junior to January 1, 1953. 
The waters of the Rio Grande are allocated between US and Mexico according to the 
1944 Rio Grande Treaty.  In addition, the flow is allocated between Colorado, New Mexico, 
and Texas according with the Rio Grande and Pecos Compacts and the Rio Grande Project.  
The strategies used in the WAM model of the Rio Grande will be discussed in Chapter VIII. 
 
6.5.2 WAM Applications to Intrastate WAS 
Intrastate water allocation in Texas involves complex system configurations of policies, 
practices, and administrative institutions. As part of SB1 stipulations, all entities involved in 
managing the state’s waters must use the modeling tools provided by the WAM System. 
This has resulted in greater consistency in the development of water management plans and 
the evaluation of water right permit applications. 
 
6.5.2.1 WAM System and Water Management Plans  
The TWDB is the primary water resources planning agency in Texas. TWDB is in 
charge of developing the state’s comprehensive water masterplan and to provide leadership, 
technical services, and financial assistance to the 16 RWPG for the development of their 
regional water plans. To perform the myriad of studies required for supporting these 
planning activities, all agencies involved utilize the WAM System administered by TCEQ.  
The TCEQ has developed modeling guidelines for applying the WRAP model under varying 
conditions and assumptions.  To assure consistency in the model development process, the 
TCEQ has stipulated eight model runs and an additional run for firm yield analysis.  Each 
run reflects a specified combination of premises regarding: 
 
(1) Return flow estimates – Consideration of 0, 50, and 100% of return flows. 
(2) Water use – Full authorized amounts of water rights or maximum annual amount of 
water used recorded over the last 10-year period. 
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(3) Reservoir sedimentation conditions – Full reservoir capacity or under year 2000 
sedimentation conditions. 
(4) Water rights permits – Inclusion of term and perpetual rights. 
 
Runs 1–3 are called the “Re-use” runs and they reflect varying return flow amounts.  
Water use in these runs is set to the full amounts, reservoirs are considered to have full 
capacity, and only perpetual rights are included.  Runs 4–7 are called the “Cancellation” 
runs and they combine varying water use amounts with 0 or 100% of return flows, reservoirs 
have full capacity, and they only include perpetual rights.  Run 8 is the “Current conditions” 
run.  This run uses 100% of the return flows, the reservoirs are under the year 2000 
conditions, and both term and perpetual permits are included in the simulation. Each model 
run is performed under two hydrologic conditions: 1) normal flows and 2) drought-of-record 
flows.  The objective of these runs is to determine the projected amount of water that would 
be available under normal and drought-of-record conditions, project the amount of water that 
would become available if water rights cancellation procedures are implemented, and 
investigate the potential impact of municipal and industrial return flows on existing water 
rights, instream uses, and freshwater inflows to bays and estuaries (TCEQ 2005e). 
 
6.5.2.2 WAM System and Water Right Permit Applications 
As explained in section 6.2, water right permit applications are carefully scrutinized by 
the TCEQ before the permit is granted.  Two key requirements that must be met in order to 
approve a permit application are that unappropriated water must be available and that 
existing water rights will not be impaired.  The TCEQ relies on the WRAP capabilities for 
evaluating these requirements. 
Two alternative scenarios are modeled in WRAP to evaluate the aforesaid requirements 
and help determine whether or not the permit can be granted (Wurbs 2005).  Permanent 
permits are evaluated using what is referred to as the “Full authorization” scenario (Run 3).  
This scenario assumes the following conditions: 1) all water rights are using their entire 
allocation, 2) 0% return flows, 3) reservoirs have full capacity, and 4) term permits are not 
included.  Using any other run which simulates quantities less than the full amount 
authorized to each permit may result in water over-appropriation by issuing additional water 
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rights based upon water that has already been allocated to senior water right holders.  
Alternatively, the “Current conditions” run (Run 8) is used for evaluating term permit 
applications.  These simulations are used to determine if unappropriated water is still 
available at a desired reliability (see section 6.2) and if the reliability of existing senior water 
rights is not decreased as a result of the proposed permit.  Failure to meet any of these 
requirements would result in rejection of the permit application. 
Wurbs (2005) evaluated the Texas experience and highlighted two significant 
contributions of the WAM System to the state’s water management.  First, the WAM 
System has helped integrate planning efforts at all management levels and brought greater 
consistency to the administrative and regulatory processes.  Second, as the different planning 
and regulatory scenarios are considered, important water management issues have arisen 
regarding acceptable levels of reliability, reservoir storage priorities, environmental flow 
needs, water permits for multiple reservoir systems, and accounting of return flows.  These 
key issues are being addressed in new WAM studies and some of them may define the 
criteria for the refinement of guidelines and regulations that will further improve water 
resources management. 
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CHAPTER VII 
 
SYSTEMATIZATION OF WATER ALLOCATION SYSTEMS 
 
Efficient allocation of water is increasingly a central issue for the economic well-being 
of individual regions and countries.  The allocation of water resources is typically 
accomplished within the framework of water allocation systems (WAS).  Robust WAS 
facilitate the achievement of economic and social goals.  On the other hand, inadequate 
WAS encourage misuse of the resource ultimately leading to inefficiency and loss to 
individual users who need to compensate for obsolete practices.  In general, a WAS sets 
priorities, applies rules, and organizes responses to a range of water allocation scenarios.   
The development of WAS has become a central issue in water resources management, for 
an effective WAS can help to ensure peace, stability, and prosperity at the local, national, and 
international levels.  The primary objective of a WAS is to codify arrangements to maximize 
the efficient use of water resources by (1) distributing water equitably among users, (2) 
protecting existing users from having their supply diminished by new users, (3) establishing 
rules for sharing limited water resources during drought periods, (4) protecting the long-term 
reliability of the resource by avoiding over-exploitation (Wurbs 2004), and (5) adapting to 
changes in the societal values of water by accommodating new users and uses.  Accomplishing 
this, however, is a challenging task for the institutions that mediate access to water. 
 
7.1 THREE-DIMENSIONALITY OF WATER ALLOCATION 
WAS are defined by multiple overlapping legal systems and levels of water management 
policies and practices. The specific rules for allocating water reflect continual adaptations to 
different water needs and are molded to the hydrologic and socio-economic characteristics 
of a region.  Among nations, water is allocated by means of treaties, decrees, and other 
agreements. The principles and doctrines that have historically governed such agreements 
are commonly known as international water law (Chapter II).  In the United States (US), 
water is allocated among states through interstate river compacts and other legal means 
(Chapter III). Within states, water is distributed among water service and supply 
organizations or individual users through water rights systems (Chapter IV).   
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7.2 SYSTEMATIZATION OF WATER ALLOCATION SYSTEMS 
While the importance of effective water allocation is well recognized, methodologies are 
extremely disparate and somewhat obscure.  From past experiences it is safe to say that there 
is a mismatch between normative prescription of water policy, actual practices, and 
institutional mechanisms.  For instance, although most international treaties define general 
water allocation objectives, usually they neither clarify the allocations among specific users 
nor set priorities under emergency shortages. Also, when the water allocation mechanisms in 
interstate compacts are vague, and thus subject to conflicting interpretations, they may lead 
to lengthy disputes and waste of resources on litigations and Supreme Court appeals.  The 
manner in which water rights systems have evolved in each state has resulted in a lack of 
uniformity in water allocation rules and policies. This lack of specificity at all levels may 
preclude selecting effective allocating mechanisms, which in turn may lead to 
inconsistencies among actions and inefficient performance and incompliance of the system 
objectives (Frederiksen 1992, Wolf 1997).  For these reasons, there is a growing interest in 
the field of developing, improving and administering WAS. 
In this Chapter, a conceptual model for the systematization of WAS is presented. WAS 
are addressed from a hierarchy of water management levels that include: 
 
(1) International river basins involving water allocation among nations. 
(2) Interstate river basin compacts and other interstate allocation arrangements in the US. 
(3) Intrastate water allocation based on water rights systems in the US. 
 
Following this hierarchy, the voluminous compilation of treaties, compacts, and 
scientific and engineering literature are reviewed and researched from the perspective of 
eight major areas fundamental to any WAS: water rights, determination of water allotment, 
administrative systems, reservoir storage considerations, system reliability, multiple uses, 
instream flow requirements, and drought management.  A summary of the researched issues 
and the mechanisms used to address them is presented in Table 7.1.  The systematic scrutiny 
of these areas at all three management levels will define a conceptual framework for 
assessing water allocation. 
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7.3 WATER RIGHTS  
Scope: What are the rules for determining who has the right to use water and in what 
priority?  
The fundamental element of a WAS is the water right.   Water rights systems (WRS) 
give structure to the water allocation process by regulating who has the right to use the 
water.  A robust WRS gives order and security to support economic progress while 
facilitating the achievement of society’s goals for water. A non-comprehensive WRS hinders 
the effective use of the resource and water is wasted in order to compensate for the 
inadequacies of the system.  Designing sound comprehensive WRS is important because 
they define the appropriate structure that guides the use of water. 
 
7.3.1 Intrastate Water Rights Systems 
The framework of policies and rules that administer water rights is usually developed at 
the national or state level.  Different WRS have different set of rules and mechanisms for 
defining who has the right to use water.  Two important concepts can be used to analyze 
such differences: certainty and flexibility.  Certainty can be defined as the level of security 
water right holders can have that water will be available to supply their demands.  Flexibility 
refers to the provisions of a WRS that enables it to supply the water needs of water right 
holders under changing water availability and demand circumstances.   
Water is a highly variable resource, thus its availability cannot be completely ensured.  
Therefore, it can be said that a WRS rather than allocating an amount of water, it allocates 
the probability of obtaining that amount of water or the risk of not obtaining it.  In other 
words, WRS determine how the risks of shortages are distributed among users.   
Tarlock (2000) defines WRS as systems of winners and losers.  Well-developed WRS 
clearly declare who are the winners and losers in times of water shortages.  This not only 
gives security and promotes investment (i.e. certainty), but also provides mechanisms for the 
reallocation of water during times of severe shortages from winners to losers (flexibility).  
Tarlock (2000) suggests that property rights are needed for providing enough incentive for 
future development, reallocation in the face of changing circumstances, and conservation. 
Most WRS rely on the permit system for establishing certainty.  Once a permit is issued 
and water right is vested, the user will have some level of certainty that, if water is available, 
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he/she can use water for the pre-approved purposes.  Certainty of water usage is probably 
the most important criteria for water development.  When a water right holder decides to 
develop the resource, in all likelihood, an economic investment is required to put the water 
to beneficial use.  If there is high uncertainty of water availability for a particular water 
right, investors are more reluctant to develop the resource and the water right holder chances 
for financing or supporting any water related enterprise are small.  The degree of certainty 
WRS give to their water rights holders vary with the system and doctrine of appropriation 
since different types of WRS have different ways of defining how risks are to be distributed 
among users.   
Pure riparianism is a system based on common property and is dependent on torts, 
therefore it does not declare winners and losers in advance but instead provides some 
mechanism for compensation of losers.  In pure riparian states the use of water is attached to 
the ownership of the riverside land, and as long as an individual owns the land, he/she also 
has the right to use the water.  However, this certainty is limited because a riparian user is 
always at risk of having his/her water right scrutinized, modified, or even deemed 
unreasonable in relation to other riparian rights (Chapter IV).  Since land property is the 
main criteria to determine right and there is usually no priority established among water 
rights holders, if conflict arises, even a new use can affect the terms of an existing riparian 
right.  Also a riparian land owner’s right to use water does not expire and can be claimed at 
any time.  Moreover, reasonableness of use is determined by judicial action, thus the 
outcomes of disputes are very difficult to predict and can take a long time to resolve.  In 
other words, even though riparian rights are inherent to the waterfront property and cannot 
be lost by non-use, there is uncertainty in the system due to weaknesses in the reasonable use 
doctrine.  On the other hand, it could be argued that riparianism is a flexible doctrine 
because it allows the system to accommodate preferred uses by dimming them more 
reasonable and therefore adapting to society’s evolving values of water.  However, due to 
the system’s dependence on torts this flexibility may be overshadowed by the problems 
mentioned above, especially during periods of drought where disputes among water users 
are more likely to occur. 
Even though efforts have been made in many eastern states to firm up their WRS the rest 
of the states that still rely on pure riparianism still do so because they assume a continuous 
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abundant supply of water. Eastern states that have adopted regulated riparianism have 
moved from this assumption and have developed measures, to different degrees, for 
establishing a permit system that clearly defines the terms and limitations of water rights 
under regular circumstances and shortages.  Being a system of public rights (or semi-private 
property rights), it tries to reconcile the protection of private values and the furtherance of 
public values.  Even though in regulated riparianism the right to use the water is judged on 
whether the use is reasonable, this criterion is applied very differently than in traditional 
riparianism.  In regulated riparianism reasonableness of use is determined based on the 
general social policy and prior to the issuance of a permit.  The requirement of permits 
provides certainty in the case of investments since once the permit is granted it cannot be 
curtailed save for cases of water shortage, noncompliance, or termination of the permit’s 
period of validity.   
The amount of water the water right holder is to receive is variable.  Most regulated 
riparian states have systems based on proportional water rights. The water is allocated based 
on percentages or fractions of the available streamflow or storage.  Therefore the amount of 
water received by the user varies from year to year and is affected by any new water right 
holders in the system.  To reduce this uncertainty, when shortages are imminent, some states 
(e.g. Arkansas) enforce pre-establish priorities for certain uses, usually protecting domestic 
uses and distributing the shortages among other uses. Most commonly, this prioritization 
obeys the following order: human consumption, agriculture, and other uses.  Other states 
under regulated riparianism allocate risks equitably among all users by reducing all 
diversions by the same rate regardless of the type of use.   
Since the right to use the water in regulated riparianism is not dependent on riparian land 
ownership but on the criteria established by a state’s overseeing agency, permits can be 
terminated regardless of continued land ownership.  As a result, regulated riparian states 
have established permit systems where water rights have a prescribed duration period.  This 
gives a high degree of flexibility to the system since it allows to accommodate newcomers 
and reallocate water to more desirable uses once a permit has expired.  However, short 
duration periods may not allow the users sufficient time to payoff capital equipment or 
recover from losses during dry years, thus adding uncertainties that may promote 
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economically inefficient decisions. Therefore, the degree of certainty in regulated 
riparianism is dependent upon the duration of the water permit.   
The prior appropriation doctrine is a private property WRS.  These systems provide a 
clear and complete risk allocation scheme in advance of shortages.  In times of low supply, 
water allocations follow a priority schedule based on the dates the appropriations started 
(Chapter IV).  In this case, senior water appropriators have greater certainty of receiving 
their full water right allotment and lower risks of shortages than junior appropriators. The 
principle of “absence of damage” states that new appropriations cannot occur unless it is 
shown that they do not damage existing water rights in any way.  Most prior appropriation 
states rely on permitting systems for recording and monitoring water use. Once a prior 
appropriation water right is vested it cannot be terminated except in the case of non use.  
This “non use” rule is intended to prevent “sleeper rights” that may be claimed later and 
introduce uncertainty into the overall system (Livingston 1995). However, this can be seen 
as an incentive for the user to use his/her entire entitlement regardless of need in order to 
avoid loosing the permit. This high degree of certainty offers little flexibility to 
accommodate different scenarios of water supply and demand.   
A special case of water rights allocation can be observed in the case of the Rio Grande 
where the system was created by court adjudication.  The Rio Grande water rights system 
allocates water and risks based on the type of water use (Chapter VI).  Municipal uses 
receive the greatest protection against shortages by receiving their allotment first.  
Agricultural uses bear all the risk by having to reduce or curtail their supply first and having 
their storage rights honored only when there is a water surplus after all other rights and 
operational needs of the system have been satisfied.  
WRS must be flexible and allow water allocations to change in order to adapt to 
changing physical, economic, and social circumstances. Water reallocation not only occurs 
within the context of administrative reallocation but also through voluntary reallocation or 
transferability of water rights.  Voluntary reallocation usually occurs within the context of 
water markets.  This transferability of water rights within and between user-groups is to be 
driven by economic efficiency, where water is transferred from low valued uses to the 
highest valued use.   
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As water demands increases and water supplies are more likely to decrease due to 
pollution and potentially climate change (Miller et al. 1997; Tarlock 2002) water markets are 
the most likely source of new supplies.  However, the question of whether the redistributions 
commanded by the market are fair and consistent with social and ecological values is not 
easy to answer.  The value society puts on its water resources can not always be expressed in 
monetary terms and therefore the highest economically valued use is not necessarily the 
most desirable.  Overseeing institutions are crucial for ensuring the protection of non-
quantifiable values of water and enforcing binding contracts between individuals.  Thus, a 
mix of market and administrative mechanisms are usually required. The best combinations 
of such mechanisms vary somewhat depending on local circumstances.   In 1992, California 
established an emergency water bank for the reallocation of water rights as a respond to a 
five year drought.  The water bank allowed market transfers of water rights but with a 
significant amount of state control.  The water bank program was highly successful in 
transferring water from less (i.e. agriculture) to more economically sensitive sectors (i.e. 
municipal and industrial) of the state. 
 
7.3.2 Water Rights in Interstate Basins 
WRS in interstate rivers can present an administrative challenge, especially between 
states following the prior appropriation doctrine.  These difficulties arise in cases where 
water users in the downstream state have appropriation dates well ahead of appropriators on 
upstream states.  In this case, since water compacts override state water rights law, those 
early downstream appropriators might lose water during times of low flows or if their state’s 
water allocation is not large enough.  This situation has been avoided by some states by 
taking a different approach and addressing this issue in the compact.  For instance, the Belle 
Fourche, Yellowstone, and Snake Rivers Compacts all have made clear that compact 
allocative terms apply only to post-compact diversions and uses and pre-compact rights are 
preserved as if there were no compacts.   
Another approach has been adopted by some eastern states to avoid conflict between 
water users of a basin on different sides of states’ lines.  Watershed management and 
planning agencies with water rights granting capabilities determine who within the interstate 
watershed has the right to use the water.  The criteria used to determine the right to use water 
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is guided primarily by the agency’s comprehensive plan for the basin regardless of the state 
in which the water users reside or where the diversion is being made (Sherk 1994).  The best 
example of this trend is the Delaware River Basin Commission which has quasi-judicial 
powers that allow it to determine the validity of rights and resolve disputes. 
 
7.3.3 International Water Rights 
Usually, determining who has the right to use water at the international level is not a 
difficult task.  International law recognizes that all riparian counties have the right to use the 
resource regardless of their economical and political power status.  Defining the terms and 
extent of such right is more complicated.  International water rights as defined by 
international water law are an evolving concept modeled after the prior appropriation system 
and the doctrine of equitable utilization developed in the US (Chapter IV).    But unlike the 
US where the Supreme Court can determine the extent of a state’s right to use a common 
resource, international law lacks such an institution and international water rights are defined 
by vague concepts that in practice have little meaning.  In addition, intranational or intrastate 
WRS allow the creation of semi-exclusive private rights (i.e. property rights) which is not 
yet seen in the international setting.   
An international water right has no clear definition of control rights.  In other words, the 
extent of an international water right in terms of the right to exclusion (who will have access 
to the resource and who will not), management (regulation of usage patterns), and alienation 
(right to sell, lease, etc.) are unknown (Schlager and Ostrom 1992).  Therefore, even though 
water can be seen as a commodity within a country’s borders, that same country may not 
recognize water as such commodity outside its borders.   
Countries usually invoke state sovereignty over its water resources making it more 
difficult to efficiently manage the resource. Recently, a model of “community property” has 
been advocated in which rivers an associated water resources are to be managed jointly 
regardless of international borders (Dellapena 1994b).  However, this concept has not been 
adopted in any international agreement nor has been implemented in any international water 
project besides the formation of committees for riparian cooperation.  The weakness of the 
definition of water rights is probably the major reason of the international water law 
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shortcomings in being a major factor for stabilizing and securing international relations over 
shared water resources. 
The need for stronger definitions for international water rights has been stressed in 
recent years with political changes such as the dissolution of the Soviet Union.  Former 
Soviet countries in Central Asia have been struggling to reconstruct an economy from 
severely depleted resources, especially water.  The environmental devastation in the Aral 
Sea and the many social conflicts that have resulted from it has left the counties of the region 
competing for an ever decreasing resource.  In the Middle East, longstanding conflict 
between Turkey, Iran, and Iraq over the Euphrates-Tigris basin and Palestine and Israel have 
drawn attention to problems with the international water law doctrines of absolute 
sovereignty (hydrography) and absolute riverain integrity (chronology)(Chapter II, section 
2.1).   
In these water-stressed regions these contradicting concepts have caused decades of 
deadlocks and hostilities.  It has been argued that a more efficient approach would be to 
manage the resources according to needs rather than rights.  In other words, it would be 
easier to reach agreements based on sharing the socio-economic benefits of water rather than 
address the right to share a particular amount of water.  Basis for this, come from the 
experience of international treaties were “baskets of benefits” have been included as part of 
treaty provisions.  For instance, the 1909 agreement between Canada and US allocates the 
water based on equality of benefits.  The Lesotho Highlands Treaty grants South Africa 
water for conservation and to Lesotho hydropower from the same reservoir project.  A recent 
example of this management mechanism is the Southern Anatolia Project (GAP from its 
Turkish acronym) in the Euphrates-Tigris basin.  After decades of deadlocks between the 
riparian countries based on Turkey’s claim of absolute sovereignty rights and Syria and Iraq 
claims of prior use and riverain integrity rights, the countries appear to be cooperating in 
establishing dialogue and investigation pertinent to the region needs and socio-economic 
development.   
 Kibaroglu (2002) argues that using needs rather than rights as the basis for allocation is 
the new paradigm for international water management.  The author states that the doctrine of 
equitable utilization is the correct mechanism to establish needs-based allocation because it 
provides flexibility to integrate multiple issues.  Currently, the GAP project operates on the 
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basis of an agreement between Turkey and Syria to cooperate on technical trainings, studies’ 
development, technology and data exchange, and conduction of joint projects. The 
agreement has neither water allocation stipulations nor any specific provisions for the 
recognition of water rights.  Even though this new approach is extremely promising for 
resolution of future water conflicts and to further improve international water law and 
management, several important issues must be considered.   
 First, at the international level, equitable utilization has also displayed the same 
shortcomings of absolute sovereignty and riverain integrity doctrines, (i.e. vagueness, 
impracticality and contradiction).  Flexibility for reaching comprehensive agreements is 
found in the US application of the doctrine, where strong and impartial institutions (i.e. US 
Supreme Court or basin commissions) oversee, mediate, rule, and enforce allocations.  
International water law has not such an institution and in the case of the Euphrates-Tigris 
conflict, the countries have been reluctant to create an institution with enough power to 
make such decisions.   
 Second, a country’s need for water has no relationship with the amount of water 
available for use. Currently the riparian countries of the Euphrates-Tigris basin have water 
claims that exceed the Euphrates supply by 50% (Recknagel 2005).  A needs-based 
approach would necessarily require creating some criteria for deciding whose need should 
have priority and that in itself creates a legal dilemma almost impossible to solve at the 
current stage of international law.   
 Third, there is the fact that needs for water change overtime and at different rates in 
different countries according with the economic development stage of each country.  This 
presents a worrisome scenario in regions with great disparity between riparian states and a 
history of unwillingness for cooperation and compromise exist.  Water rights systems protect 
countries in time of scarcity against overuse by other more powerful countries.  In the case 
of the Euphrates-Tigris basin, both conditions exist.  Turkey is a more economically advance 
country than Iraq and Syria and is relying of its surface water resources to support its 
growing economy.  Moreover, Turkey has repeatedly show disregard for its neighbor’s 
claims as well as for international intervention by curtailing the flow of the Euphrates.  
International organizations have intervened by threatening to curtail funds for water 
development projects in order to resolve these crises.  Moreover, when the GAP project is 
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completed by 2010, Turkish irrigation projects will consume 50% of the Euphrates flows 
giving little margin for considering other needs.  More recently, the countries have been 
opened to dialogue and cooperation and have formed a Joint Technical Committee (JTC) for 
investigating future agreements on water rights.  The countries however, have refused to 
give any significant power to the JTC or to make any definite commitment for joint 
integrated management. Meanwhile this massive water management project grows nearer its 
completion date without an agreement in place and the potential for conflict increases, with 
every passing day having the potential to be the first of the next drought.   
 
7.4 DETERMINATION OF WATER ALLOTMENT 
Scope: What are the hydrological and policy criteria used for assigning diversion and 
storage quantities to water users? 
 
7.4.1 International Allotment 
 During international negotiations the determination of a nation’s water allotment has 
been mostly governed by the principles of equitable utilization and avoidance of significant 
harm.  Equitability of utilization is not necessarily interpreted as the division of water into 
equal portions but as equality of right to use the water for beneficial purposes.  The manner 
in which a nation’s “equal right” to use the water is determined has been categorized in the 
UN Convention on the Law of Non-Navigational Uses of International Watercourses.  The 
Convention identifies a list of as much as seven factors that should be considered as a whole 
and none is paramount (UN 1997): 
 
(1) Geographic, hydrographic, hydrological, climatic, ecological and other factors of a 
natural character. 
(2) The social and economic needs of the watercourse states concerned. 
(3) The population dependent on the watercourse in each watercourse state. 
(4) The effects of the use or uses of the watercourses in one watercourse state on other 
watercourse states. 
(5) Existing and potential uses of the watercourse. 
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(6) Conservation, protection, development and economy of use of the water resources of 
the watercourse and the costs of measures taken to that effect. 
(7) The availability of alternatives, of comparable value, to a particular planned or 
existing use. 
 
Besides this, no other guidelines are given on how to weight each factor against each other 
than “the weight to be given to each factor is to be determined by its importance in 
comparison with that of other relevant factors”.  Moreover, the lack of specificity in the 
definition of such factors makes the process highly ambiguous and overall impractical 
(Elmusa 1998, Utton 1998, McCaffrey 2001).  For instance, one of the factors calls for 
consideration of the physical and natural attributes of the international watercourse but gives 
no further insight on how to incorporate them into the consideration process.  If we are to 
take drainage area and streamflow contribution as the main physical attributes for 
determining equitable apportionment: how do we use them for determining a nations share?  
Is total drainage area more relevant than streamflow contribution?  How do these factors 
compare in importance with other factors such as population dependent on the watercourse 
or existing uses of the watercourse? 
 Perhaps not giving any hierarchy to these factors, more than giving flexibility to the 
process, has made political power the more significant factor in the determination of a 
nation’s water share.  However, this is not to say that the factors proposed by the Convention 
are not relevant or useful to the process of international water allocation.  When one 
considers other alternatives, it would be highly improbable that a nation would agree to 
consider other more technically specialized approaches such as economic maximization and 
game theory that are not well anchored in international law.  It is mostly the lack of guidance 
in how to evaluate these factors what makes the process of equitable apportionment 
somewhat ambiguous and obscure.  
 Elmusa (1998) has suggested that socioeconomic and environmental factors should have 
priority over the others since they are the ones that better define “relative justice” and 
facilitate compromise among riparians. According to the author, the history of political 
negotiations and conflicts shows that countries based their rights to use watercourses on their 
socioeconomic and environmental needs.  Others have taken a more physically oriented 
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approach for determining equitable utilization. Pherry (2000) evaluates different scenarios 
for allocating the waters of the Zambezi River between Zambia and Zimbabwe.   The author 
used mean annual flows and each country’s flow contribution as criteria to determine 
equitable allotment assuming two administrative scenarios: allocation among user-groups 
irrespective of their location and total volume allocation to each sovereign state.  Both 
allocation alternatives are expressed as net annual flows and percentage of mean annual 
runoff.  The author concluded that given the political characteristics of the Zambezi region, 
using flow contributions to determine water allocation while managing the basin as a whole 
and assigning allocations according to user-groups would give more water to the countries 
and therefore is the most equitable and beneficial scenario of allocation.   
International water allocation sometimes includes storage allocation especially when 
international dams are constructed.  In these cases, economic considerations are also taken 
into account into the allocation process.  Such was the case in the 1944 Rio Grande Water 
Treaty between the US and Mexico.  Even though the main purpose of the treaty is to divide 
the flows of the river, it made provisions for the construction of international dams and their 
management by the International Boundary and Water Commission (IBWC). The IBWC 
was to determine the details and allocation of storage in accordance with the treaty water 
provisions and water accounting of their allotted flows.  Two international dams were 
constructed Amistad and Falcon.  It was the determined by the IBWC that the conservation 
storage in the reservoirs was to be divided between the two countries in accordance with 
their monetary contribution to the construction project: in Amistad, 56% to the US and 44% 
to Mexico; and in Falcon, 59% to the US and 41% to Mexico. 
 
7.4.2 Interstate Allotments 
In the US, interstate water compacts allocation provisions usually do not discuss the 
rationale for proportioning the flows between states.  However, in the case of the 1947 Pecos 
River Compact, it is known that the adopted allocative methodology was intended to provide 
Texas with an amount of water equivalent to what was reaching the state line under the 1947 
natural conditions.  Also, the 1929 Rio Grande River Compact allocation was intended to 
preserve the allocation of the river as of 1929 by developing a series of curves relating 
inflows and outflows to Elephant Butte Reservoir.  This suggests that the allocative criterion 
 117
used in these compacts was to protect the pre-compact level of beneficial use (i.e. existing 
uses) established in the corresponding states.  Due to the lack of detail given on the 
compacts’ text, other criteria such as runoff contribution are more difficult to identify.  
However, equitability is always the main purpose or objective of the allocation.   
The majority of compacts specify that water originating in a specific state belongs to that 
state, and only waters from shared sections of the steam are divided.  A smaller number of 
compacts divide the water regardless of where the water originated (e.g. Sabine River 
Compact).  Whatever the underlying principles for determining an equitable allotment have 
been, allocations are usually defined as fixed amounts or as percentages of the stream flow.  
The flow amounts specified can be annual (e.g. South Platte River Compact), monthly (e.g. 
Big Blue River Compact) or daily (e.g. La Plata River Compact).  The total water 
availability is determined from flow measurements at specific gauge stations or estimated 
flows from site-specific hydrologic models.   
Storage allocations in compacts are much simpler.  They are basically limitations on the 
amount of water that can be stored by upstream states.  In parts of the country where the 
regime of inflows are in mismatch with the regime of water use or where there are great 
variability of flows, upstream states require storage to be able to use their fair share of the 
resource while downstream states require some assurance that some flows will reach the 
state line.  The storage limits can be expressed as fixed storage quantities or storage 
elevation levels or they can be a series of storage amounts that vary depending on the season 
or stream flow conditions.  In these types of compacts the downstream state will receive 
only what is left of inflows after the upstream state has had its allotment, therefore assuming 
most of the risk of water shortages.   
The major advantage of storage allocation compacts is that they are relatively easy to 
implement, monitor and enforce since the level of water in storage at a dam is openly 
visible.  Most problems arise from the drafting of the compact, especially regarding if the 
compacts limits or not the construction of new dams (McCormick 1994).  For instance, the 
Canadian River Compact was the center of litigation from 1987 to 1994 between Oklahoma, 
Texas and New Mexico due to differences in interpretation of compact language.  Finally the 
Supreme Court decided in favor of Oklahoma and Texas interpretation of the compact 
stipulations.  Recently, Oklahoma has expressed its resolution to sue Texas for breaching the 
 118
Canadian River Compact by constructing the Palo Duro Reservoir and increasing Texas’ 
storage capacity, an interpretation the state of Texas disagrees with.  Since the Canadian 
River Compact Commission does not have any effective mechanism for conflict resolution 
and/or enforcement, this conflict will most likely end in the Supreme Court. 
 
7.4.3 Intrastate Water Allotment 
The criteria for determining the allotment size of individual users within a state varies 
according with the state’s allocation philosophy. In states following pure riparianism, a 
riparian user is entitled to take as much water as he/she need as long as it does not negatively 
impact other riparian’s water uses.  If conflicts arise, a court suit must follow to determine 
the riparians fair share of water as well as any possible compensation for damages caused.   
The specific criteria a state court uses to determine if a particular riparian user has used more 
than his/her fair share of water vary from state to state but it is always based on the concepts 
of reasonable use and equitability (Chapter IV).  However, several generalizations can be 
made regarding the courts’ criteria for determining equitable apportionments.  Some of the 
criteria used are: priority of appropriation, physical and climatic conditions, consumptive 
usage, rate of return flows, extent of established uses, availability of storage, and damage to 
upstream areas as compared to benefits downstream.   
Regulated riparianism has built on these rules and added other of its own in its 
permitting structure.  The influence of the “natural flow” theory (Chapter IV) is still evident 
in more regulated eastern states where instream flow uses have historically been considered 
more important than in western states.  For that reason, a minimum flow is usually 
established and given priority over most uses.  From the remainder flow individual water 
rights diversions are assigned.  There are different methodologies for determining the water 
allotment size of individual rights.  In general, the permit size is related to the size or value 
of the land, especially if it is riparian land.  The amount allocated is usually in proportion to 
the landholding, the length of riparian streamfront or the operational size of the user 
operation (Chapter IV).  Some states use a more ad hoc approach where proposed water 
rights are evaluated and its size determined based on the use compatibility with the state’s 
development interest, water use policy, historical water consumption, and/or other concerns 
such as economic value of the use.   
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In the prior appropriation system the amount of water allocated to an individual use is 
directly related to the concept of beneficial use.  In the early days of the system the amount a 
user was entitled to was whatever amount of unappropriated water he/she can put to optimal 
beneficial use (i.e. consumptive uses).  As water has become scarcer and western water 
administration more structured and regulated, states have become more stringent in 
determining the size of a water permit.   
Additional criteria factored into the process vary from state to state.  Several additional 
factors are: harm to current appropriators, regional economic interests, preferred water uses, 
water conservation technology, the public trust, and environmental concerns among others.  
For instance, since 1985 the state of Texas requires the Texas Commission on 
Environmental Quality (TCEQ), formerly known as the Texas Natural Resource 
Conservation Commission, to consider potential environmental damages to aquatic and 
terrestrial habitats before conceding new water right permits.  Nonetheless, the most 
important factor is water availability.  Many states have declared certain river basins to be 
fully or even over appropriated and have prohibited the concession of additional water 
rights. Therefore, only unappropriated water is available for appropriation.   
Four considerations arise when determining if there is water available for appropriation: 
(1) the geographical source of the water relative to the proposed diversion, (2) the existence 
of prior claims (e.g. other water rights, federal rights, international or interstate 
commitments, Indian rights, etc), (3) exclusivity of the water body (e.g. preservation), and 
(4) the potential for re-appropriation of water (e.g. return flows, irrigation seepage, runoff 
from excess application etc.) (Beck et al. 2001b).  In many states it is not unusual for new 
potential water users to be required to prove that there is still water available for 
appropriation at the desired water body.  If it is established that there is enough water 
available, then intent of using the water for beneficial use must be proved (Chapter IV) and 
water is allocated accordingly with the user’s need.  It is important to note that no water is 
allocated to compensate for losses due to inefficient water conveyance and/or inadequate 
technology. 
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7.5 ADMINISTRATIVE SYSTEMS 
Scope: What are the roles and jurisdiction of the multiple administrative institutions that 
mediate access to water?  
Effective governance is a requisite to achieve successful management of water 
resources.  Water systems are equally impacted by the availability of water as it is by the 
institutional framework that mediates access to water.  It is therefore important to examine 
the institutional mechanisms used to facilitate effective development and management of the 
resource. 
 
7.5.1 International Transboundary Administration 
There is no one overseeing international water entity with real administrative powers.  
Instead, several international councils, commissions, and organizations perform different 
aspects of regional or watershed-level water management.  The institutions listed in Table 
7.2 are examples of the various kinds of administrative entities created for managing 
international waters.  The functions and powers of these institutions vary. In general, the 
institutions may have legal, operational, and/or regulatory functions (Frederiksen 1992).  
Legal functions typically include resolutions of law, authorization of funds, and policy 
making.  Operational functions consist mostly of project planning, design, construction, and 
maintenance, data collection and sharing, and professional assistance.  Regulatory functions 
include resource apportionment, determination of harm, dispute settlement, and assessment 
of compliance with established laws, regulations, and agreements. 
International administrative entities can be divided into two main categories: (1) those 
that deal with international waters in general and (2) those that were created for overseeing a 
specific transboundary water system.  International organizations sponsored by the UN, 
international law committees, and the International Court of Justice (ICJ) (Table 7.2) are 
examples of the first category.  These entities typically serve as advisors in coordinating 
efforts for water development, policy improvement, and maintaining and promoting 
cooperation and good will among co-riparian countries.  Perhaps the major contribution of 
these entities has been made in the fields of policy-making and conflict resolution.  For 
instance, the most influential documents on international water law, namely the Helsinski 
Rules and the UN Convention on the Law of the Non-Navigational Uses of International  
 121
Table 7.2. International Administrative Entities
Administrative 
Entity Examples
Primary 
Function
Water Resources 
Responsibilities
International Law 
Association
International Law 
Commission
Courts of Justice International Court of Justice Legal
Advisory opinions on 
specific conflicts.  
Settlement of legal 
disputes. No enforcement 
capabilities.
World Bank
UN Environment 
Programme
UN Development 
Programme
International Boundary   
and Waters Commission   
(US and Mexico)
Treaty enforcement. Water 
accounting. Research and 
planning. Construct, 
operate, and maintain 
water works. Dispute 
settlement.
Mekong River Commission 
(Thailand, Laos, 
Cambodia, and Vietnam)
Create policy. 
Development and 
enforcement of water 
plans.  Dispute settlement. 
Monitoring and 
information sharing.
International Joint 
Commission            
(US and Canada)
Evaluate new water 
diversions and projects.  
Dispute settlement. 
Agreement enforcement. 
Monitoring and 
information sharing.
Operational 
and Regulatory
Legal
Advisory functions for the 
development of 
international policies
Operational Financing, mediation, professional assistance.
International  
Commissions
International 
Organizations
International Law 
Committees
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Table 7.2. Continued
Administrative 
Entity Examples
Primary 
Function
Water Resources 
Responsibilities
Nile Basin Initiative       
(Burundi, Democratic 
Republic of Congo, Egypt, 
Ethiopia, Kenya, Rwanda, 
Sudan, Tanzania, and 
Uganda)
Operational
Policy direction for 
cooperation. Resource 
planning and management.
Intergovernmental 
Coordinating Committee of 
the La Plate River Basin 
Countries              
(Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, 
Paraguay, and Uruguay)
Operational
Promotion of mutual 
projects. Infrastructure 
improvement. 
Conservation efforts. 
Resource management.
Intergovernmental 
Committees
 
 
 
Watercourses, were drafted by the International Law Association and the International Law 
Commission, respectively.  UN international organizations have played a crucial role in the 
resolution of conflicts and subsequent development of management efforts in some 
international river basins.  For example, the World Bank intervention in the India and 
Pakistan dispute over the Indus River was probably the most critical factor in the 
formulation of the Indus Waters Agreement. Similarly, the intervention of the UN 
Environmental Programme in the Zambezi River and UN Development Programme in the 
Mekong River as mediators and financial partners was the catalyst for the formation of 
international agreements.  However, the role of these organizations is limited since these 
success stories can be attributed more to the interest and effort of individuals, than the actual 
role and jurisdiction of the international organizations themselves (Nakayama 1997, Biswas 
1999).  
Perhaps the only international organ with any kind of leverage for resolving disputes 
over international waters is the ICJ.  The general functions of the ICJ are to settle, in 
accordance with international law, the legal disputes submitted to it by states, and to give 
advisory opinions on legal questions referred by duly authorized international organs and 
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agencies.  However, cases in the ICJ are entered into voluntarily and only recognized nations 
can bring their cases to the Court consideration.  Furthermore, like all other international 
entities aforementioned, the ICJ has no practical mechanism to enforce its decisions. 
International River Commissions and intergovernmental committees exemplify the 
second category of international administrative entities.  These entities are usually created by 
treaties for managing and enforcing water allocation as defined in international agreements 
for specific transboundary river basins.   
Three of the most comprehensive river commissions are the IBWC, the International 
Joint Commission (IJC), and the Mekong River Commission (MRC).  The IBWC was 
created pursuant to the 1944 Treaty that allocates the Colorado, Tijuana, and Rio Grande 
rivers between US and Mexico.  The main role of the IBWC is the joint operation of the 
Amistad and Falcon international reservoirs and to regulate streamflows in accordance with 
the 1944 Treaty rules.  Water accounting is an integral part of the system’s operation.  The 
IBWC keeps records of reservoir inflows, releases, evaporation, and storage, and assigns 
them to each country.  The IBWC schedules releases requested by each country and deducts 
them from their total water allocation.  This procedure allows the IBCW to compute the 
amount of water that each country has in storage at any time and provides the basis for 
evaluating if the countries are in or out of compliance with the established agreements.  
Other IBWC functions include planning and regulation of water quality and sanitation 
activities, flood control, and resolution of conflicts. Even though the IBWC is probably the 
most efficient international administrative institution in terms of reservoir management, it is 
not a model of comprehensive basin-wide management.  As with many other international 
institutions, the IBWC was created for the management of joint water infrastructure. 
Therefore it lacks adaptation mechanisms as it is bounded by the provisions established in 
the treaty and does not have the power to implement alternative basin-wide management 
strategies. 
The IJC administers the 1909 Boundary Waters Treaty between US and Canada.  The 
jurisdiction of the IJC is limited to the boundary waters, mostly the sections of the Niagara 
and Mary-Milk rivers and the Great Lakes.  Each country retaining exclusive control over 
the tributaries to boundary waters within its territories.  However, the IJC has stronger 
judicial and investigative powers than the IBWC, especially for conflict resolution.  The IJC 
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has judicial power to approve projects affecting boundary waters, water flowing from 
boundary waters, and transboundary waters below the boundary (Utton 1991b).  The 
countries are required to obtain approval from the IJC before taking any action that may 
affect the flow or level of boundary waters.  The IJC makes decisions based on a set of 
priority preferences according to use type as established in Article VIII of the treaty: 
 
(1) Uses for domestic and sanitary purposes 
(2) Uses for navigation 
(3) Uses for power and irrigation purposes 
 
The IJC decisions are binding and are made based on majority of votes, each country 
having three votes.  The secret of the IJC success lies in the fact that the treaty established 
that in the case of a deadlock, the dispute is to be referred to an umpire appointed by the 
parties.  The umpire’s conclusion will render the IJC decision, which is adjudicatory in 
nature.  The IJC investigative powers are also extensive. Either country may request an 
investigation on potential issues that may cause conflict. The IJC has developed a reputation 
of impartiality, objectivity, and efficiency that has been a key factor in preserving the 
tradition of goodwill and cooperation that exist between the two countries.  Nonetheless, the 
lack of basin-wide management capabilities has been problematic.  This has made very 
difficult for the IJC to successfully perform some of its responsibilities such as 
environmental protection, especially in the Great Lakes (Utton 1991b). 
The MRC was created through the Agreement on the Cooperation for the Sustainable 
Development of the Mekong River Basin of 1995.  In contrast to the IBWC, the MRC was 
created for “the integrated management” of the Mekong River basin, which aimed at 
optimized utilization of the water resources in the basin by dealing with it as a unit, 
regardless of the borders among riparian countries (Nakayama 1997).  The principal 
functions of the MRC are represented in its four core programs: Basin Development Plan, 
Water Utilisation Programme, Environment Programme, and the Flood Management and 
Mitigation Programme. This agreement, however, does not specifies water allocations.  
Instead, it vested power to the MRC to formulate water utilization rules.  As of 2005, an 
accord has not been reached on the actual water allocation mechanisms.  However, the MRC 
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is a relatively young institution and major advances have been made in other areas such as 
data collection and sharing, professional training, research cooperation, and conservation 
planning.   
Intergovernmental Committees are also entities created for overseeing specific 
transboundary water systems but their functions are mostly directed toward improving 
cooperation and dialogue among co-riparian countries.  Burchi and Speij (2003) provide 
further information regarding commissions and committees for the administration of bi- and 
multinational river basins. 
 
7.5.1 Interstate Transboundary Administration 
The water resources responsibilities of administrative entities at the interstate level are 
summarized in Table 7.3.  About two thirds of all interstate water allocation compacts create 
commissions to administer the compact. There is a difference in power and structure among 
commissions created by interstate compacts and those created by federal-interstate 
compacts.  In the case of the former, the functions of interstate water commissions (IWCs) 
are usually more limited.  Generally, the purpose of IWCs is to accumulate information, 
facilitate communication, and negotiate during changing circumstances (Copas 1997).   
In Texas, there are five IWCs that administer the Pecos, Red, Sabine, Canadian, and Rio 
Grande basins compacts (Chapter VI).  In this region, accusations of non-compliance arise 
regularly, many of them resulting in lengthy and costly Supreme Court litigations (e.g. 
Pecos, Canadian, and Rio Grande).  Only the Rio Grande Compact Commission (RGCC) 
has water accounting capabilities as specified in the compact.  In 1987, the Pecos River 
Compact Commission added a River Master office for water accounting as a result of a 
Supreme Court resolution after 30 years of disputes between Texas and New Mexico.  On 
the other hand, federal-interstate compacts (e.g. Delaware and Susquehanna River Basin 
Compacts) have established commissions with extensive planning, regulatory, and 
enforcement powers.  The Delaware River Basin Commission (DRBC) has the authority to 
approve or reject any project that may have a substantial effect on the water resources of the 
basin.  Approval decisions are guided by the comprehensive plan for the basin developed by 
the DRBC itself.  The Susquehanna River Basin Commission has powers and duties similar 
to the DRBC but they are also in charge of water quality permits and floodplain management  
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Table 7.3. Interstate Administrative Entities
Administrative Entity Water Resources Responsibilities
Interstate and Federal-Interstate 
Compact Commissions
Administer water compacts specifications. Manage 
and operate interstate rivers and reservoirs at 
different degrees.
*US Army Corps of Engineers
Construction, operation and maintenance of water 
infrastructure. Some resource management and 
regulatory functions.
*US Bureau of Reclamation
Monitoring an development of irrigation projects in 
the West. Construction, operation and maintenance 
of water infrastructure.
*Environmental Protection Agency Administers and enforces the Clean Water Act and other federal environmental protection programs. 
*US Fish and Wildlife Service
Administers and enforced the Endangered Species 
Act. Declares critical habitat areas for species 
protection. 
*US Geological Survey
Monitoring and collection of data. Preparation of 
technical reports. Financing of water resources 
research. Mediation in some interstate water 
compact commissions.
* Federal Agency  
 
 
regulations.  Water commissions also function as forums for resolving disputes.  The most 
common mechanisms for conflict resolution are voting and arbitration (McCormick 1994).   
Voting can occur among commission members in order to use a majority criterion to 
reach a decision. Several commissions have non-voting federal representatives (e.g. US 
Geological Survey) and some allow these members to vote when a tie needs to be broken 
(e.g. Yellowstone and Snake River Compact Commissions). In reality, only the DRBC has 
enough power to make and enforce independent decisions. This commission has the 
authority to allocate the waters of the basin among the signatory states in accordance with 
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the Supreme Court’s doctrine of equitable apportionment and impose penal sanctions to 
compact violators (Muys 2003, Copas 1997). 
The federal role in the administration of interstate water resources is also important.  
During the first part of the 20th century, the federal construction agencies and congressional 
public works committees fostered countless water projects around the nation and guaranteed 
federal involvement in the development and management of water. Currently, the US 
Bureau of Reclamation and the US Corps of Engineers operate and manage several reservoir 
and water infrastructure projects in many interstate basins.  Nonetheless, federal funding of 
water projects has been greatly reduced and a new pattern of greater cost sharing by project 
beneficiaries has emerged (Cortner and Auburg 1988).   
Federal regulation, on the other hand, has become increasingly influential on the set of 
institutions that mediate access to water.  This federal influence is shaped by the federal 
jurisdiction over navigable waters, federal laws (e.g. Clean Water Act, Safe Drinking Act, 
Endangered Species Act, National Environmental Policy Act, etc.), and Supreme Court 
cases.  Federal agencies such as the Environmental Protection Agency and the US Fish and 
Wildlife Service can set restrictions on water use and establish management efforts to ensure 
compliance with federal regulations.  In addition, the federal government has reserved water 
rights for Native American lands. When the federal government established Native 
American reservations, it implicitly reserved sufficient water to serve the purpose of the 
reservation.  Even though these reserved rights have not been exercised, they have the 
potential for future conflict, especially in times of water shortage (Miller et al. 1997; Tarlock 
et al. 2002).   
Other federal reserved water rights are created when the federal government withdraws 
land from the public domain (e.g. for parks, military bases, etc.).  These rights could 
represent large amounts of water considering that about half of the western states lands are 
under federal ownership.  For instance, the federal government owns 80% of the lands in the 
state of Nevada and 72% of the Colorado River basin (Kenney 2003). Even though most 
compacts include this recognition of federal water rights, most of them do not include the 
federal government as a signatory party.  For this reason federal-interstate compacts such as 
the Delaware River Basin Compact of 1961, by including the federal government as a 
signatory party and as member of the DRBC, had made provisions for linking federal and 
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state planning and imposing significant constraints on both the state and federal government.  
Based on the experience in the Delaware River Basin, the National Water Commission 
(1973) recommended the federal-interstate compact approach as the preferred institutional 
strategy for water resources planning and management in multi-state water sharing regions.   
 
7.5.3 Intrastate Water Administration 
Water resources administration at the intrastate level is carried out by a myriad of 
federal, state and local agencies (Table 7.4).  These administrative bodies interact to make 
up multi-level water allocation frameworks.  The purpose of these administrative systems is 
to provide a methodology for allocating water and to regulate water rights.  These are 
usually state agencies or water control boards with mixed executive and judicial powers to 
adjudicate water rights.  Some states have very comprehensive agencies administering the 
management of all natural resources while others have a particular agency devoted 
exclusively to water management.  The level of authority vested by the state in its water 
administering agency also varies.  Some agencies have broad powers that allows for 
comprehensive authority while others are more limited, being authorized only to issue water 
permits.  In Texas, the Texas Commission on Environmental Quality and the Texas Water 
Development Board have statewide jurisdiction for the implementation of water laws and 
administration of the water rights system (Chapter VI). 
Two states have taken a different approach for their water management institutions.  
Instead of having an agency for dealing with the details of water allocation, Colorado relies 
on the judicial system charged with administrative powers (Gloperud 1991a; Getches 1997).  
Colorado’s Water Court system is composed of water divisions that correspond to seven 
major basins, each been overseen by a water judge, a water engineer, a water referee, and a 
water clerk.  Water judges are district judges appointed by the state’s Supreme Court and 
have jurisdiction in the determination of water rights, the use and administration of water, 
and all other water matters within their jurisdictions (Hobbs 2004).  In Florida, regulatory 
authority is divided between five regional water management districts (WMDs) 
corresponding to major river basins. Some of the functions of the WMDs include: 
establishing minimum inflows, declaring water shortages emergencies, evaluating new permits 
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Table 7.4. Intrastate Administrative Entities
Administrative Entity Water Resources Responsibilities
State Water Agencies
Administration of federal water programs. 
Different levels of authority for resource 
management, regulation, issuance of permits,   
and resolution of conflict among water users.
Municipal and county water 
authorities or districts
Planning, construction, maintenance           
and operation of local water projects.
*US Army Corps of Engineers
Construction, operation and                 
maintenance of reservoirs
*US Bureau of Reclamation
Construction, operation and                 
maintenance of reservoirs
* Federal Agency  
 
 
for consumptive uses, comprehensive planning, and constructing and operating water 
development works. 
The implementation of state and federal water resources legislation at the local level is 
typically accomplished through river authorities and municipal and/or county water districts.  
In Texas, there are 19 river authorities in charge of the development and management of 
major river basins (Wurbs 2004).  A variety of specialized districts have been established for 
the planning, construction, and maintenance of local projects.  The legislature authorizes 
each district by special legislation that specifically defines the powers, duties, and 
limitations upon the district. Some special districts found in Texas include: water control and 
improvement, groundwater conservation, irrigation, fresh water supply, drainage, and 
municipal utility districts (Caroom 1997). 
As previously discussed, the institutional arrangement for intrastate water administration 
in the US cascades from bureaucratic management to self-governing local institutions.  This 
branching framework results in a de-centralized management structure.  Although federal 
and state involvement is necessary to accomplish large-scale water management objectives, 
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self-governing institutions at the local level allow for a greater degree of adaptability to local 
conditions and needs, provide for faster response to changing circumstances, and facilitate 
cooperation among participants (Tang 1992).  On the other hand, this approach increases the 
complexity of water management and could result in duplicity of efforts that may translate 
into higher operational costs and other system inefficiencies.  In 1997, Senate Bill 1 (SB1) 
provided for this approach to water supply planning in Texas.  In the past, the TWDB had 
been responsible for determining what strategies and projects each region or city should 
implement to meet future water supply needs.  SB1 changed that to a “bottom up” planning 
process that calls for local representatives from all interest groups, called Regional Water 
Planning Groups (RWPG), to develop strategies to meet water supply needs over a 50 year 
time period.  The TWDB oversees the planning process and provides administrative and 
technical support to the RWPG (Chapter VI).  
Four key aspects in the administration of water resources were identified from the 
evaluation of administrative water agencies at all management levels. Administrative 
agencies must have the power and capability to conduct and lead efforts in the areas of: (1) 
data collection, (2) planning, (3) resource management and regulation, and (4) conflict 
resolution.  Data collection involves conducting and supporting water resources monitoring 
and research (e.g. streamflow, water use patterns, system performance, etc.).  The agency 
must also be a conduit for information sharing and dialogue.  Long-term planning of water 
development projects and policy formulation are crucial elements for ensuring the 
effectiveness of the system in meeting future needs, especially under water scarcity 
conditions.  An important aspect of this process is the evaluation of potential scenarios of 
water demand and availability. Adopting watershed scale management strategies, in which 
watershed boundaries rather than political boundaries are the basic unit of analysis, may be 
beneficial as they provide a more hydrologically correct view of the water resources of a 
region.  The agencies also need the authority to manage and operate water resources systems 
(i.e. reservoirs, channels, diversions, etc.) and regulate water allocations. The extent of this 
authority should be in accordance with their position within the hierarchy of management 
levels.  Water accounting methodologies are a critical aspect of resource management as it 
provides a mechanism for assessing compliance of agreements and the enforcement of 
regulations.  Finally, these agencies must provide the necessary framework and mechanisms 
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for conflict resolution (e.g. voting, arbitration, mediation, etc.) and define courses of action 
in the case of non-compliance (e.g. water debt repayment, monetary compensation, storage 
provisions, etc). 
 
7.6 RESERVOIR STORAGE CONSIDERATIONS 
Scope: How reservoir storage considerations can be incorporated into WAS to support 
its administration and for meeting present and future demands? 
Streamflows and water demands are typically characterized by great temporal 
variability.  Thus, reservoir storage is necessary to regulate streamflow fluctuations and 
provide a more dependable water supply.  In general, for reservoir operation purposes the 
storage capacity of a reservoir is subdivided into the following pools: inactive, conservation, 
flood control, and surcharge.  The water stored in the conservation pool is the only portion 
of the storage available for allocation, thus in the context of this discussion the term 
“reservoir storage” refers specifically to the conservation pool. 
Reservoirs provide an added measure of security by storing water during wet periods and 
making it available during periods of seasonal low streamflows, high demands, or long-term 
droughts.  Reservoir storage is commonly shared by many users for a variety of purposes.  
Municipal demands are highly dependent upon storage to ensure the consistent supply of 
water necessary for basic human needs.  Other uses like agricultural irrigation do not usually 
require a continuous supply of water, but they need the security of having enough water to 
meet the demands for growing crops during particular seasons.  Releases from storage can 
also be used to meet instream flow needs during periods when streamflows are significantly 
diminished.  Consequently, incorporating reservoir storage considerations in a WAS is 
essential for the efficient use and conservation of water resources.  This section presents 
some key issues regarding reservoir storage within the context of international, interstate, 
and intrastate WAS. 
 
7.6.1 Water Accounting 
The primary objective of international treaties and interstate compacts is to establish 
policies and mechanisms for the proper allocation of water resources between nations and 
states (Chapters II and III).  These legal agreements are used to determine how much water a 
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nation or state is entitled to from the total amount of water available in a specified 
timeframe.  In addition, they serve as binding documents that protect the parties involved 
from being deprived of their fare share of the water.   
Once water has been allocated, the management and enforcement of the treaties or 
compacts relies on proper water accounting procedures that allow to evaluate if the parties 
are in compliance with the established agreements and to provide a better basis for 
evaluating and solving conflicts.  Incorporating reservoir storage in the water accounting 
procedure allows to obtain a more accurate estimate of the water used by each party and the 
remaining portion of their allocated supply that may be carried over in storage if the 
agreement allows to do so.  Moreover, coordination between actual reservoir operations and 
the administration of the treaties or compacts is recommended in order to manage the 
reservoir storage in a manner that reflects the established agreements and meet demands 
more efficiently. 
The 1944 Rio Grande Treaty between the US and Mexico is used here to illustrate how 
reservoir storage provisions may be used to facilitate delivery of the allocated waters and to 
verify compliance with the international treaty agreements.  The treaty allocates the water 
that reaches the Rio Grande between the US and Mexico based on a series of allocation rules 
outlined on Article 4 of the treaty.  In general, the rules allot all or a portion of the water 
reaching the main stream to each country based on the geographical origin of the flows (i.e. 
Rio Grande tributary sub-basins). The treaty also authorized construction of two 
international dams, Amistad and Falcon, to serve as storage facilities that would regulate 
flows from the upper Rio Grande basin.  These reservoirs are located in series and are 
operated as a system by the IBWC to meet the provisions of the agreement.   
The IBWC is responsible for the water accounting procedures of the river/reservoir 
system.  For such purposes, the IBWC keeps records of reservoir inflows and releases, and 
evaporation and storage volumes allocated to each country.  Reservoir inflows are credited 
to each country following the Article 4 allocation rules.  If a country has a full conservation 
pool, the treaty contains a stipulation that allows transferring the excess flows to the other 
country if such country has unused conservation storage capacity.  Releases from storage 
may be requested at any time and they are subtracted from the water available in the 
conservation storage of the country requesting them.  The rationale for the allotment of 
 133
conservation storage to each country was explained in section 7.2.1. The estimated volume 
of water lost due to evaporation is proportionally allocated to each country’s share of the 
reservoir storage. 
This procedure allows the IBCW to compute the amount of water that each country has 
in storage at any time and provides the basis for evaluating if the countries are in or out of 
compliance with the established agreements.  For example, the treaty requires Mexico to 
make available an annual average of 350,000 acre-ft of water from six Mexican tributaries to 
the US over five year cycles. The treaty also indicates that in the event of extraordinary 
drought water debts shall be made up in the next five year cycle.  In 1992, Mexico began a 
10-year cycle of failing to meet this requirement claiming to be in an extraordinary drought 
condition (Combs 2004).  Failure to comply with this aspect of the treaty resulted in intense 
political tension between the nations.  The IBWC’s water accounting procedures allowed to 
keep a record of the water owed by Mexico, which amounted to a high of 1.5 million acre-ft 
in 2002.  As of October 1, 2004, Mexico’s deficit stood at 716,670 acre-ft.  The present 
status of this issue is that Mexico has delivered the required amount of water in the first two 
full years of the current cycle and an understanding between the two nations was reached in 
2005 for Mexico to pay its entire water debt by September 2005 (IBWC 2005).  A weekly 
water accounting data sheet of Mexico’s water deliveries to pay off the deficit is available at 
the IBCW website (http://www.ibwc.state.gov/html/mexico_deliveries.html). 
Some interstate compacts in the US also have explicit reservoir storage considerations in 
their water allocation rules.  The Canadian River compact between New Mexico, Texas, and 
Oklahoma, besides dividing the waters of the basin it sets maximum amounts of 
conservation storage allowed to each state in the reservoirs of the system.  For instance, New 
Mexico is allowed free and unrestricted use of the runoff generated below Conchas Dam, 
however it cannot store more than 200,000 acre-ft in the reservoirs below said dam.  The 
right of Texas to store water is limited to 500,000 acre-ft, until Oklahoma has been provided 
with 300,000 acre-ft of conservation storage.  These values exclude storage on reservoirs in 
the North Canadian River for Texas and Oklahoma, and east of the 97th Meridian for 
Oklahoma.  Once Oklahoma has received 300,000 acre-ft, the limit for Texas switches to 
200,000 acre-ft plus whatever amount of water Oklahoma has in conservation storage during 
the same time period.  In other words, the amount of water that Texas can store in excess of 
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500,000 acre-ft is the same amount of water that Oklahoma is storing over 300,000 acre-ft.  
Although the compact does not specify a rationale for establishing these limits, this type of 
practice helps prevent an unbalanced use of the available water in the system.  The Canadian 
River Compact Commission (CRCC) administers this compact and performs an annual 
accounting of water stored in each state to determine compact compliance.  For example, to 
verify if New Mexico is in compliance with Texas the actual amount of storage in Texas 
reservoirs is divided by 350,000 acre-ft and its converted to a percentage.  The 350,000 acre-
ft value represents the amount of water that Texas normally has in storage during an average 
runoff year and with New Mexico complying with the compact (CRCC 2004). 
 
7.6.2 Hedging Methods 
Another critical aspect of managing conservation storage is the determination of how 
much water should be used for meeting present needs and the amount to be carried over in 
storage to meet future demands.  This aspect can be better evaluated within the context of 
intrastate WAS.  Once water has been allocated to a state, it must be distributed between 
individual users to meet demands.  The tradeoffs between how much water to withhold from 
immediate use and retaining that water in storage for future use is known as hedging.   
Hedging rules allow for some water to be stored even if there is enough water to satisfy 
present demands in order to provide insurance for high-valued uses when there is a low 
potential for refill or high uncertainty of inflows (Draper and Lund 2004).  The rationale is 
that having small shortages more frequently is preferable than coping with the risks and 
costs or larger shortages (Loucks et al. 1981).  The most common methods to incorporate 
hedging into a WAS are based on: (1) legal considerations (laws) and (2) operational rules. 
The allocation of the US share (Texas share) of the Lower Rio Grande waters follows 
the rules established in the Texas Administrative Code.  Title 30 – Chapter 303 of this state 
legislation specifies procedures for allocating the Texas share of water stored in Amistad and 
Falcon Reservoirs.  These procedures are carried out by the TCEQ Watermaster.  The 
allocation procedure performed each month by the Watermaster is outlined in Chapter VI, 
section 6.2.1, and summarized here as follows: 
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(1) From the total amount of usable storage, reserve 225,000 acre-ft for domestic, 
municipal, and industrial uses. This reserve is referred to as the “municipal pool”. 
(2) From the remaining storage, deduct the total-end-of-month account balances for all 
Lower and Middle Rio Grande irrigation and mining allottees. 
(3) From the remaining storage, deduct 75,000 acre-ft for an operating reserve. 
(4) The balance is allocated to irrigation and mining allottees. 
 
This procedure places the highest priority to maintaining the municipal reserve full.  
This reflects the importance of meeting current and future municipal demands since even if 
agricultural or mining shortages are occurring in the present month and there is plenty of 
water available in the municipal pool, this water cannot be used to meet those current needs 
but rather it is reserved for future municipal uses.  In other words, storing enough water to 
meet current and potential future municipal needs is favored at the expense of having 
shortages for other uses that may have been avoided by using water from the municipal pool. 
The Water Code also has provisions for storing water for future irrigation uses.  If there is 
excess water after the aforementioned allocation steps are completed, irrigation rights may 
store water for future use (if the water right permit allows it), but storage cannot exceed 
more than 1.41 times its authorized diversion right (Chapter VI). 
The second approach for incorporating hedging into a WAS is by means of operational 
rules.  Operational rules are guidelines for determining the quantities of water to be stored or 
released from a reservoir under various conditions.  Operational rules are commonly 
expressed as rule curves which specify reservoir releases as a function of storage content and 
time of year.  Rule curves provide greater flexibility in managing storage and releases since, 
in contrast to treaties and compacts, it is fairly easy to modify them over time based on 
experience and changing conditions. 
For water supply systems, the standard operating policy (SOP) is to supply current 
demands and store water only after demands have been met.  Hedging operating policies 
modify the SOP by setting storage levels that serve as triggering mechanisms to start and 
resume water rationing.  The storage levels may be defined based on multiple runs of 
simulation models in which various storage levels can be tested to see whether or not they 
are sufficient to meet forecasted demands considering the expected inflows.  Water rationing 
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can be applied to specific water demands or all demands may be curtailed by certain 
percentage.  Bayazit and Ünal (1990) tested different combinations of storage triggers for a 
water supply reservoir and concluded that the performance of reservoirs under hedging 
operational policies are more stable and the potential for large shortages are significantly 
reduced compared to those following the SOP.  The US Bureau of Reclamation incorporates 
hedging into the operation of California’s Central Valley Project (CVP) reservoirs in order 
to retain sufficient carryover storage to reduce the risks of large shortages (USBR 2000).  
Carryover storage in CVP reservoirs is used to provide reasonable assurance that minimum 
storage, instream flows, diversions, and hydroelectric demands are able to be sustained.  
Additional considerations for fish restoration and wildlife habitat are required by the CVP 
Improvement Act of 1992. 
Basic hedging rules are more suitable for single purpose reservoir systems.  However, 
when dealing with multi-purpose reservoir systems, which involve more complex 
operations, these basic rules may become too simplistic.  Therefore, an optimization 
procedure that can consider the system objectives and constraints may be required.  
Mathematical programming techniques have been used in the academic field to address this 
problem (Oliveira and Loucks 1997; Draper and Lund 2004), yet its implementation in real-
world applications has been limited (Duranyildiz et al. 2000). 
 
7.7 SYSTEM RELIABILITY 
Scope: How can reliability considerations be incorporated into WAS to provide a better 
basis for decision-making? 
7.7.1 Reliability Theory 
River/reservoir systems are characterized by great variability of streamflows, climatic 
patterns, reservoir evaporation rates, and other pertinent factors.  Because of these 
uncertainties regarding the future hydrologic character of the system, water supply 
capabilities must be viewed from a reliability, probability, or percent-of-time perspective 
(Wurbs 1996).  Reliability (R) is a measure of dependability and can be used to assess the 
capabilities of a river/reservoir system to satisfy specified water use requirements.  Reservoir 
reliability is an indication of the probability of meeting a given demand.  Alternatively, 
reservoir reliability can be expressed as the percent of the time that a given demand can be 
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met.  Also, reliability may be interpreted as the complement (R = 1 – F) of the risk of failure 
(F), which expresses the probability or the percent of the time that the demand will not be 
met.  Incorporating reliability considerations into a WAS may be therefore beneficial as it 
can provide an improved basis for decision making. 
Reliability indices, such as period reliability and volume reliability, provide a 
mechanism for evaluating and comparing alternative reservoir storage allocations and 
operating plans in terms of their capabilities for meeting system demands (Wurbs 1996). 
Reliability indices can be computed from the results of a water supply simulation study 
based on either the historical record flow series or on multiple synthetically generated flow 
sequences which preserve selected statistical characteristics of the historical data. 
Period reliability (Rp) represents the percentage of time periods in which demand targets 
were met.  Rp is calculated as: 
 
    Rp = (n/N) 100%    (Eq. 7.1) 
 
where n is the number of time periods that the system was able to meet the target demands, 
and N is the total number of time periods in the simulation.  Rp can also be interpreted as the 
probability of a specified demand target being met in any randomly selected time period.  
The risk of failure Fp, which is the compliment of Rp, reflects the frequency of shortages in 
the simulation.  A period during which all or a specified percentage of the demand was not 
met is considered a shortage or failure.  Alternatively, a failure state may be defined as any 
period in which the reservoir storage falls below pre-specified levels. 
Volume reliability (Rv) is the ratio of the volume of water supplied (v) to the total 
volume target (V): 
 
    Rv = (v/V) 100%    (Eq. 7.2) 
 
Rv reflects the magnitude and the frequency of shortages.  In terms of Rv, a failure state 
occurs when v is less than V or less than a specified percentage of V during a given period.  
The shortage magnitude or volume is the difference between V and v. 
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It should be recognized that in reality a reliability of 100% does not necessarily mean 
that the system will always be able to supply all demands without failure.  Reliability indices 
do not provide a perfect appraisal of the system capabilities as they are influenced by 
modeling assumptions and are based on historic hydrologic data that does not necessarily 
reflect the entire range of possible future inflow sequences. 
 
7.7.2 Reliability Applications 
One of the key aspects of WAS in which the benefits of incorporating reliability 
considerations can be observed is in the planning and design of water supply systems.  A 
primary objective in many international water allocation treaties is to allow the construction 
of dams and other pertinent water supply projects (e.g. 1944 US and Mexico Treaty; Lesotho 
Highlands Treaty).  Also, some interstate compacts made provisions for future development 
of shared projects (e.g. 1929 Rio Grande Compact).   
One of the fundamental hydrologic analyses in the planning stages of reservoir design is 
the development of storage-yield relationships.  Basically, this analysis is used to determine 
the reservoir yield given a storage allocation, or to determine the storage required to attain a 
desired yield.  The reservoir storage-yield relationship can also be used to determine the 
quantity of water that a given storage can supply at different levels of reliability.   
The maximum amount of water that can be supplied continuously with a Rp and Rv of 
100% is commonly referred to as firm yield.  Most designs of reservoir storage for 
municipal and industrial water supply are based on supplying the firm yield during the most 
critical drought of record (USACE 1997).  This conservative design practice is based on 
building a sufficiently large reservoir so that the risk of shortages is theoretically zero.  This 
practice however may not be optimal if water development costs are high.   
Tolerating a relatively small risk of shortage may significantly reduce the storage 
required to provide the desired yield rate and thus reduce the related construction costs 
(USACE 1997).  Therefore, an understanding of system reliability can provide greater 
flexibility in the design process and allows for the evaluation of tradeoffs between costs and 
system dependability. 
Considering reliability concepts can also be beneficial in the assessment of water 
availability.  The process of allocating water between nations, states, or users has an inherent 
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element of uncertainty.  It is impossible to make absolute guarantees of supplying a specified 
amount of water without having any shortages.  Reliability indices are useful to provide an 
estimate of the risk of future shortages.  Different types of water uses can tolerate different 
levels of risk, thus a reservoir can supply water to various users at different levels of 
reliability.  Greater quantities of water become available as the level of risk increases.  
Certain water users require high levels of reliability, while for others obtaining a relatively 
large quantity of water with some risk of shortage may be preferable over obtaining a supply 
of greater reliability but smaller quantity.  The level of reliability assigned to each water user 
or water right can be used as a rationing mechanism during shortages.  Storage triggering 
mechanisms can be implemented to progressively curtail uses according to their level of 
reliability.  When a shortage occurs the first uses to be curtailed are those with lower 
reliabilities, hence they absorb the initial effects of droughts and higher reliability uses 
would only be curtailed under the most severe drought conditions.  Drought management is 
further discussed is section 7.2.8. 
Evidently, there is qualitative judgment in determining acceptable levels of reliability, 
but in general higher reliabilities are needed for municipal and industrial uses than for 
agricultural, environmental, and recreational uses.  For instance, in evaluating water right 
permit applications in Texas, the TCEQ has applied the general rule that municipal supplies 
should have a Rp and Rv of 100%, and for agricultural supplies, 75% of the permitted 
demand should be met at least 75% of the time (Wurbs 2005).  Requiring a reliability of 
100% for municipal supplies is common practice since shortages are considered intolerable 
for purposes such as drinking water.  Small shortages may be tolerated without serious 
economic impact by reducing the less important uses such as lawn watering, car washing, 
refilling pools, etc.  However, a shortage of 10% of the demand may cause serious hardship.  
For agricultural purposes shortages are usually acceptable under certain conditions.  A 
shortage of 10% usually has a negligible economic effect, but shortages as large as 50% can 
be disastrous (USACE 1997). 
It is important to recognize that the long-term reliability of a river/reservoir system in 
meeting system demands can be significantly different from the short-term (i.e. several 
months) reliability.  Salazar and Wurbs (2004) investigated this consideration and developed 
the Conditional Reliability Model (CRM). The CRM is defined as the process of 
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determining the likelihood of meeting water use requirements (reliability) after a specific 
instance of storage or inflow (the condition) has occurred.  The model evaluates the 
likelihood of historical hydrologic sequences based on storage conditions using conditional 
frequency duration curves (CFDC).  A CFDC represents the probability distribution of flows 
after the occurrence of the storage within specified intervals (e.g. high, medium, or low 
storage).  The objective is to capitalize on the storage-flow relationship, which basically 
shows that low storage is likely to be followed by low flows, and high storage is followed by 
higher flows.  Some applications of the CRM methodology include evaluating short-term 
reliabilities for water diversions, designing short-term drought management strategies, and 
administering curtailment of water rights; all of which are highly dependent on the current 
conditions of reservoir storage. 
Another important aspect of the relationship between reliability and water availability is 
how to manage the tradeoffs between how much water to commit for beneficial use and the 
level of reliability that can be attained. Certainly, in many occasions there will be more 
water available than the quantity associated with 100% reliability.   
Wurbs (1997) stated that if water commitments are limited as required to assure an 
extremely high level of reliability, the amount of streamflow available for beneficial use is 
constraint, and a greater proportion of the water flows into the ocean or is lost through 
reservoir evaporation.  In this study, the Brazos River in Texas was used to demonstrate that 
yields can increase greatly with relatively small reductions in reliability.  A yield-reliability 
relationship was developed for a particular diversion in the river.  It was found that the firm 
yield rate could be increased by 71.3% and the reliability would only decrease from 100 to 
96.2%, which is still a relatively high reliability.  Thus, the amount of water supplied at this 
diversion by the Brazos River basin can be increased significantly by tolerating slightly 
higher risks of shortages.  It should be noted here, however, that this diversion is supplied by 
a system of nine reservoirs.  Multiple-reservoir system operations can significantly increase 
reliabilities, as compared to operating the reservoirs independently. Coordinated releases 
from multiple reservoirs increases reliability by sharing the risks associated with individual 
reservoirs not being able to meet their individual demands (Wurbs 1996). 
As previously stated, reliability considerations may bring flexibility to a WAS. 
Reliability concepts can be used to aid in the planning and design of reservoirs, to assess the 
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water supply capabilities of a system, to evaluate the effects of new water right permits on 
other users, to provide a measure of the risks of shortages, and to establish priorities between 
competing uses, among others. Proper understanding of the relationship between reliability 
and water availability also improves water management strategies as significant quantities of 
water may be “liberated” for beneficial use by tolerating relatively small risks of shortages. 
Incorporating these reliability considerations also require certain flexibility in the 
administration of WAS.   
At the international and interstate levels this could be a challenge due to the lack of 
commissions or other management agencies with enough enforcement and administrative 
power to incorporate these concepts.  When these legal agreements are created with the 
intention of building water supply projects, a fixed, perpetual water supply and flow 
allocation regime is generally assumed.  Typically, no provisions are made for improving 
allocation schemes in response to newer and more precise hydrological studies or unforeseen 
changes in water availability.  An institutional inertia exists as the parties involved are likely 
to insist in maintaining the status quo in spite of known system inefficiencies.  Moreover, in 
the case where treaties or compacts protect certain uses or users against shortages, any 
modification to the water allocation scheme based on a redistribution of risk of shortages 
would be illegal.  For instance, the Yellowstone River Compact protects pre-compact water 
users by applying the compact’s allocation scheme only after those water rights are fully 
satisfied.   
Perhaps, greater applicability can be achieved at the intrastate level.  In river basins 
where water rights have not been adjudicated, water management is more flexible as 
decisions are typically based on operational policies that can be modified in response to 
experience, new management practices, improved hydrologic information, and changes in 
water demand and availability. 
 
7.8 MULTIPLE USES 
Scope: What water uses are recognized within the WAS? What are the provisions within 
the WAS for dealing with conflicting water uses?  
The value given by society to the quantity, reliability, quality, location and timing of 
water resources differ across competing user groups and countries, and these relative values 
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change over time.  Thus, decisions about water use may involve a multitude of claimants 
whose desires may increasingly come into conflict, especially when water availability 
conditions worsen.  The increased potential for conflict warrants closer examination of the 
ways in which institutions manage multiple uses to facilitate effective water allocation.  
 
7.8.1 Recognition of Multiple Uses 
In any particular region, the use of water by a community is multi-purpose and intended 
to meet the requirements of different users. WAS must then reflect this multi-dimensionality 
from the policy design to the management level.  At the policy level, a WAS needs to 
recognize as legitimate those water uses valued by society and define how conflicts among 
those water uses are to be resolved.  At the management level, water supply systems should 
be designed to include all sectors of water users.  
The recognition of legitimate water uses does not depend on engineering or scientific 
considerations but on the socio-economic, cultural, and political characteristics of a country.  
In the US, the federal government has placed that responsibility on the individual states. 
Water uses that are considered legitimate vary according to the appropriation doctrine and 
even among states following the same doctrine. 
In the prior appropriation doctrine, legitimate uses are defined based on the concept of 
beneficial use (Chapter IV).  Some states have general definitions of beneficial uses while 
others contain specific listings.  In North Dakota, a beneficial use is simply defined as a use 
of water for “purposes consistent with the best interest of the people state” (Beck et al. 
1991a).  On the other hand, other states have drafted lists of beneficial uses which typically 
include: domestic and municipal, industrial, irrigation, mining, hydroelectric power, 
navigation, recreation, fish and wildlife, among others.   
Some state statues also specify that some uses are more beneficial than others and 
establish priorities within the recognized uses.  Typically, domestic and municipal uses have 
the highest priority, followed by irrigation and livestock, power and mining, and recreation 
and wildlife.  These priorities are applied in the evaluation of competing permit applications 
and, in a few states, in the case of insufficient supplies (e.g. Nebraska, California).  Other 
states have recognized less traditional uses like appropriation for avoiding pollution 
(Nevada), and groundwater recharge (Idaho, Utah, California).  Some states also specify 
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non-beneficial uses. For example, California prohibits the use of potable water in cemeteries, 
golf courses, residential landscaping, and cooling towers. 
Riparian water law is restrictive in nature.  This means that a person is legally allowed to 
use the water in any way for any legal and reasonable purpose until a court restricts that use.  
However, there have been precedents or statues acknowledging specific uses of water.  
There is a preference for “natural” uses over other uses which the courts referred to as 
“artificial”.  The term “natural” refers to domestic uses (i.e. household, livestock, gardening) 
and “artificial” to those that produce comfort and prosperity (e.g. irrigation, manufacturing, 
mining). In regulated riparian states, administrative officials have the power to determine 
preferred uses as well as to choose between competing uses.  However, some statutes do set 
priorities for allocation in the time of permit issuance or when there is not enough water for 
all needs.  These priority schemes give highest priority to direct human consumption (i.e. 
domestic and municipal) followed (with some exceptions) by agricultural and other uses. 
Some states, like Arkansas, give minimum streamflows the highest priority after municipal 
uses.  Only Massachusetts and New York do not give any preferences among uses. 
 
7.8.2 Solving Conflicts 
Accommodating multiple uses brings a range of benefits but also costs.  When properly 
considered, multiple-use water systems can address the users needs better than single-use 
schemes, lead to improved cost recovery, promote sustainable development, and help 
integrate the different institutional aspects of water management and administration.  On the 
other hand, multiple-use systems are more difficult and expensive to manage and can lead to 
conflict between different users, overloaded systems, and tail-end problems where those at 
the end of under-designed systems receive nothing due to overuse by others (Smits et al. 
2004). 
In general, water institutions can use several criteria for solving conflicts among the 
different sectors of water usage: pre-established priorities, economic criteria, equity, and 
sustainability considerations.  Most WAS in countries, states, and/or river basins are 
established by the acts of legislation or judicial adjudication.  In several of these cases the 
law that establishes the allocation and management framework also establishes priorities for 
conflicting uses.  For example, in 1969 the Texas Supreme Court adjudicated the Lower Rio 
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Grande and established a system of allocation by use.  The water obtained from the US 
multipurpose pool at Amistad and Falcon was to be used in such a way that if water is 
insufficient, municipal uses are to be satisfied first. Agricultural uses are completely 
satisfied only when there is enough surplus of water (Chapter VI).   
Economic criteria can also be used for resolving conflict.  Different economic values are 
assigned to each water use according to market or institutional standards.  In case of conflict, 
water uses with higher economic value can be favored by institutions or market mechanisms 
can be used to reallocate water from low valued uses to higher valued ones.  Care must be 
taken when assigning the appropriate value to the use.  Low values can result in inefficient 
use of the resource, water hoarding, wastefulness and damage to water ecosystems.  When 
properly used, economic criteria can be used to encourage reallocation of water as well as to 
discourage unnecessary or inefficient uses.   
An equity criterion refers to the concepts of social fairness, justice, and impartiality.  
Therefore, it is dependent on society’s principles of ethic and fair play.  This is much like the 
doctrine of equitable utilization, where water users stand on the same level in power and 
right to benefit from the resource.  Nancarrow and Symeb (2004) describe the issues that 
affect the perception of fairness in allocation among conflicting uses: self interest; efficient 
uses of water; business investments; viable communities and prior rights to water.  People’s 
opinions on such issues change over time.   
Historically, many water systems were designed to support certain uses that were 
deemed very important for sustaining economy.  For example, in many states of the US there 
are still laws and policies that favor outdated uses such as mining and highly consumptive 
agricultural practices.  However, society’s needs and values have change and these policies 
are inefficient and unfairly protected.  To resolve this, legislative action might be required. 
Also some uses such as ecological preservation, recreation, and scenic beauty have low 
economic values and those groups that advocate environmental uses are fewer than other 
more economically empowered user-groups. Water uses valued by minority groups, such as 
native tribes and small-scale community enterprises, would be in disadvantage in an 
economic water allocation framework.  Therefore, government intervention is usually 
necessary to ensure the consideration and protection of these public interests.   
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Economic efficiency and equity are centered on fundamental human needs.  However, 
other values, such as ecological health, are not necessarily related to such needs. Ecological 
sustainability recognizes the value of ecological components in promoting and advancing 
important public interests.  Perhaps the best example of this mechanism has been the 
application of federal laws, such as the Endangered Species Act, which prohibits any federal 
action that might threaten the survival of species considered in danger of extinction.  
Sustainability also refers to the concept of equilibrium in the development of water 
resources.  The question is not only if there is enough water for a particular use without 
conflicting with other uses, but also without hindering future ones. In other words, 
equilibrium relates to supplying current needs while conserving enough resources for future 
benefits.  This requires comprehensive planning of policies and proactive measures such as 
basin development plans and integrated water resources management (IWRM).  The purpose 
of IWRM is to manage multiple sources and uses of water so that, over time, more efficient 
water resource supply systems and use patterns emerge, while maintaining or improving 
ambient water quality.  IWRM has been the management approach recommended by 
international organizations (World Bank 1993). 
Formal international institutions of water law encourage the multi-purpose development 
of water resources.  Both the body of international water law and recommendations from 
international advisory committees emphasize the need for considering multiple uses in the 
different aspects of water allocation.  The Agenda 21 of the UN Conference on Environment 
& Development at Rio de Janerio, Brazil (1992), which establishes the UN policy for 
sustainable development, states that “water-supply infrastructure … should be expanded for 
multiple uses” in order to assist in developing the economy and ensure the reduction of 
poverty.  Also, international organizations in charge of the financing of water projects have 
recently required that countries interested in utilizing the organization resources must 
incorporate multi-purpose water projects and policies (Solanes and Getches 1998).   
In the case of conflicting uses, international water law gives priority to water uses 
necessary to sustain human life such as drinking and the production of food to prevent 
starvation (UN 1997).  The concept of equitable utilization and the no-harm rule are also 
invoked; however, these concepts frequently contradict each other making it difficult to 
reach resolution.  McCaffrey (1999) argues that these conflicts are more likely to be resolved 
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by cooperation and compromise, than by rigid insistence on rules of law.  This suggests that 
probably the most effective strategy for solving conflict among uses at the international level 
is the joint management of the resource.  
Multi-use strategies have been mostly applied in managing specific international water 
projects.  This is also true for interstate WAS.  In the past, large scale projects were typically 
designed with a sub-sectoral focus for domestic or irrigation uses, with no overlap between 
the two.  As the economic and/or social values of water change from one use to another or to 
new uses; these single-purpose systems might not be able to cope efficiently to sustain 
progress.  Although these systems were designed for single use development, their operation 
could be modified to incorporate multiple use objectives.  However, this change in 
operational policies may fall short from fully providing for multiple needs.   
Systems that are fully designed for multiple purposes are based on comprehensive 
assessment of needs and resources and are intended to make the most effective use of water 
(Smits et al. 2004).  A typical multi-purpose reservoir project designates storage for flood 
control and conservation.  The operation of these reservoirs is typically based on satisfying 
the conflicting objectives of maximizing conservation storage while maximizing the empty 
space required for flood control.   
The multiple purposes that depend on the conservation storage are sometimes 
complementary but often conflicting (Wurbs 1996).  Water that is stored primarily for water 
supply can also be used for uses such as recreation and fisheries while in storage, and then, 
as it is released, it can be used for hydropower generation and streamflow augmentation 
before it reaches the diversion location.  However, when the available water is not sufficient 
for satisfying all uses, conflicts arise between consumptive and instream or in-reservoir uses. 
As previously explained, the criteria for solving these conflicts are specified in treaties or 
compacts and administered by international or interstate agencies.  In other situations where 
no agency has been created, courts have the responsibility to resolve such disputes and 
establish mechanisms for weighting the users’ claims for water.   
In the US there are two major conflicting water allocation scenarios: conflicts between 
traditional agricultural practices and growing municipal needs; and conflicts between highly-
consumptive economy-driven uses and environmental needs.  Demands from these groups 
are not only for a particular water quantity but also for a required standard of quality, 
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reliability, and cost. Competition among these uses is not only dependent on water 
availability but also on politics, culture, and the economic history and expectations of that 
particular region (Kenney 2003).   
For the most part, agriculture is the greatest water consumer accounting for 80 percent of 
the nation’s consumptive water use (ERS 2004).  Nonetheless, the agricultural contributions 
to the economy continues to decline and the value of water in agriculture is several orders of 
magnitude less than that used for municipal and domestic uses (National Research Council 
1992).  The competition between economic and environmental uses of water is very 
problematic in the sense that it is often centered in the fact that environmental uses of water 
are often not recognized as legitimate uses or are deemed less important than consumptive 
uses.  For instance, the prior appropriation system does not generally recognize obligations 
to the environment.  Moreover, by punishing non-use of water it can actively encourage 
environmental degradation.  Also, the history of the development of the western US is filled 
with the development of major water projects that have had significant negative impacts on 
water ecosystems. 
In the US more and more frequently water markets have provided a way to address these 
issues. Markets compensate farmers for temporarily or even permanently transferring their 
water rights to municipal purposes. However, these transfers can have significant 
economical and social impacts on agricultural communities.  In the western US, where water 
rights are private property rights, compensation for water transfers go entirely to the farmers 
while other members of the community receive no compensation (Kenney 2003).  This 
suggests that some sort of regulation of water markets is needed in order to mitigate these 
impacts. Water markets have also assisted in economic/consumptive uses and environmental 
uses (see section 7.2.7).  In addition to market mechanisms, the eastern US has used their 
permit system for dealing with conflicting uses.  Some states have pre-established priorities 
based on type of use that apply only under water scarcity conditions.  Also, their permit 
duration periods are used for reallocating water to new uses in accordance with the water 
regulatory agency’s evolving vision of water use. 
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7.9 INSTREAM FLOW REQUIREMENTS 
Scope: What are the strategies used to incorporate non-traditional instream uses of 
water into a WAS scheme? 
Adequate instream flow is vital for the comprehensive utilization and protection of water 
resources.  As economies develop, the consumptive use of water usually increases and more 
pressure is put on taking water out of the channel.  However, as society progresses, the 
social values of water also change and other non-consumptive uses of water are expected to 
be protected.   
Over the last decades, worldwide, more attention has been placed on increasing 
streamflows to improve water quality, protect fish and wildlife habitat, provide for 
recreational activities, and maintaining the aesthetic integrity of water systems.  In the US, 
the Clean Water Act and the Endangered Species Act have further stressed the importance of 
providing for the non-consumptive uses of water and exerted more pressure on water 
regulatory agencies to provide adequate flows for environmental protection.  In addition, 
even in the more arid west, outdoor recreation such as hunting, fishing, and environmental 
tourism has grown to a multi-billion dollar industry that is greatly dependent on healthy 
water systems. 
 
7.9.1 International Provisions 
At the international level, instruments of law (e.g. treaties, conventions, etc.) seldom 
address environmental and other instream uses in any specific provision.  The concept of 
environmental flows is explored only in the more recent international doctrine of integrated 
water resources management or community of riparian states.  For instance, the 1996 United 
Nations Convention on the Non-Navigational Uses of International Watercourses requires 
countries to protect and preserve the ecosystems of international watercourses and control 
the sources of pollution.  In the text, states located within an international watercourse have 
an obligation to cooperate in the regulation of the watercourse flows.  Also, the long 
standing doctrine of not causing significant harm, confirmed by both the Helsinski Rules and 
the UN Convention, defines terms to reduce transboundary impacts including adverse effects 
resulting from a change in conditions of transboundary waters.  As explained in Chapter II, 
the Helsinski Rules have never been completely accepted and the Convention of Non-
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Navigational Uses has not yet been ratified.  Therefore, even though these agreements, 
collectively, may provide a basis for a comprehensive international regime for instream uses 
(mainly environmental flows) they are ambiguous and give ample margin for 
implementation to the parties involved. 
Perhaps more practical insight can be discovered from the study of bilateral and 
multilateral agreements.  Although very few of these treaties specifically address instream 
non-consumptive uses of water, the few that do have used one of two approaches.  Treaties 
either set very specific allocative provisions and limitations or establish an administrative 
body which, among other duties, will determine how these uses are going to be addressed.  
For instance, the Niagara River Water Diversion Treaty of 1950 between Canada and the US 
curtails diversions during specific times and dates in order to maintain adequate flows for 
the protection of scenic beauty and recreational uses.  The flow rates specified in the treaty 
are mandatory minimums and all excess waters are then divided equally between both 
countries.   
The International Joint Commission is the administrative body for the Niagara River 
which manages the Treaty’s provisions and provides an instrument for conflict resolution.  
Probably the only treaty that has any meaningful provision for the protection of 
environmental flows is the 1995 Mekong River Agreement.  The agreement creates the 
Mekong River Commission (MRC) which is in charge of creating a framework for the 
management and sustainable development of the Lower Mekong River basin.  The 
agreement states that the signatory parties are to protect the environment of the basin by 
minimizing and mitigating pollution and other harmful effects resulting from development 
plans and uses of the waters. The agreement also requires the establishment of minimum 
monthly natural flows during the dry season.  A Joint Committee which is the 
implementation branch of the MRC is appointed to adopt the necessary guidelines for the 
location and levels of the flows.  Currently, the Committee has developed a hydrological 
model of the Lower Mekong River with the support of the World Bank.  Alternative 
development scenarios are being evaluated as part of a bigger study to determine the 
environmental flows component required in the treaty. 
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7.9.2 Interstate and Intrastate Provisions 
In the US, instream flow needs have been included in WAS in several ways.  Among 
states, instream needs are usually not considered separately from the other water needs and it 
is left to the individual states to consider and provide for them from their water allotment as 
established by ratified interstate compacts and in accordance with the state’s water 
administration policy.  More recently a different approach has been taken in eastern states in 
which state’s borders are ignored and administration of water rights and uses within a 
transboundary basin, including instream flows, are regulated by policies established by a 
commission. 
At the intrastate level, states either define instream flows as guaranteed minimum flows 
reserved prior to allocation or incorporate them within their water rights system.  In the 
eastern US, where the riparian doctrine evolved, instream uses have historically been 
considered important due to the natural flow tradition (Chapter IV).  Nonetheless, in the 
traditional riparian states, expanding municipal and other out-of-river demands have exposed 
the weakness of the reasonable use rule to balance and much less protect conflicting water 
rights.   
In more regulated eastern states, minimum stream flows are usually established for the 
protection of environmental ecosystems rather than for ensuring natural flow to other 
riparians.  These minimum flow rates are maintained at particular stream gauges and usually 
have specifications on how minimum flows may vary throughout the year.  This specificity 
can be used to facilitate trade-offs between competing uses.  For instance, when a minimum 
flow is established for habitat protection and fisheries, it can be increased during the 
spawning season and decreased during winter.  Also, in areas of aesthetic and recreational 
interest, higher minimum flows can be established for the peak season of tourism and later 
be reduced. 
Western prior appropriation states emphasize the private property nature of water that 
has been physically put to use and the historically preferred uses of water have been 
consumptive in nature.  In contrast to the riparian natural flow theory, prior appropriation 
laws were designed to promote traditional economic uses of water, which besides 
hydropower were mostly out-of-stream.  As environmental awareness grew, many western 
states revised their water laws to allow for the recognition and establishment of instream 
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water rights for environmental, recreational and aesthetics purposes.  For instance, the state 
of Texas now recognizes recreation and pleasure, stock raising, public parks, and game 
preserves as beneficial uses of water.  However, the concern about environmental flows has 
come at a time when consumptive uses of water such as municipal, industrial and irrigation 
are also increasing.   
Due to the fact that instream water rights in the west are relatively recent, they are junior 
to most consumptive rights and therefore their recognition as beneficial uses has little 
practical significance.  For instance, in Texas environmental instream water rights have only 
been recognized since 1985 and with most of the state’s surface waters already allocated 
little water remains for environmental flows.  In most cases, public agencies own most 
instream rights which make these efforts dependent on the state’s economic and political 
will.   
Some states’ legislations have also incorporated concerns for instream needs by 
requiring water administrative agencies to review the effects of proposed water rights on the 
instream uses of water.  In Texas, this process usually entails revision of stream gauges near 
the area where the diversion is proposed, quantification of median flows needed for 
sustaining the aquatic habitats, and consideration of potential impacts on terrestrial wildlife 
and wetlands (Rochelle 2004).  The effectiveness of such practices, however, is dependent 
on the level of development of the river system. In overappropriated rivers this practice has 
come too late to make any significant impact on ensuring healthy aquatic ecosystems.   
For these reasons, water markets have become the most effective mechanism for 
accommodating instream needs since organizations interested in ensuring instream flows for 
environmental protection and other non-consumptive uses can purchase rights from more 
senior users.  Landry (1998) reported that water sales for environmental and other instream 
uses have occurred in nine of the eleven western states with several federal and state water 
acquisition programs of agencies such as the New Mexico Interstate Stream Commission.  
Nonetheless, relying on water markets alone for protection of instream uses may not be 
enough to ensure a comprehensive protection of instream values of water.   
It must be considered that most established water market mechanisms, especially in 
western states are designed for reallocating water from one consumptive use to another (i.e. 
agricultural to municipal) and have worked sometimes exclusively for that purpose.  Also, 
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water banking is not a permanent solution since it only works when and where there is 
money available for such purposes.  Reliance on markets shifts the responsibility of 
environmental protection from the government to the private sector which creates 
uncertainty, especially when considering that most success in environmental flows 
protection has been obtain through legislation and governmental programs.  Therefore, when 
designing strategies to use this mechanism, provisions must be made for assuring a high 
level of long-term protection and security at least comparable to those obtained by more 
traditional mechanisms such as legislation. 
Major concern for instream uses of water has prompted stronger pressure for instream 
flow protection in Texas.  Texas ranks first among the states in hunting opportunities and 
second in fishing, activities that amounted $4 billion in annual revenues in 1993 alone 
(TPWD, TCEQ, and TWDB, 2003). It has been considered the number one destination in 
the world for birdwatchers (Sansom 1995).  In 2001 the Texas Senate Bill 2 instructed the 
TWDB, the Texas Parks and Wildlife Department (TPWD), and the TCEQ to develop a 
state program for instream flows on priority rivers by the end of 2010.  In response, the 
agencies drafted a proposed instream flow program that is described in two documents: the 
Programmatic Work Plan (PWP) (TPWD, TCEQ, and TWDB, 2002) and Technical 
Overview Document (TOD) (TPWD, TCEQ, and TWDB, 2003).  The PWP outlines the 
scope, timeframe, and methodology for planning and conducting priority studies while the 
TOD details scientific and engineering methodologies for data collection and analysis that 
will be needed to develop such studies.  Priority basin instream flow studies were identified 
based on potential water development projects, water rights permitting issues, and other 
factors.  Among the priority basin studies are the Trinity, Lower Colorado, Sulphur, Brazos, 
San Antonio, Guadalupe, and Sabine Rivers.  Additional basins to be considered later on are 
the Neches, Red, and the upper subbasins of the Guadalupe and Sabine Rivers.  This 
program is still in a study and development phase and regulatory implications have not yet 
been determined. 
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7.10 DROUGHT MANAGEMENT 
Scope: What are the special conditions defined within WAS for declaring a drought 
state? What are the adjustments to normal allocation rules and/or implementation of 
new rules used to cope with drought conditions? 
A key component of a WAS, particularly in arid regions, is to establish methodologies to 
respond to periods of water scarcity.  Drought periods are the ultimate test for a WAS, for 
effective water allocation becomes critical as reliable supplies diminish.  However, drought 
periods are difficult to detect as they develop slowly and usually cover large regions and can 
last for years.  Droughts are natural disasters and their severity is dependent not only on 
physical factors such as precipitation, temperature, and moisture but also on social 
components.  When WAS are well prepared to withstand water scarcity, the impacts of 
droughts are less severe. 
 
7.10.1 Definitions of Drought 
In general, droughts are defined as recurrent climatic events characterized by a lack or 
dramatic reduction of precipitation for an extended period of time.  The factors used to 
define if a drought is occurring or about to occur vary from region to region.  The manner in 
which WAS define droughts are important because they determine drought policies and 
response actions.  There is no universally accepted definition of a drought.  Droughts are 
insidious and their effects accumulate gradually over time, which makes difficult to 
determine whether or not it exists and how severe it could be.  Moreover, since droughts 
occur in all regions of the world regardless of climate and economic background, a single 
mechanism to determine if a drought is in progress might not be a viable expectation.  
Droughts have been defined based on different characteristics: meteorological, 
agricultural, hydrological, and socioeconomic (Wilhite and Glantz 1985).  Meteorological 
droughts are defined by the decline in climatic moisture as compared to normal conditions.  
The standard of comparison for this definition is site-specific as moisture conditions vary 
greatly from region to region.  Agricultural droughts are defined based on yield losses in 
agricultural production.   Hydrological droughts are defined based on the effects of low 
precipitations on surface and sub-surface water supplies rather than lack of precipitation 
itself. A hydrological drought downstream of a river can be caused by changes in 
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precipitation, land use, or water use patterns upstream that result in diminished streamflows 
regardless of precipitation downstream. Socioeconomic droughts are defined based on the 
economic effects of the reduction of precipitation and/or streamflows (supply) on water 
users (demand).  In other words, a socio-economic drought occurs when demands exceeds 
supply.   
In the US, the national drought policy has incorporated two basic drought definitions: 
stored water and natural water droughts.  Stored water droughts occur when stored resources 
in man-made reservoirs, natural lakes and groundwater aquifers are depleted for unusually 
prolonged periods of time due to low precipitation.  This type of droughts are rarely affected 
by regular periods of less-than-normal rainfall and only very prolonged periods of low 
precipitation and increased water use can have significant impacts.  Natural water droughts 
on the other hand, react quickly to short periods of below-normal rainfall.  These affect 
mostly people depending on direct precipitation and unregulated streamflows for agriculture 
and other water-dependent businesses. 
Due to the many intricacies and interconnections between the physical and 
socioeconomical aspects of droughts, the aforementioned compartmentalized definitions of 
droughts are more difficult to practically integrate into the water management system.  For 
that reason, public declarations of droughts are often triggered by specific and well-defined 
conditions.  These triggers then become the practical definition of drought for a particular 
region or for specific sectors such as agriculture or municipal water supply (National 
Drought Policy Commission 2000).  For instance, in more humid areas a drought can be 
declared only after a couple of months without rain.  In more arid areas, a couple of months 
without rain might be considered normal and only when reservoir levels start to drop 
dramatically, a state of alarm may be reached.   
Some water resources management systems like the Australian, use rainfall triggers to 
guide their drought mitigation programs.  Australia water management has identified a range 
of triggered drought definitions based on percentages of normal precipitation.  If the 
accumulated rainfall over three successive months (or six months for the most arid regions) 
is 10% or less of what normal precipitation should be, a drought watch is issued in the 
affected region.  A serious deficiency is declared when rainfall over a three month or longer 
period falls within the lowest 5 to 10% of historical records.  Conversely, if rainfall is in the 
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lowest 5% of records for three months or more, a severe rainfall deficiency is declared.  The 
drought is considered to have ceased when plentiful rainfall returns.  Plentiful rainfall is 
defined as well above average rainfall for one month or above average rainfall over a three-
month period (Australian Government 2005). 
One of the most common mechanisms for defining droughts is droughts indexes. These 
drought indicators are objective measures of the system that can help agencies identify the 
onset, increasing or decreasing severity, and conclusion of a drought (Werick and Whipple 
1994). Most water-supply planners find it useful to evaluate one or more indices before 
making a decision.   
The most widely used index is the Palmer Drought Severity Index (PDSI) (Palmer 
1965).  The PDSI uses temperature and rainfall data to determine dryness.  One of its major 
strongholds is that it can determine long-term droughts by identifying long-terms trends that 
are not affected by abnormally wet months.  Only a long enough wet spell would mean the 
drought is over.  The PDSI is a meteorological drought index and does not consider non-
meteorological aspects such as streamflow, lake levels, and snowpack in determining when a 
drought starts and ends.  The PDSI provides measures of moisture conditions that are 
standardized for comparison.   
The Crop Moisture Index (CMI) is an index within the computations of the PDSI that 
evaluates short-term moisture conditions and can be used to monitor impacts on crops.  The 
PDSI follows a 4 to -4 scale with 0 as normal conditions and negative numbers as drought 
conditions (-2 moderate, -3 severe, -4 extreme).  Even though PDSI has become the semi-
official drought index for drought monitoring in the US, it has been argued that it does not 
properly depicts drought conditions in mountainous lands or in regions of frequent climatic 
extremes (Smith et al. 1993, Hayes 2005).  Also, the PDSI was designed for assessing 
impacts mostly in agriculture and does not accurately represent other hydrological impacts 
of droughts (Mckee et al. 1995).  In addition, the extreme and severe classifications occur 
with greater frequency in some regions than in others (Willeke et al. 1994), which can make 
planning response actions based on drought intensity impractical (Hayes 2005).  The 
National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) keeps weekly maps of PDSI as 
part of their national drought monitoring program (www.cpc.ncep.noaa.gov/products/ 
analysis_monitoring/regionalmonitoring/palmer.gif).  
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Due to the shortcomings of the PDSI in accounting for topographic and climatic 
variability in Colorado, Shafer and Dezman (1982) developed a new index called the 
Surface Water Supply Index (SWSI).  In addition to the meteorological considerations of the 
PDSI, the SWSI also accounts for snowpack, streamflow, precipitation, and reservoir 
storage.  It is calculated by river basin and standardized for facilitating comparison.  Like the 
PDSI, a 0 value represents normal conditions and has a range from +4 to -4.  Perhaps its 
major disadvantage is that any change in water management (e.g. new diversions or 
reservoirs) or new streamflow data would require new algorithms to be calculated for that 
particular basin (Hayes 2005).  SWSI has been used in Colorado as complement to the PDSI 
to trigger drought responses. 
In 1993, McKey et al. developed the Standardized Precipitation Index (SPI) which 
represents the effects of droughts in water availability of different sources. The SPI 
determines precipitation deficits for 3, 6, 12, 24, and 48 months based on long-term 
precipitation records and transforms them into a normal distribution.  Positive SPI values 
correspond to wetter than median conditions and negative values to less than median 
precipitation (e.g. -1 to -1.5 moderately dry, -1.5 to -1.9 severely dry, -2 or less extremely 
dry).  A drought is defined as an event where the SPI is continuously negative reaching 
values less than -1 and ends when SPI become positive.  SPI has been used operationally to 
monitor droughts in Colorado since 1994 (Hayes 2005) but it’s yet to be widely applied and 
tested anywhere else (Oklahoma Drought Management Team 1997). 
In 1988, Congress passed the Reclamation States Drought Assistance Act which allowed 
states to request the assistance from the Bureau of Reclamation for drought mitigation 
projects.  As part of those projects, the Bureau developed the Reclamation Drought Index 
(RDI) as a tool for defining duration and severity of droughts.  The RDI is flexible so it can 
accommodate the meteorological and hydrological conditions particularly of the western 
states.  RDI is calculated at the basin level and is unique to each basin.  This could be 
advantageous since the RDI can be tailored to the specific characteristics and needs of a 
particular state although it can make interbasin comparisons difficult.  The RDI main 
strength is that it has the ability to account for climatic as well as water supply factors.  It 
incorporates water supply components (precipitation, snowpack, reservoir levels, etc.), 
demands (consumption as a function of temperature), and duration with months weighted 
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according to their significance in water consumption (Hayes 2005).  The RDI values for 
severity are similar to those for PDSI (-1.5 mild, -1.5 to -4 moderate, -4 or less extreme).  
The state of Oklahoma uses the RDI as part of their water supply drought monitoring system 
(Oklahoma Drought Management Team 1997).  There are many other drought indexes used 
in US and abroad for monitoring drought conditions.  Some of them are specialized for 
assessing impacts on specific sectors such as the Keetch-Byram Drought Index for assessing 
wildfire potential hazard and the Satellite Vegetation Health Index which uses satellite 
gathered data to assess the health of crops. 
 
7.10.2 Drought Management at the International Level 
Traditionally, drought has been a misunderstood phenomenon against which cultures 
have felt powerless.  In impoverished countries, governments concerns with droughts are 
centered mostly on issues of food security and meeting the nutritional needs of the 
population, environmental degradation, and a retardation of the development process 
(Wilhite and Svodoba 2000).  In more developed countries, even though droughts do not 
necessarily translate into starvation, they have caused substantial environmental, economic, 
and social impacts.  Due to the magnitude of the situation, some drought planning efforts 
have been undertaken at the international level, especially in the last decades.   
Droughts in international treaties and interstate compacts are not comprehensively 
address.  Most transboundary water agreements do not have specific provisions for times of 
severe scarcity. Some, however, have several provisions for dry years (i.e. below normal 
precipitation or streamflow).  For instance, the Rio Grande Compact has provided a system 
of water credits and debits in which water debt accrued over dry years can be repaid during 
wet years.  This, however, is far from being comprehensive since it assumes low flow 
periods to be short and that there is enough storage capacity in the river to withstand them.   
The Rio Grande Treaties of 1906 and 1944 between US and Mexico specifically 
addresses the potential of drought.  The 1906 Treaty established that in the case of 
“extraordinary drought” water deliveries to Mexico are to be reduced in the same proportion 
as deliveries to the US.  Similarly, the 1944 Treaty established that during “extraordinary 
drought” conditions Mexico can accrue water debts that shall be made up in the next five 
year cycle (Chapter VI).  However, the term “extraordinary drought” was not defined in the 
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treaties and no mechanism of conflict resolution was provided.  Therefore, this provision 
rather than providing a mechanism to deal with droughts, has allowed Mexico to curtail 
water deliveries on the Rio Grande, which has produced serious differences on whether 
Mexico is compliance or non-compliance with the treaty and fuel hostilities between the two 
countries (Combs 2004). 
More recently, there has been some interest in organizing international efforts to address 
droughts in a proactive way rather than emergency relief.  As a result, there have been some 
consorted efforts between riparian and/or neighboring countries to develop regional anti-
drought programs.  For example, the Southwest Asia Drought Assessment and Mitigation 
Project has the objective of developing a conjunctive drought mitigation program in 
Afghanistan, Pakistan and India.  This project, like other international drought management 
efforts, is still in its initial phase and studies are been conducted on regional analysis of 
drought indices, satellite data and their potential use in drought monitoring and management, 
and development of drought-related policies and institutions (IWMI 2005). 
 
7.10.3 Drought Management at the Interstate and Intrastate Level  
In the US, efforts have also been made for establishing regional drought preparedness 
programs. For example, in 1997, the Western Drought Coordination Council (WDCC) was 
created with the purpose of developing model drought policies and management/mitigation 
measures to reduce impacts associated with droughts.  However, the WDCC has been in 
hiatus since 1999 and its functions have been delegated to the National Drought Policy 
Commission. 
Other regional entities follow the basin planning approach.  For example, the Delaware 
River Basin Commission (DRBC) has an active drought management program that provides 
initiatives to help states in the basin prepare for droughts.  The DRBC also conditions the 
granting and renewal of permits to the implementation of water conservation practices.  The 
Susquehanna River Basin Commission has gone a step further and developed a coordinated 
plan of drought management activities among the basin’s riparian states.  The coordination 
plan establishes precipitation deficit, ground-water level, streamflow, reservoir levels and 
PDSI as the triggers for initiating mitigation actions.  After the assessment of these triggers, 
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if a drought emergency is declared, non-essential water uses in the basin are to be limited to 
75 to 85% of their normal withdrawal rate (Susquehanna River Basin Commission 2000). 
Historically in the US, droughts have been addressed at the state or local level.  
However, as a result of several episodes of severe droughts in the last century and billions of 
dollars in losses, the Congress passed in 1998 the National Drought Policy Act that created 
the National Drought Policy Commission (NDPC) to advice Congress in drought response 
and preparedness issues.  In 2000, the NPDC reported to Congress its recommendations on 
how to achieve a coordinated approach in order to mitigate the impacts of and respond to 
droughts.  The report concluded that national drought policy was needed to “support but not 
supplant nor interfere with state, tribal, regional, local, and individual efforts to reduce 
drought impacts” (NPDC 2000).  The reality is that even though these national initiatives 
have developed recently, at the state level there has been significant progress in proactive 
drought management for the last twenty years.  Nonetheless, the report marks a shift from 
the emphasis on drought relief to drought preparedness and mitigation and the need for 
institutional coordination among all levels of government. 
Drought mitigation usually follows one or several of three response alternatives: 
strategic long-term responses, tactical short-term responses, and/or emergency responses 
(Werick and Whipple 1994).  A long-term approach refers to long-term economical and 
institutional measures such as infrastructure and legislation.  A tactical approach involves 
response measures, planned for in advanced, to cope with expected short term water deficits.  
Emergency responses are measures taken when circumstances exceed the expectations or 
level of preparedness of the system due to inefficiency or the occurrence of more intense 
and/or prolonged droughts than those in record. Long-term strategic planning and 
emergency response are concerned with institutional capacity and appropriate organizational 
structure that can facilitate governmental response to droughts.  
Tactical short-term measures are more concerned with decision-making and responsive 
actions that can be implemented at the time of the drought to reduce the residual drought 
vulnerability, especially in terms of water availability.  It is in this branch of drought 
preparedness that most mechanisms of drought mitigation related to water supply systems 
are developed. Tactical responses for risk-reduction require climate and water supply 
monitoring as well as pre-developed plans for mitigation called drought contingency plans 
 160
(US Army Corps of Engineers 1981).  The development of such plans and strategies requires 
modeling capabilities for developing water supply alternatives. 
The most important mechanism in tactical responses is the use of triggers.  Different 
sectors of the water management system use different triggers to launch mitigation 
measures.  For instance, an agency in charge of overseeing agricultural production might use 
one or several agriculture indexes such as the CMI or more general indexes like the PDSI to 
launch mitigation measures as specified in their drought contingency plans.   
Since most drought indexes describe climatological conditions, WAS most commonly 
use other type of triggers to launch mitigation.  Lakes and reservoir level conditions and 
streamflows are the most common operational triggers. The state of Texas Drought 
Preparedness Plan establishes five drought stages: abnormally dry (advisory level), first-
stage drought (watch), severe drought (warning), extreme drought (disaster) exceptional 
drought (emergency).  One of the criteria for defining a drought and its severity is water 
availability.  Both reservoir conditions and streamflows are used as triggers or thresholds for 
initiating different levels of responsive actions.   
Each drought stage has an associated range of values describing reservoir and 
streamflows conditions.  In Texas, reservoir conditions are described as percent of reservoir 
conservation storage capacity and it is calculated by dividing the actual water volume 
storage by the total conservation storage capacity (municipal water supply, hydropower and 
irrigation). Streamflows conditions are represented by percent exceedance probabilities 
computed from 30-day historical mean flows from 29 stations all over the state (Drought 
Preparedness Council 2005).  Percent exceedance probability is the probability or percent of 
time that flows of a given magnitude are exceeded.  For example, if a streamflow magnitude 
is said to have a 70% exceedance probability, it can be also said that the stream is expected 
to have flows greater than that particular value 70% of the time.  Table 7.5 presents the 
percent of reservoir conservation storage capacity and streamflow percent of exceedance 
values associated with the different drought stages.  
 The Texas Water Development Board (TWBD) is responsible for compiling 
information, determining the aforementioned trigger values, and developing an overall level 
of concern in terms of water availability from 1 to 5 accordingly to the drought stages 
already explained.  This is done for each of Texas ten climatic regions as defined by NOAA  
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Table 7.5. Water Availability Assessment Values for Texas Drought Preparedness
Plan
Drought Stage Description 
Percent of Reservoir 
Storage Conservation 
Capacity
Streamflow Percent 
Exceedance
Advisory Abnormally Dry <70 70-79
Watch First-Stage Drought <60 80-89
Warning Severe Drought <40 90-94
Emergency Extreme Drought <20 95-98
Disaster Exceptional Drought <10 99-100
 Source: Drought Preparedness Council  (2005) 
Drought Severity Classification Ranges
 
 
 
(Drought Preparedness Council 2005).  The levels of concern are then analyzed by the State 
Drought Manager who decides if any state specific mitigating measures are necessary.  
Otherwise, it is left to the local water management organizations to adopt specific mitigation 
actions in accordance with their drought contingency plans, the drought stages, and level of 
concern established by the TWDB.  The Texas Water Availability Modeling System 
supports the formulation of drought mitigation strategies.  Most drought contingency 
actions in Texas involve rationing, water marketing, inter-basin transfers, and voluntary 
restrictions. 
An alternative strategy for defining drought and activating drought mitigation based on 
current storage conditions was presented by Salazar and Wurbs (2004).  The authors 
developed a conditional reliability model (CRM) (see Section 7.2.5) that determines the 
likelihood of meeting water use requirements as a function of storage.  In contrast to 
reliability indices based on long-term simulations, the CRM can create short-term reliability 
estimates that reflect the current storage conditions.  The model can be used to find a trigger 
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level based on an assumed acceptable level of reliability.  For instance, a trigger level can be 
defined as the minimum storage required to guarantee 100% reliability of meeting water 
demands over a 12-month period.  If storage levels fall below this minimum, contingency 
measures are adopted. 
The state of California has a well-developed process for drought mitigation.  In addition 
to the drought contingency actions found in Texas, California also has specific requirements 
to cut some water uses up to 50% during severe droughts (National Drought Policy 
Commission 2000).  Also, in 1991-92, after several years of severe drought, California 
established a temporary Drought Emergency Water Bank (DEWB).  In this strategy, the 
Department of Water Resources served as a broker for water transfers and set a fixed price 
for both purchases and sales of water by the Bank.  Most of the water used in transfers came 
from farmers who fallowed their land and sold the water their crops would have consumed 
to the bank and from inter-basin transfers. Also, the DEWB established a dual-contract 
system in which buyers and sellers who committed to the Bank early, made a deposit on the 
water they thought would need or supply, which allowed the Bank to anticipate water 
surplus or deficit (Howitt 1994).  Overall, the experience of the DEWB is considered a 
success because it facilitated the transfer of water from low-valued uses to high-valued uses 
during a period of intense scarcity by minimizing transaction costs and risks. 
Werick and Whipple (1994) have listed several mechanisms for drought mitigation that 
can be triggered by state drought plans.  Among them are: conjunctive management of 
groundwater and surface water resources, water markets, water banking, conditional 
reservoir operation for protection of instream flows, voluntary and mandatory water use 
restrictions, and water pricing.  There are more than 30 drought plans from various states 
and many of them provide triggering mechanisms or thresholds that are intended to initiate 
specific actions by various agencies, but when these thresholds are reached or exceeded, the 
prescribed responses are rarely implemented in a timely or effective manner (Drought 
Preparedness Council 2005). 
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CHAPTER VIII 
 
MODELING THE WATER ALLOCATION FRAMEWORK 
 
One of the main arguments that permeate throughout this dissertation is the complexity 
of water allocation systems (WAS). WAS encompass many levels of physical, 
administrative, legal, and regulatory aspects.  Computer simulation models can assist water 
managers in dealing with complex water allocation issues.  Computer simulation models can 
be used to evaluate water management strategies, plan development projects, simulate 
allocation under alternative water availability scenarios, support the negotiation of 
agreements, administer water rights systems, and the like.  During the planning and design 
stage, computer models can allow decision makers to evaluate the physical and economic 
impacts of alternative allocation policies, demand levels, and institutional restrictions.  Once 
a WAS is established, computer models may be used to simulate the management and 
regulation of the water resources of a river basin within its hydrological and administrative 
setting. 
The state of Texas has successfully developed and implemented a Water Availability 
Modeling (WAM) system to support the water planning process and the administration of its 
water rights permit system (Chapter VI). The WAM system was authorized by the 1997 
Senate Bill 1, the Brown-Lewis Water Management Plan.  A key component of the WAM 
system is the Water Rights Analysis Package (WRAP).  This computer model has been used 
to simulate water allocation and management scenarios in all Texas river basins, including 
the international Rio Grande. 
The scope of this Chapter is to demonstrate how the principles presented in the 
conceptual framework (Chapter VII) can be used to assess water allocation issues.  In order 
to do that, the Rio Grande basin in Texas will be used as a case study.  Three major current 
water allocation issues of the Texas Rio Grande are evaluated in this Chapter: reallocation 
among uses, instream flow considerations, and drought assessment. 
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8.1 WRAP PROGRAM OVERVIEW 
WRAP is the computer program used for modeling all Texas basins as part of the WAM 
system.  WRAP is a generalized model, developed at Texas A&M University, designed to 
simulate a river basin under a priority-based WAS (Wurbs 2005).  WRAP is a suite of 
programs that include WinWRAP, SIM, HYD, and TABLES.  WinWRAP is a user interface to 
apply the model under the Windows operating system environment.  SIM is the main 
river/reservoir system water allocation simulation model.  HYD is a pre-simulation program 
designed for developing sequences of monthly naturalized streamflows and reservoir net 
evaporation-precipitation rates. These sequences are then read by SIM as input files.   
TABLES is the post-simulation program that organizes, summarizes, analyzes, and displays 
SIM results.  Recent additions that expand the model capabilities include the SIMD, DAY, 
and SALT programs.  SIMD is similar to SIM but with additional features that allow sub-
monthly time steps, flood forecasting, routing, and flood control operations.  DAY provides 
the input data for SIMD by transforming monthly hydrologic data into daily time steps and 
determining routing parameters. SALT uses the SIM/SIMD output file along with a salinity 
input file to determine salinity levels throughout the river/reservoir system. 
WRAP evaluates the ability of the river/reservoir system to meet demands during a 
hypothetical repetition of historical natural hydrology.  Demands are met as long as water is 
available from streamflow and/or reservoir storage.  Shortages are declared if insufficient 
water is available in the system to satisfy the water rights demand targets. The program 
performs the water allocation computations by tracking inflow sequences and accounting for 
reservoir storage, system losses (evaporation, channel losses, etc.), diversions, instream 
flows, and other variables.   
Water allocations are also subject to prescribed water rights conditions and reservoir 
operational rules.  The spatial connectivity of the system is modeled as a set of control 
points. The computational algorithms are based on the location of each control point related 
to the others as defined in the input data.  The modeling process starts by computing 
naturalized inflows at gauging stations that are used as primary control points and 
distributing flows from those control points to others located in ungauged areas.  Naturalized 
flows represent the natural flows that would have occurred in the absence of the water users 
and water management facilities and practices.  Then water is allocated to each water right 
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in priority order subject to water availability and other management constraints.  Simulation 
results include regulated flows (i.e. physical flows at control points), reservoir storage 
contents, diversions, water right shortages, unappropriated flows (i.e. flows still available for 
appropriation), reliability indices, frequency statistics, and other pertinent variables.  
Detailed program information can be found in the program manuals for its latest version of 
April 2005 (Wurbs 2005).  Full documentation and downloadable versions of the program 
can be obtained at: http://ceprofs.tamu.edu/rwurbs/wrap.htm. 
 
8.2 RIO GRANDE WAM MODEL 
The Rio Grande WAM model was developed by R. J. Brandes Company (2004).  The 
Rio Grande WAM was modeled using the February 2003 version of WRAP but can be run 
with the 2005 version with no complications.  Since water allocation in the Rio Grande is 
governed by two international treaties, an interstate compact, and two intrastate water right 
systems, a series of special considerations were incorporated in the WRAP input files to 
properly simulate this complex system.  These special considerations are summarized below. 
 
8.2.1 Modeling Considerations for International Allocation 
The allocation of water between the United States (US) and Mexico (MX) was 
accomplished in WRAP by using two interconnected parallel water systems, one models US 
water and the other MX water.  The naturalized flows determined for each of the tributaries 
to the Rio Grande included in the model are assigned to its country of origin.  In this 
manner, it is ensured that the naturalized flows originating in each country are only available 
for use in that country.  Naturalized flows computed in WRAP-HYD were determined for the 
mainstream, regardless of the ownership of the flows as established by both the 1944 Treaty 
and the 1906 Convention.  Since the SIM model is structured as two parallel systems, the 
naturalized inflows needed to be divided between the two river systems prior to the water 
allocation simulation.  This was accomplished with a spreadsheet program that performs a 
mass balance of the flows for each side of the Rio Grande.  The inflows to MX include the 
allocation assigned by the 1906 Convention (60,000 ac-ft/yr). 
According to the 1944 Treaty, MX must deliver to Texas one-third of the flows reaching 
the mainstream of the Rio Grande from MX tributaries.  This is accomplished in the WAM 
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model by first simulating the MX demands and then transferring one-third of the simulated 
inflows that reach the control points representing the mouth of six MX tributaries to the 
Texas system as return flows.  The priority of the MX water rights is established in the 
model using priority codes that are based on type of use (municipal and industrial first and 
then irrigation) and river order (from upstream to downstream).  Another consideration is the 
equal split of the water in the mainstream of the Rio Grande at Fort Quitman in accordance 
with the International Boundary and Water Commission (IBWC) accounting procedures.  
After accounting for all water rights above Fort Quitman, one-half of the regulated flows in 
the Texas system are transferred to the MX system and vice versa.  Water allocation above 
Fort Quitman within Texas is explained in section 8.2.3.  Evaporation losses from the 
Amistad and Falcon Reservoirs are proportionally allocated to each country based on the 
beginning-of-month storage in each country’s pool. 
The WAM model also incorporates the treaty provisions with regard to excess inflows.  
For instance, if the MX pool in Amistad is full, excess inflows are delivered to the MX 
Falcon pool.  However, if the MX Falcon pool is full, then excess water is transferred to the 
Texas pool in Amistad.  Similarly, if the MX pool in Falcon is full and Texas has storage 
capacity available in Falcon, then the water is transfer to that pool.  If Texas does not have 
storage capacity available, releases made are available for the MX portion of the Rio 
Grande.  The same logic applies for Texas excess inflows with corresponding transfers being 
made to MX. 
 
8.2.2 Modeling Considerations for Interstate Allocation 
From the US allocation of the waters of the Rio Grande, the Texas share is defined by 
the Rio Grande Compact.  This water is subject to the operation of the Rio Grande Project 
(RGP), which delivers waters to New Mexico, Texas, and to Mexico according with the 
1906 Convention. The project is operated by the U.S. Bureau of Reclamation and water is 
allocated based on the quantity of water in storage in Elephant Butte Reservoir (EBR) on 
December 1 of each year.  Therefore, the amount of water Texas receives varies according 
with the storage at EBR.  Inflows to EBR are dependent on water usage and storage at 
Colorado and New Mexico.  Historically, there have been years when deliveries to EBR by 
one of both states (i.e. Colorado and New Mexico) have been more or less than those 
 167
required by the Rio Grande Compact.  Also, there have been occasions when the water 
already allocated in storage at EBR at the end of a year has not been released and carried 
over as storage for next year. 
To account for these issues two adjustments were made to the historical inflows used in 
WRAP.  Inflows were adjusted to reflect the effects of any Rio Grande Compact over/under 
deliveries by New Mexico and of any unreleased Project water on the allocation of RGP 
water to Texas.  In order to do this, first a series of relationships between total RGP releases, 
total diversions and charges by Texas were used to develop a complete record of historical 
monthly diversions.  These quantities were then added to the historical monthly flows to 
establish historical annual amounts available to Texas and MX.  The historical annual amounts 
diverted by MX into the Acequia Madre Canal were then subtracted to establish the total 
historical annual quantities of Rio Grande water available for diversion by Texas. 
 
8.2.3 Modeling Considerations for Intrastate Allocation 
The allocation of the Texas share of the Rio Grande water is governed by two distinct 
water rights systems: one for water rights above Fort Quitman and one for water rights 
below Fort Quitman.  Water rights above Fort Quitman are honored in accordance with the 
doctrine of prior appropriation, like the rest of Texas.  These water rights are not associated 
with the Amistad-Falcon Reservoir system.  As explained in section 8.2.1, one-half of the 
regulated flows reaching Fort Quitman from the Texas system are transferred to the MX 
system and vice versa.  Therefore, the allocation of water rights above Fort Quitman needs 
to be performed first in the simulation.  In the WAM model, the number representing the 
priority date, which is related to the actual date stipulated in the permits, is reduced by 100.  
This adjustment makes these water rights senior to all other Texas water rights. 
Water rights below Fort Quitman are subject to an allocation sequence that is governed 
by water use type instead of priority date.  Since the WRAP model requires the use of 
priority dates to perform the computations, a special numbering scheme was developed for 
the Rio Grande WAM.  The number assigned to each right is an eight digit code in which the 
first four numbers represent a specific group of rights with the same general priority and the 
last four digits specify a river order number (from upstream to downstream) which 
determines the order of the individual rights.  For example, the first four digits of all Texas 
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water rights classified as Domestic, Municipal, and Industrial (DMI) are between 4000 and 
4999.  The last for digits begin with 0100 and continue increasing in intervals of 100 up to 
9900.  The Class A water rights code starts with 5000, and for Class B with 6000.  
Therefore, DMI uses are satisfied first, followed by Class A and Class B rights.  For rights 
within the same general priority group, the river order number establishes their relative 
priority. 
The Texas water rights below Fort Quitman are dependent on the Amistad-Falcon 
Reservoir system.  Water rights with diversion points between Amistad and Falcon are 
satisfied first using available streamflow with backup from Amistad.  For water rights below 
Falcon, streamflow is used first with backup from Falcon and then from Amistad.  In the 
model, Amistad is given a higher priority for refilling storage than Falcon in accordance 
with IBWC operational rules.  The amount of storage available to backup the water rights 
and for operational purposes is determined by Texas Commission on Environmental Quality 
(TCEQ) rules.  The next month storage allocations are accomplished within the WAM 
model by means of three dummy reservoirs.  The first dummy reservoir (FDR) represents 
the combined storage in the Texas Amistad and Falcon Reservoirs.  The other two 
computational reservoirs represent the amount of storage available to Class A and Class B 
irrigation rights and are sized to have a capacity of 1.41 times the combined annual diversion 
amounts for each category.  Storage allocations are performed in the following fashion: 
 
(1) The FDR is set equal to the end-of-month combined storage from the Texas Amistad 
and Falcon pools.  The FDR has zero water in storage at the beginning of a 
simulation and the beginning of each time step. 
(2) DMI reserve (225,000 ac-ft) and dead storage (4,600 ac-ft) is deducted from the FDR. 
(3) The end-of-month account balance for Class A and Class B rights is deducted from 
the FDR. 
(4) The operating reserve (75,000 ac-ft) is removed from the FDR. 
(5) Deductions are made from the second and third dummy reservoirs (negative 
allocations) when the accounting process determines that water is required to re-
establish the system operating reserve. 
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(6) If excess water is available in the FDR, this water is transferred to the second and 
third dummy reservoirs.  The second dummy reservoir (Class A) receives 63% of the 
remaining water and 37% goes to the third dummy reservoir (Class B). 
 
At the beginning of each month, a check is performed for Class A and Class B rights 
using the Drought Index (DI) option in WRAP.  The DI option is used to modify the Class A 
and Class B diversion targets as a function of storage content in the second and third dummy 
reservoirs.  If there is enough storage to satisfy all demands in the coming month the DI 
evaluates to 1 and no adjustments are made.  If there is not enough storage, the DI evaluates 
to a factor equal to the amount of water in the dummy reservoir divided by the monthly 
demand for that particular month.  The diversion amounts associated with that Class of water 
right are then reduced in accordance with the DI factor. 
Although all water rights in the Rio Grande WAM are simulated individually, the 
Amistad-Falcon storage accounting process is performed with all water rights of a single 
class grouped and accounted for as a single account.  Therefore, all Class A and Class B 
water rights generally have the same diversion reliability within the WAM. 
 
8.3 MODELING OF WATER ALLOCATION ISSUES ON THE RIO GRANDE 
The Rio Grande is a basin in stress.   In the Middle Rio Grande, arid climate, dwindling 
water supplies, increased demand for services both in Texas and New Mexico, and 
contamination discharges of heavy industries and military-related facilities which are 
exempt from regulation  have created a scenario of water crisis waiting to occur.  In the 
Lower Rio Grande, overappropriation, alarming increase in demands for municipal uses, 
decreased reliabilities of irrigation water, drought susceptibility, and international treaty 
issues are impacting the long-term water availability of the region.  The river's role as a 
border, and its crossing of states, means that regional and binational political considerations 
are essential to managing the basin's water supply.  Also, population is expected to more 
than double over the next fifty years (RWPG 2001).  This growth only adds to the urgency 
to improve water efficiency and increase long-term planning efforts. 
About 10% of the population of Texas lives in the 32 counties around the Rio Grande 
(Silvy et al. 2003) and virtually all water needs in the Lower Rio Grande Basin are met by 
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only one source, the river (Berger 1995).  However, the amount of water supplied by the 
river is limited and often erratic given the basin semi-arid climate.  Groundwater supplies are 
of such poor quality that they do not provide a valid alternative solution to the problem 
(McCoy 1990).  Water rights for using the river have evolved over a long period of disputes 
between users.  These disputes were intended to be resolved by the court decree of 1969 that 
established the current use-type based water rights system.  However, despite the creation of 
this complicated system of water rights, the system remains over-allocated and no new rights 
are granted.  However, existing rights can be transferred by several market means.   
During the last two decades there has been an "active market" for water rights, mostly 
from agricultural uses to municipal uses (Chang and Griffin 1992).  Purchased agriculture 
water is not fully converted into municipal water.  Instead, the quantity available for 
municipal uses is a fraction of the irrigation right depending on the class of irrigation water 
right (Chapter VI).  This approach is a conservation measure to ensure the system is not 
further stressed by the higher reliability required for municipal uses. 
Droughts in the region further aggravate this situation.  Drought occurs, on average, 
once every seven to ten years (Berger 1995). While droughts cannot be avoided in the 
region, steps can be taken to reduce their deleterious effects.  The rapidly growing demands 
in the region make drought preparedness a main concern for ensuring that demands are met 
during dry years.  Moreover, this area hosts an environment of rare and spectacular wildlife 
and plant species fueling an important local eco-tourism industry (Berger 1995).  Many 
acres of wetlands have disappeared since the 1960's, since water use has been on a steep 
incline.  Wetlands and surrounding upland areas are important to the survival of a number of 
endemic mammals, fish, birds, insects and plants.  Any alternations to the hydrologic regime 
of the region could have devastating effects on the basin’s ecosystems. 
In the following sections some of these issues will be addressed within the context of 
reallocation of water between uses, drought management, and instream flow requirements.  
The conceptual framework developed in Chapter VII is used as the basis for assessing the 
effectiveness of several alternative water management strategies in addressing these issues. 
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8.3.1 Reallocation Simulation 
The scope of this simulation is twofold: (1) to assess water availability in the current 
system for future demands, and (2) explore the effects of reallocation mechanisms to supply 
such demands.  Several of the water issues identified in the conceptual framework will be 
used in this assessment: water rights (section 7.2.1), reservoir storage considerations (section 
7.2.4), system reliability (section 7.2.5), and multiple uses (section 7.2.6). 
 
8.3.1.1 DMI Reserve Size Assessment  
As mentioned previously, the terms of water rights in the Lower Rio Grande have been 
established by court decree and priorities are based on type of use.  The allocation of storage 
between the use types in the system’s reservoirs (Amistad and Falcon) is also predetermined by 
this decree (Chapter VI).  One of the provisions is the establishment of the DMI reserve.  Every 
month, 225,000 ac-ft are reserved in storage to provide an added measure of security for DMI 
uses in case of future scarcity.  This is a form of hedging based on legal stipulations (section 
7.2.4).  In addition, an operational reserve (OR) is kept in storage for several purposes including 
delivery of water during low flow periods.  Thus, the OR serves as another backup storage for 
DMI uses.  The size of the OR varies monthly according with the water available after allocations. 
The water right system in the Lower Rio Grande allocates all the risks of shortages to 
irrigators as it intends to protect DMI uses.  The mechanism for storage allocation is 
imbedded in the water code (Chapter VI).  These rules of allocation were developed in the 
late 1960s and 1970s when methodologies for assessing the necessary storage for ensuring 
complete protection of DMI uses were limited.  A conservative approach was taken in which 
the DMI reserve size was set equal to the annual DMI diversions.  In other words, it was 
guaranteed that the storage would be enough to cover all DMI demands for an entire year 
even if there were no inflows.  However, an entire year without inflows is an extremely 
unlikely, if not impossible, hydrologic scenario.  The purpose of this simulation exercise is 
to address if the current size of the DMI pool is necessary for ensuring complete satisfaction 
of DMI demands. This assurance will be assessed in terms of volume and period reliabilities. 
In this exercise, the September 2005 full appropriation scenario (TCEQ Run 3) for the 
Rio Grande was used as the base model for comparison purposes.  A preliminary simulation 
run using the base model was performed to establish the initial storage conditions of the 
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reservoirs.  TCEQ applications of WRAP assume that the reservoirs are full at the beginning 
of the simulation.  The rationale behind this is that the results for a long period of analysis are 
not significantly affected by the initial conditions.  However, having full reservoirs at the 
beginning of the simulation may not be a realistic assumption for arid areas like the Rio 
Grande basin.  The initial storage content less the storage content at the end of the simulation 
represents extra water that could result in estimated reliabilities being higher than they should 
(Wurbs 2005).  Thus, the Beginning-Ending Storage (BES) feature in WRAP was used to 
determine the initial storage conditions.  The BES feature is based on setting beginning and 
ending storages equal, which reflects the concept of a cycling hydrologic simulation period.  
The initial storage condition for Amistad Reservoir was determined to be 259,929 ac-ft (15.5% 
of capacity) and for Falcon 61,140 ac-ft (3.9% of capacity).  The storage traces for Amistad 
and Falcon Reservoirs shown in Figure 8.1 illustrate the results of this preliminary exercise. 
Once the initial storage conditions were determined, several simulation runs were 
performed representing different scenarios of DMI and OR reserves sizes.  The current water 
demands for the Lower Rio Grande (below Amistad) are shown in Table 8.1.  The period of 
analysis extends from 1940 to 2000.  The WAM model input data was modified as necessary 
to represent the different scenarios.  The first set of runs consisted of the following scenarios: 
 
• Preliminary run (Pre-run): base scenario with full initial storage conditions at reservoirs. 
• Base scenario: DMI = 225,000 ac-ft/month; OR storage included. 
• Scenario 1: DMI = 50% of total (112,500 ac-ft/month); OR storage included. 
• Scenario 2: DMI = 25% of total (56,250 ac-ft/month); OR storage included. 
• Scenario 3: DMI = 0% of total (0 ac-ft/month); OR storage included. 
 
The average period (Rp) and volume (Rv) reliabilities for water right groups that are 
dependent on the Amistad-Falcon Reservoirs system are presented in Table 8.2.  Notice that 
as expected reliabilities for the Pre-run scenario are higher than for the Base scenario.  
Therefore, determining a beginning-of-period storage as described above, rather than 
assuming full storage capacity, provides a more realistic analysis of the base conditions in 
the basin. 
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Table 8.1  Summary of Water Demands by Use in the Lower Rio Grande
297, 067 1,616,363 183,894
Note: Values given in ac-ft/year
DMI Water 
Demands
Class A Irrigation and 
Mining Demands
Class B Irrigation and 
Mining Demands
 
 
 
 
 
Table 8.2. Reliabilities Based on Various DMI Reserve Sizes
Rv Rp Rv Rp Rv Rp
Pre-run 100 100 100 62.3 45.2 39.8 23.2
Base 100 100 100 61.3 44.6 38.3 21.6
1 50 100 100 62.0 45.0 38.8 21.6
2 25 100 100 62.3 45.0 38.9 21.5
3 0 100 100 62.6 45.3 39.2 21.4
Notes: Reliabilities are given in percentages.
           Rv = Volume Reliability;   Rp = Period Reliability
Class A Irrigation 
Water Rights
Class B Irrigation 
Water RightsScenario
% of Total 
DMI 
Reserve
 Municipal Water 
Rights
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The Rp and Rv for municipal water rights in all scenarios is 100%.  This demonstrates that 
municipal water rights are not affected by reductions in DMI reserve storage.  Based on the 
model premises and assumptions, municipal demands would be fully met even if the DMI 
reserve is eliminated.   This suggests that reserving 225,000 ac-ft/month of DMI storage is 
an extremely conservative hedging measure.  The water liberated from the DMI reserve was 
available for other purposes in the simulation.  With respect to Class A and Class B water 
rights, the liberated water helped to improve the reliabilities for irrigators.  The largest 
increase was observed for Class A reliabilities, with increases of 1.3% and 0.7% for Rv and 
Rp, respectively.  The significance of these increases in terms of additional volume is 
expounded in section 8.3.1.2.  The OR also absorbed some of the freed water.  The average 
OR storage in the Base scenario is 68,988 ac-ft/month, while for Scenario 3 the average is 
69,678 ac-ft/month, an increase of 690 ac-ft/month. 
 The significance of the OR in terms of its effects on reliabilities was also evaluated.  The 
second set of runs consists of the following scenarios: 
 
• Base scenario: DMI = 225,000 ac-ft/month; OR storage included. 
• Scenario 4: DMI = 225,000 ac-ft/month; OR = 0 ac-ft. 
• Scenario 5: DMI = 0% of total (0 ac-ft/month); OR storage included. 
• Scenario 6: DMI = 0% of total (0 ac-ft/month); OR = 0 ac-ft. 
 
The average Rp and Rv for water right groups that are dependent on the Amistad-Falcon 
Reservoirs system are presented in Table 8.3.  It is observed that if both the OR and DMI 
reserves are eliminated (Scenario 6), the municipal use reliabilities would fall slightly below 
100%.  In other words, there are some periods, although not many, when backup storage was 
needed for meeting municipal demands.  Scenario 5 suggests that the water stored in the OR 
might be enough to ensure 100% reliabilities for the current municipal demands.  In other 
words, when backup storage was needed for municipal rights, the OR had enough storage to 
satisfy demands.  However, the storage allocated to the OR is not constant and it could even 
reach 0 ac-ft.  Therefore, the simulation results cannot be seen as a guarantee that the OR 
will always have enough water for municipal demands when needed.  This situation can be 
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Table 8.3. Reliabilities for Water Rights Dependent on Amistad and Falcon Reservoirs
Based on Inclusion or Elimination of DMI and/or OR Reserves
Scenario Simulation 
Conditions
Municipal Class A 
Irrigation
Class B 
Irrigation
Municipal Class A 
Irrigation
Class B 
Irrigation
DMI  100%
OR    100%
DMI  100%
OR       0%
DMI     0%
OR   100%
DMI     0%
OR       0%
Note: Reliabilities are given in percentages.
Base
4
5
6
Volume Reliability Period Reliability
44.6
100.0
38.3 100.0
21.4
99.98
100.0 21.6
100.0 62.1 38.4 100.0 45.9 21.9
61.3
21.7
62.6 39.2 100.0 45.3
63.3 39.2 99.99 46.3
 
 
 
avoided if provisions are made for not allowing the OR to fall to zero; perhaps not allowing 
it to fall below the 48,000 ac-ft/month minimum established in the operational rules 
(Chapter VI, section 6.2.1). 
 
8.3.1.2 Improving Reliabilities for Irrigation Uses 
 From the previous section it was observed that reliabilities for irrigation uses did not 
increased significantly from the reduction or elimination of the DMI reserve.  However, as 
discussed in section 7.2.5, large amounts of water can be liberated by small changes in 
reliabilities.  A trial-and-error exercise was performed using Scenario 3, in which irrigation 
diversions (Class A and Class B) were systematically increased in the WRAP input file 
using adjustment factors (UP records) until irrigation volume reliabilities matched those of 
the Base scenario.   
 The purpose of this exercise is to determine the amount of water that could be added to 
irrigators’ diversions under Scenario 3 by maintaining the current reliabilities (Rv for Base 
scenario).  This exercise assumes that it is preferable for irrigators to have a larger 
interruptible supply of water than a more consistent but smaller amount.  It was determined 
that under the Scenario 3 conditions an increase of 20% on irrigation demands can be 
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attained with the same reliability as the base scenario.  Therefore, eliminating the DMI 
reserve could potentially provide to Class A and Class B irrigators an extra 323,273 ac-
ft/year and 36,779 ac-ft/year, respectively, without affecting the current municipal and 
irrigation reliabilities.  However, this conclusion is valid only if the storage capacity for 
irrigation uses does not change.  The Lower Rio Grande water rights system establishes that 
the maximum storage capacity for irrigation rights changes as a function of the permitted 
diversion (maximum of 1.41 ac-ft of storage for each ac-ft of authorized diversion).  In 
addition, Class A rights accrue storage at a rate 1.7 greater than Class B rights (Chapter VI).  
An additional simulation exercise was performed in which these varying storage capacities 
were considered.  The objective of these simulations is to investigate the effects of 
eliminating the DMI reserve (Scenario 3) on irrigators’ reliabilities subject to the storage 
allocation policy explained above. The exercise consisted of determining the reliabilities 
associated with diversion increases of 20, 30, and 40%.  
 
• Base:  DMI = 225,000 ac-ft/month; Current irrigation diversions. 
• Scenario 3: DMI = 0 ac-ft/month; Current irrigation diversions. 
• Scenario 7: DMI = 0 ac-ft/month; Irrigation diversions increased by 20%. 
• Scenario 8: DMI = 0 ac-ft/month; Irrigation diversions increased by 30%. 
• Scenario 9: DMI = 0 ac-ft/month; Irrigation diversions increased by 40%. 
 
 Results are presented in Table 8.4.  It would be expected that the increase in demands 
would result in a decrease in reliability. Period reliabilities followed this pattern, especially 
for Class B irrigators.  However, notice how Class A volume reliability increases when 
demands are increased by 20%.  This increase in volume reliability shows the effect of 
increasing the maximum allowable storage for Class A rights.  Yet, Class B volume 
reliability in this scenario is smaller than the Base scenario reliability. This disparity could 
be attributed to the different storage accruement rates for Class A and Class B.  No clear 
relationship can be observed between irrigation volume reliability and increases in 
diversions, which could be attributed to the complex storage allocation formula of the 
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system. More insight was obtained by increasing irrigation storage capacities rather than 
demands. The next simulation exercise explores this alternative in more detail. 
 Several simulation runs were performed to investigate the effects of using water made 
available from the elimination of the DMI reserve for increasing the storage capacity of 
irrigation rights.  Permitted irrigation diversions are not increased in this simulation.  The 
current maximum storage allocation formula (X * permitted diversions, X = 1.41) was 
modified by multiplying the permitted demands by different adjustment factors (X). 
 
 
Table 8.4. Evaluation of Increases in Irrigation Diversions. No DMI
Base 3 7 8 9
(No increase) (No increase) (20% increase) (30% increase) (40% increase)
Class A 61.3 62.6 62.7 61.6 61.6
Class B 38.3 39.2 37.7 38.3 35.4
Class A 44.6 45.3 44.0 42.8 46.6
Class B 21.5 21.4 19.0 17.2 16.6
Note: Reliabilities are given in percentages.
Rv
Rp
Scenarios
 
 
 
This exercise runs consist of the following scenarios: 
 
• Base:  DMI = 225,000 ac-ft/month; Irrigation pools capacity set at 1.41 times their 
annual permitted diversion. 
• Scenario 10: DMI = 0 ac-ft/month; Irrigation pools capacity set at 1.55 times their 
annual permitted diversion. 
• Scenario 11: DMI = 0 ac-ft/month; Irrigation pools capacity set at 1.78 times their 
annual permitted diversion. 
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• Scenario 12: DMI = 0 ac-ft/month; Irrigation pools capacity set at 2.16 times their 
annual permitted diversion. 
 
 The adjustment factor of 1.55 used in Scenario 10 corresponds to a 10% increase in the 
irrigation pool size.  In Scenarios 11 and 12 the adjustment factors correspond to the 
reallocation of 25 and 50% of the DMI reserve to irrigation storage pools.  Table 8.5 shows 
irrigators’ reliabilities as a function of the adjustment factors (or Class A and Class B storage 
capacity). In general, reliabilities for Class A water rights increase with increases in their 
storage capacities. For Class B, volume reliabilities increase in Scenario 10 but then decrease in 
Scenarios 11 and 12.  Also, changes in Class B period reliabilities do not appear to correspond 
 
 
Table 8.5. Evaluation of Increases in Irrigation Storage Capacity. No DMI
Class A Class B Class A Class B Class A Class B
Base 1.41 2,279,072 259,291 61.3 38.3 44.6 21.6
3 1.41 2,279,072 259,291 62.6 39.2 45.3 21.4
10 1.55 2,505,363 285,036 63.6 39.5 47.0 22.6
11 1.78 2,877,126 327,331 63.6 39.0 46.9 22.3
12 2.16 3,491,344 397,211 63.7 37.7 47.0 21.2
Note: Reliabilities are given in percentages.
Scenario
Storage Capacity       
(ac-ft/yr) Period ReliabilityVolume ReliabilityAdjustment 
Factor
 
 
 
with increases in storage capacity.  This can be explained by understanding the Rio Grande 
model assumptions regarding the allocation of shortages to Class A and Class B water rights.  
Since there is no priority among irrigation rights within the same class group, the model 
assumes that shortages within a class group are distributed uniformly.  This is accomplished 
by lowering diversion targets by a fraction that is determined based on the available storage 
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for that class group at the beginning of the month (section 8.2.3).  Therefore, the potentially 
higher storages at Class A pool (perhaps from excess flows that could not be stored with the 
original capacity) could avoid diversion reductions.  This may translate into greater Class A 
depletions at diversion points, leaving less inflow available for Class B water rights which 
have a lower priority than Class A rights.  Nonetheless, overall reliabilities improve as a 
result of the reallocation of portions of the DMI storage reserve to the irrigation pools.  This 
suggests that increasing storage capacities rather than increasing diversion amounts could be 
a more effective strategy for improving irrigators’ reliabilities.  In other words, it is more 
efficient to have water in storage for use when needed, than being allowed to divert an 
additional amount of water that may or may not be available in the stream. 
 
8.3.1.3 Assessment of Future Municipal Demands 
Municipal demands for the year 2050 were calculated based on the projection developed 
by the Rio Grande Regional Water Planning Group M (RWPG 2001).  According to the 
plan, the three counties that will experience the greatest population growth and therefore 
greatest demand for municipal uses are: Cameron, Hidalgo, and Webb.  These three counties 
account for 72% of all municipal demands in the region.  On average, by the year 2050 
municipal demands are expected to increase in these three counties by 106% (from 178,483 
to 367,675 ac-ft/yr).   In order to simulate this future water use scenario, all municipal water 
rights in these counties were increased by 106%.  The adjusted water rights diversion targets 
are presented in Table 8.6.  The following set of simulation runs was developed to assess the 
capability of the system to supply the increased demands: 
 
• Scenario 13: DMI = 225,000 ac-ft/month; OR storage included; 2050 municipal demands. 
• Scenario 14: DMI = 0% of total (0 ac-ft/month); OR storage included; 2050 municipal     
demands. 
• Scenario 15: DMI = 0% of total (0 ac-ft/month); OR = 0 ac-ft; 2050 municipal demands. 
 
The average Rp and Rv for water right groups that are dependent on the Amistad-Falcon 
Reservoirs system are presented in Table 8.7.  The results demonstrate the inability of the 
system under the current water allocation scheme to fully provide for future municipal demands  
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Table 8.6. Municipal Water Rights Data for Hidalgo, Cameron, and Webb Counties
Owner Water Right ID Use ID Priority
Current 
Diversion 
(ac-ft/yr)
Diversion 
Year 2050 
(ac-ft/yr)
US Dept Agri-Animal&Plant 1230312700100M MUNMID 40005000 600.0 1236.0
Central Power & Light Co 6230002700100I MUNLWR 40005400 600.0 1236.0
Central Power & Light Co 6230002700100I MUNLWR 40005100 375.0 772.5
Falcon Rural WSC 6230007200101M MUNLWR 40011200 85.0 175.1
La Joya WSC 6230008100100M MUNLWR 40005200 250.0 515.0
La Joya WSC 6230008100100M MUNLWR 40005300 750.1 1545.1
North Alamo WSC 6230024000100M MUNLWR 40007200 1198.0 2467.9
North Alamo WSC 6230024000100M MUNLWR 40008800 6251.2 12877.4
Central Power & Light 6230029400101M MUNLWR 40005100 375.0 772.5
Hidalgo, County of 6230031300100M MUNLWR 40006705 15.3 31.4
Rio WSC 6230033900101M MUNLWR 40003500 131.5 270.9
Rio WSC 6230033900101M MUNLWR 40004700 200.0 412.0
Mcallen, City of 6230035300101M MUNLWR 40006700 678.8 1398.4
Hidalgo County Mud No. 1 6230054300101M MUNLWR 40005900 84.0 173.1
City of Edinburg 6230080100100M MUNLWR 40007100 2591.3 5338.1
City of Pharr 6230080800101M MUNLWR 40003700 1083.9 2232.8
City of Pharr 6230080800101M MUNLWR 40006800 1764.0 3633.8
Sharyland WSC 6230080900101M MUNLWR 40006500 5583.5 11502.0
Palm Valley Est Utility Dist 6230080900201M MUNLWR 40009500 312.5 643.8
Mercedes, City of 6230082300100M MUNLWR 40007800 1015.0 2090.9
City of Weslaco 6230082400100M MUNLWR 40007900 736.3 1516.7
Military Highway WSC 6230083100101M MUNLWR 40009600 632.0 1302.0
Calpine Constr Finance Co 6230083500201M MUNLWR 40005700 250.0 515.0
Cameron Co Irr Dist No 2 6230084100102M MUNLWR 40010200 15057.5 31018.5
Town of La Blanca 6230085200100M MUNLWR 40007400 12.5 25.8
Town of Hidalgo 6230085700100M MUNLWR 40007000 12.5 25.8
Town of Los Ebanos 6230085800100M MUNLWR 40004400 12.5 25.8
Town of Sullivan City 6230085900100M MUNLWR 40004300 12.5 25.8
Town of Penitas 6230086000100M MUNLWR 40006000 12.5 25.8
Village of La Joya 6230086400100M MUNLWR 40004600 12.5 25.8
Texas Plastics Inc 6230087000100M MUNLWR 40008000 100.0 206.0
Arroyo WSC 6230062500101M MUNLWR 40010600 60.0 123.6
Note: Year 2050 diversions are based on future estimated demands (Rio Grande RWPG 2001)  
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Table 8.6. Continued
Owner Water Right ID Use ID Priority
Current 
Diversion  
(ac-ft/yr)
Diversion 
Year 2050 
(ac-ft/yr)
Boca Chica Water Supply Inc 6230015100201M MUNLWR 40012000 20.0 41.2
Brownsville Public UtilBoard 6230086500201M MUNLWR 40011800 29285.1 60327.3
Brownsville Public UtilBoard 12301838001 MUNLWR 40000000 40000.0 82400.0
City of Harlingen 6230022300100M MUNLWR 40009800 162.0 333.7
City of Harlingen 6230022300100M MUNLWR 40009300 131.2 270.2
City of Harlingen WS 6230083100102M MUNLWR 40009400 1875.0 3862.5
City of Los Fresnos 6230085300100M MUNLWR 40011500 911.7 1878.0
City of Lyford 6230082100100M MUNLWR 40008200 370.3 762.9
East Rio Hondo WSC 6230006600201M MUNLWR 40010500 17.6 36.2
East Rio Hondo WSC 6230006600201M MUNLWR 40010100 40.0 82.4
East Rio Hondo WSC 6230006600201M MUNLWR 40011100 70.0 144.2
East Rio Hondo WSC 6230006600201M MUNLWR 40010300 75.0 154.5
East Rio Hondo WSC 6230006600201M MUNLWR 40010700 21.3 43.9
East Rio Hondo WSC 6230083800101M MUNLWR 40010900 2602.3 5360.7
Falcon Rural WSC 6230007200101M MUNLWR 40011200 85.0 175.1
Laguna Madre Water Dist 6230085000100M MUNLWR 40011000 7300.4 15038.7
Olmito Water Supply Corp 6230085400100M MUNLWR 40011400 995.7 2051.2
Town of Primera 6230085500100M MUNLWR 40009700 400.0 824.0
Valley Mud 2 6230020200100M MUNLWR 40011300 898.0 1849.9
A C Durivage Et UX 6230242800100M MUNLWR 40000900 0.5 1.1
Clarence Holt Et UX 6230243500301M MUNMID 40002100 0.5 1.1
AEP Texas Central Company 6230002700100I MUNLWR 40005400 4326.0 8911.6
Sacred Heart Childrens Home 6230274600100M MUNMID 40000300 28.5 58.7
County of Webb 6230272000100M MUNMID 40000400 2339.6 4819.6
City of Laredo 6230399700100M MUNMID 40000200 45672.2 94084.7
Note: Year 2050 diversions are based on future estimated demands (Rio Grande RWPG 2001)  
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Table 8.7. Reliabilities for Water Rights Dependent on Amistad and Falcon Reservoirs
for 2050 Projected Municipal Demands
Scenario Simulation Conditions Municipal
Class A 
Irrigation
Class B 
Irrigation Municipal
Class A 
Irrigation
Class B 
Irrigation
DMI  100%
OR    100%
DMI  100%
OR    100%
DMI     0%
OR   100%
DMI     0%
OR       0%
Note: Reliabilities are given in percentages.
13
14
15 38.8
100.0 53.9 33.2 100.0 38.4
18.999.8 55.1 33.2 99.8
18.9
Volume Reliability Period Reliability
100.0 52.6 32.3 100.0 37.9 18.5
100.0 44.6 21.6Base 100.0 61.3 38.3
 
 
 
demands without decreasing current agricultural reliabilities (Scenario 13).  A significant 
decrease in irrigators’ reliabilities is observed when comparing Scenario 13 with the Base 
scenario (between 6 and 8.7%).  Increased municipal demands cannot be fully satisfied from 
streamflow alone and some storage reserve is needed (Scenario 15).  However, notice that 
the DMI reserve is not required to assure 100% reliabilities for municipal uses (Scenario 14).  
Once again, the simulation results suggest that the OR is sufficient to backup the municipal 
demands, but at the expense of irrigators.  Scenario 14 shows that reallocation of the DMI 
reserve for future municipal appropriation is not an adequate mechanism for satisfying 
increased municipal demands while maintaining irrigation reliabilities.  For that reason, a 
different reallocation mechanism was investigated. 
 Market transactions for transferring rights from irrigation to municipal have become the 
favored source of “new” water for meeting municipal demands in the basin.  In the next 
simulation exercise, water market transfers from irrigation to municipal water rights are 
simulated to evaluate the effectiveness of this reallocation mechanism.  In order to do this, 
Class A irrigation rights with permitted diversions larger than 500 ac-ft/yr were reduced to 
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simulate a transfer of 189,192 ac-ft/year of water to municipal water rights (106% increase 
from current demands) (Table 8.8).  The selected water rights account for 98.9% of all   
Class A irrigation water rights in the three named counties.  According to TCEQ rules, when 
changing water use from Class A irrigation to municipal, only 50% of the total transferred 
water can be converted to municipal (Chapter VI). Consequently, in order to obtain the 
necessary water, 378,383 ac-ft from Class A rights need to be purchased.  To accomplish 
this, the selected Class A water rights were reduced by 23.67% (Table 8.8).  Reliabilities for 
water right groups that are dependent on the Amistad-Falcon Reservoirs system are 
presented in Table 8.9.   
The only difference between Scenario 16 and the base run is the adjustment in Class A 
and municipal rights.  Under the current allocation rules for the Lower Rio Grande, the 
market mechanism is the only strategy of the ones in this simulation exercise that, by 
providing water for increased municipal demands, does not decreases the reliabilities of 
irrigators.  In fact, under the market strategy, irrigation reliabilities improve between 3.4 and 
7.1%.  In other words, these market transactions not only benefit the municipal users that 
purchase the water and the irrigators that sell it, but also the irrigators remaining in the 
system.  It functions both as a “new” source of water and a conservation measure, liberating 
more water for irrigators.  Notice that in order to increase irrigation reliabilities and provide 
100% to municipal uses, no water from the DMI reserve had to be liberated.  However, this 
does not change the fact that the backup storage in the DMI reserve is not required for 
ensuring 100% reliability for current or future municipal uses, raising again the question if 
this water could be available for other uses; perhaps for maintaining environmental flows. 
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Table 8.8. Adjusted Class A Water Rights for Water Market Transfer to Municipal Use
Owner Water Right ID Use ID Priority
Current 
Diversion 
(ac-ft/yr)
Adjusted 
Diversion 
(ac-ft/yr)
United States Dept. of Interior 1230312900100A AM-IRR 50015900 2935 2240
US Fish & Wildlife Service 6230012600101A AL-IRR 50011700 1848.365 1410.829
Sam R Sparks Inc 6230021300100A AL-IRR 50021600 3199.825 2442.378
Diana Inez Santiso Del Rio 6230024300100A AL-IRR 50024400 920.9875 702.9759
Dulaney Farms Ltd 6230026800100A AL-IRR 50020900 1000 763
Martha M & James D Russell 6230028800101A AL-IRR 50024100 9145.875 6980.908
Madeira Properties, Ltd 6230028800102A AL-IRR 50024200 2654.125 2025.854
Carl L Bauer et al 6230029600201A AL-IRR 50022100 959.215 732.154
Coronado Company Llc 6230029700100A AL-IRR 50023600 1492.25 1139.01
River Farms Partnership 6230031700100A AL-IRR 50016700 1325 1011
Moore & Sons Farms Inc et al 6230031800100A AL-IRR 50022400 500.175 381.776
Sharyland Corporation 6230033200100A AL-IRR 50013200 2592.125 1978.530
W G Bell Jr 6230034900200A AL-IRR 50016600 1875 1431
Club Mark Corporation 6230039900101A AL-IRR 50013000 1990.235 1519.116
Annette Katz Cottingham et al 6230060100201A AL-IRR 50011400 1287 982
Starr Produce Company 6230071100101A AL-IRR 50011100 822.175 627.554
Salvador Garcia Jr 6230076700101A AL-IRR 50011200 1146.22 874.89
Hidalgo County Irr Dist 16 6230080200101A AL-IRR 50011600 30948.85 23622.79
La Feria Id Cameron Co 3 6230080300101A AL-IRR 50018800 75625.93 57724.13
City of Roma 6230080300102A AL-IRR 50018700 551.4 420.9
Santa Cruz Irr Dist 15 6230080400101A AL-IRR 50012000 77180 58910
Donna Id Hidalgo Co 1 6230080500101A AL-IRR 50016400 94063.6 71797.3
Hidalgo Co Wcid 19 6230080600100A AL-IRR 50013100 9437.57 7203.55
Valley Acres Irrig Dist 6230080700100A AL-IRR 50017800 16324.25 12460.05
Hidalgo Co Irr Dist 2 6230080800101A AL-IRR 50015300 137775 105162
Engleman Irrig District 6230080900401A AL-IRR 50016300 18994.35 14498.10
Hidalgo County Irr District #13 6230081000101A AL-IRR 50016900 4856.85 3707.16
Delta Lake Irr Dist 6230081100101A AL-IRR 50018400 174776.4 133404.2
Hidalgo & Cameron Wcid #9 6230081200101A AL-IRR 50017400 177151.6 135217.1
Hidalgo Co Irr Dist 5 6230081300100A AL-IRR 50016900 14234.63 10865.08
Hidalgo Co Irr Dist 1 6230081600101A AL-IRR 50011900 85615 65349
Santa Maria Id Cameron Co 4 6230081700101A AL-IRR 50018600 10182.5 7772.1
City of Elsa 6230082600100A AL-IRR 50017900 697.6 532.5
Hidalgo Co Irr Dist No 6 6230082800101A AL-IRR 50011800 34913 26649
Cameron Co Irr Dist No 6 6230082900100A AL-IRR 50026100 52141.93 39799.15  
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Table 8.8. Continued
Owner Water Right ID Use ID Priority
Current 
Diversion 
(ac-ft/yr)
Adjusted 
Diversion 
(ac-ft/yr)
Harlingen Irr Dist 6230083100101A AL-IRR 50019300 98232.5 74979.4
City of Harlingen Waterworks 6230083400101A AL-IRR 50019200 1625 1240
Cameron Co Wid 10 6230083400201A AL-IRR 50024900 8587.5 6554.7
Bayview Irr Dist 11 6230083500101A AL-IRR 50026000 17478.03 13340.72
Cameron Co Wid #16 6230083800101A AL-IRR 50022500 3712.5 2833.7
Cameron County Wid 17 6230083900100A AL-IRR 50022700 625 477
Adams Gardens Irr Dist 19 6230084000101A AL-IRR 50019100 18737.66 14302.17
City of Harlingen 6230084100101A AL-IRR 50021300 147823.7 112831.6
Brownsville Irrig District 6230084300101A AL-IRR 50026500 33949.45 25913.10
United Irrig District 6230084700101A AL-IRR 50012500 57374.31 43792.94
Hidalgo Co Wid 3 6230084800101A AL-IRR 50013300 9852.6 7520.3
Brownsville Public Util Board 6230086500101A AL-IRR 50026400 1782.5 1360.6
Brask-Dumont Ranch 6230242100401A AM-IRR 50000800 3071 2344
Maverick Co Wcid 1 6230267100100A AM-IRR 50000100 135000 103043
Maverick Co Wcid 1 6230267100100M AM-MUN 50000100 2145 1637
5D, Inc 6230269600100A AM-IRR 50001200 990 756
Mandel Properties Ltd 6230269800100A AM-IRR 50001300 680 519
Central Power & Light Co 6230272700100A AM-IRR 50003400 2194.5 1675.0
Laredo National Bank  Trustee 6230276300100A AM-IRR 50005400 1500 1145
Rancho Blanco Corporation 6230277200201A AM-IRR 50005500 899 686
Lannie Mecom 6230278000100A AM-MIN 50005800 1050 801  
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Table 8.9. Comparison of Reliabilities for Market Tranfers Simulation
Rv Rp Rv Rp Rv Rp
Base 100 100 61.3 44.6 38.3 21.6
16 100 100 65.4 51.6 41.8 28.0
0 0 4.1 7.1 3.4 6.4
Notes: Reliabilities are given in percentages.
           Rv = Volume Reliability;   Rp = Period Reliability
Class B Irrigation 
Water Rights
Difference
Scenario
 Municipal Water 
Rights
Class A Irrigation 
Water Rights
 
 
 
8.3.2 Instream Flow Requirements Simulation 
Mechanisms for developing and incorporating instream flow requirements are covered in 
Chapter VII, section 7.2.8.  The scope of this simulation exercise is to demonstrate some 
mechanisms for incorporating instream flow requirements in the Lower Rio Grande system 
and to assess their relative effectiveness using reliability indices. 
 
8.3.2.1 Evaluation of Methodologies for Establishing Instream Flow Requirements 
There is only one water right in the Lower Rio Grande basin with a diversion restriction 
for instream flows.  The City of Brownsville Public Utilities Board (BPUB) owns a water 
right for diverting 40,000 ac-ft/year from excess flows with priority date of 1956.  The 
BPUB water right is subject to water being available in excess of 25 cfs at its diversion point 
and has no access to storage in Amistad-Falcon Reservoirs.  In the Rio Grande WAM this 
instream flow requirement is set senior to all other municipal rights that are dependent on the 
Amistad-Falcon Reservoirs.  In this manner, these excess flow rights have access to 
whatever US flows may occur in the river downstream of Falcon before the reservoir-
dependent water rights.  Otherwise, all of the US flows in the Lower Rio Grande would be 
diverted first by the reservoir-dependent water rights, and these water rights would never 
have water available for impoundment or diversion (R.J. Brandes Company 2004). 
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The two methods that are commonly used in Texas for defining instream flow 
benchmarks (minimum instream flows) are: the Lyons method (Bounds and Lyons 1979) 
and the Consensus Criteria for Environmental Flow Needs (CCEFN).  The Lyons method 
was developed by the Texas Parks and Wildlife Department (TPWD) and has been applied 
by the TCEQ for water permitting purposes.  The CCEFN method is part of the Texas 
Guidelines for Regional Water Plan Development, produced by the Texas Water 
Development Board (TWDB 2002) and it is intended to be the official methodology for 
evaluating instream flows as part of the agency’s water planning duties by 2007.  
The Lyons method uses percentages by month of daily-averaged flows as the parameter 
that determines instream flows.  For permitting, instream flows minimums are defined as 
40% of the median monthly flows from October to February; and 60% of the monthly 
median flows from March to September. The 60% values were chosen to provide more 
protection during the critical spring and summer months (NRC 2005).  The CCEFN method 
defines three zones for pass-through flows in reservoirs and for direct diversions from free-
flowing streams and rivers (TWDB 2002).  The first zone minimum benchmark value is the 
monthly median flow.  If the flow at the measured location is equal or greater than the 
monthly median, the pass-through flow is set equal to the monthly median flow.  Zone 2, is 
defined between the monthly median flow (upper limit) and the monthly 25th percentile 
flow.  The pass-through flow is set equal to the 25th percentile.  In zone 3, which is the 
lowest flow category zone, minimum flows will be the larger of the flow necessary to 
maintain acceptable water quality standards or some site-specific minimum flow determined 
by TCEQ’s planning staff.  For the purpose of this simulation, the criterion for establishing 
the zone 3 benchmark is assumed to be the 7-day 2-year low flow (7Q2) water quality 
standard (49.58 ac-ft/day).  The 7Q2 is a statistical estimate of the lowest average flow that 
would be experienced during a consecutive 7-day period with an average recurrence interval 
of two years.  For zones 1 and 2, if the target flows (median and 25th percentile) are smaller 
than the 7Q2 water quality standard, the 7Q2 is used as target flow instead.  Whereas the 
Lyons method is routinely developed from gage flow data, CCEFN uses percentile values of 
naturalized flows to determine direct diversion and pass-through flows. 
Both methodologies determine the flow benchmarks using daily flow data.  Therefore, 
the first step is to extract from the WAM model the naturalized flows at the control point of 
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interest.  Monthly naturalized flows for the BPUB diversion point were then disaggregated 
into daily flows based on the historical streamflow distribution of the same gaging station 
used to determine compliance with the BPUB water permit (IBWC Station at Rio Grande 
Near Brownsville, Texas and Matamoros, Tamaulipas).  Since the Rio Grande basin has 
been extensively altered by human activities, a period of record was selected where flow 
alteration was minimal.  The available daily flow values from the period before the 
construction of Amistad-Falcon Reservoirs were selected for the analysis (1939 – 1950).  
Daily and monthly gage flow values were used for disaggregating monthly naturalized flows 
and obtaining daily naturalized flows.  These values were obtained using the following 
equation: 
 
⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛=
MGQ
DGQMNQDNQ                              Eq. 8.1 
 
where DNQ is daily naturalized flow, MNQ is monthly naturalized flows from WAM, DGQ 
is daily flow observed at the gage station, and MGQ is the monthly aggregated flow at the 
gage station (Trungale et al. 2003).  A comparison between observed and the resulting 
naturalized daily flows is presented in Figure 8.2.  As expected, the plot shows some 
differences between naturalized and observed values.  On average, naturalized flows are higher 
than observed flows since observed values reflect the effect of flow depleting activities 
naturalized flows have accounted for. 
 From the daily naturalized flows the monthly benchmark instream flow values were 
computed.  Table 8.10 summarizes benchmark values for the Lyons and CCEFN methods as 
well as the fixed regulatory minimum flow for the BPUB water permit. Several 
combinations of IF, TS, and TO records within WRAP were used to simulate the instream 
flow targets for each methodology. 
 Simulation results are summarized in Table 8.11.  In general, the reliabilities of the 
diversion are high because it relies on storage from the Brownsville weir.  It is observed that 
at the diversion’s control point, results are similar for the BPUB permit flow and the 
CCENF.  For the CCENF methodology diversion reliabilities were higher, but the instream 
flow requirement period reliability was lower.   
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Table 8.10. Benchmark Flows for Establishing Instream Flow 
Requirements for the  BPUB Water Right
Zone 1 
Minimun 
Flows
Zone 2 
Minimun 
Flows
Zone 3 
Minimun 
Flows
Jan 1,538 1,996 1,538 1,538 798
Feb 1,389 1,964 1,443 1,389 786
Mar 1,538 1,878 1,538 1,538 1,127
Apr 1,488 2,526 1,488 1,488 1,515
May 1,538 1,944 1,538 1,538 1,166
Jun 1,488 2,296 1,488 1,488 1,378
Jul 1,538 2,392 1,538 1,538 1,435
Aug 1,538 2,419 1,538 1,538 1,451
Sep 1,488 4,042 1,717 1,488 2,425
Oct 1,538 2,142 1,538 1,538 857
Nov 1,488 2,340 1,488 1,488 936
Dec 1,538 2,264 1,538 1,538 906
Month
CCEFN 
Lyons 
Minimun 
Flow
BPUB 
Minimun 
Flow
 
 
 192
Table 8.11. Comparison of Instream Flow Requirement Methodologies for BPUB 
Water Right
Control Point 
ET0104
Instream 
Flow 
Criteria
Instream 
Requirement  
Methodology
Average 
Regulated Flow  
(ac-ft/month)
Mean Shortage 
(ac-ft/month) Rv Rp Rp
BPUB         
Minimun Flow
336.9 157.1 95.3 92.2 67.8
CCEFN 337.1 130.8 96.1 93.9 66.4
Lyons 266.2 139.2 95.8 93.2 77.1
Notes: Reliabilities are given in percentages.
             Rv = Volume Reliability;   Rp = Period Reliability
Brownsville Diversion
 
 
 
 The Lyons method results in a better instream flow period reliability but that was 
expected given the fact that the monthly benchmark values were smaller than those of the 
other two methods.  The National Research Council (NRC) (2005) reported that Texas 
WAM’s assessments of instream flows using the Lyons method can greatly underestimate 
instream flows for certain months of the year.   
The similarities between the CCENF and the BPUB permit minimum flow results are 
not surprising. The CCENF methodology uses the 7Q2 standard as the minimum flow 
allowed under zone 3 conditions.  This value happens to be the same as the BPUB permit 
flow restriction.  At that time the original permit was approved, there were no provisions for 
considering environmental flows into the permit process so the only consideration for 
determining pass-through flows was honoring downstream permits.  It was determined that 
the flow required for downstream users was 25 cfs.  In 2001, BPUB solicited a permit for the 
construction of a weir to impound an additional 6,000 ac-ft.  It so happens that the TCEQ 
standard for minimum flows for maintaining water quality for the last stretch of the Rio 
Grande was also 25 cfs (Kathy Alexander, personal communication, September 30, 2005).  
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TCEQ approved the construction of the weir and the 25 cfs minimum flow was maintained. 
It is important to point out that the 7Q2 minimum flow standards are based on the last 30 
years of flow records.  Therefore, 7Q2 values probably reflect the effects of the BPUB 
diversion and not the minimum natural flow of the river. 
 The NRC (2005) report recommends assessing the possibility of operating the WAM 
models in a daily time-step since this could significantly improve the applications of the 
aforementioned methodologies and assessment of strategies for protecting instream flows.  
Monthly based methodologies are useful for giving general estimates of instream flow 
needs, but more detailed studies might be required in order to generate instream flow 
estimates that are consistent with flow protection goals.  Currently, efforts are being 
undertaken to develop a daily time-step version of WRAP that could potentially address 
current limitations for better incorporating instream flow requirements into the planning 
process. Other methodologies such as base flow separation and site-specific habitat flow 
requirements that are based on daily flow variations could be potentially used in conjunction 
with WAM models to further improve instream flows protection efforts. 
  
8.3.2.2 Instream Flow Requirements for the Lower Rio Grande 
Two additional simulation scenarios were formulated in order to evaluate the effects of 
adding an instream flow requirement for all water rights in the Lower Rio Grande system 
near the mouth of the river at the Brownsville station.  Currently, the instream flow 
requirement only applies to the Browsnville water right (i.e. BPUB).  In the WAM model 
(Base scenario), the instream flow target is turned off after BPUB water is diverted.  In this 
manner, the rest of the water rights are not affected by the instream flow requirement.  This 
modeling structure is modified in Scenarios 17 and 18 in order to maintain the instream flow 
requirement after the BPUB diversion, thereby affecting all water rights.  From the instream 
flow methodology evaluation it can be concluded that the 25 cfs instream flow requirement 
of the BPUB water right was the most conservative approach.  This value was adopted in the 
next set of simulations.   The scenarios can be summarized as follows: 
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• Base scenario: DMI = 225,000 ac-ft/month; OR storage included. 
• Scenario 17: DMI =225,000 ac-ft/month; OR storage included; Instream flow 
requirement  =  25 cfs at Brownsville gage. 
• Scenario 18:  DMI = 0 ac-ft/month; OR storage included; Instream flow  
requirement  =  25 cfs at Brownsville gage. 
 
Results from the simulation runs are summarized in Table 8.12. 
 
Table 8.12. Evaluation of Instream Flow  Requirement for all Water Rights
Instream 
Flow at 
Brownsville
Rv Rp Rv Rp Rv Rp Rp
Base 100 100 100 61.3 44.6 38.3 21.6 67.8
17 100 100 100 61.2 44.5 38.2 21.5 78.0
18 0 100 100 62.5 45.3 39.1 21.4 82.1
Notes: Reliabilities are given in percentages.
           Rv = Volume Reliability;   Rp = Period Reliability
Class B 
Irrigation 
Water Rights
% of 
Total 
DMI 
Reserve
Scenario
 Municipal 
Water Rights
Class A 
Irrigation 
Water Rights
 
 
 
Under the current allocation scheme of the system, it is observed that when the instream 
flow requirement applies to all water rights in the system (Scenario 17), reliability values for 
irrigators drop approximately 0.1%.  On the other hand, the period reliability for the 
instream flow increases 10.2%. Meanwhile, municipal diversion reliabilities are not affected.   
Also notice, that by making water available from the DMI reserve for appropriation 
(Scenario 18), instream flow period reliability increases 14.3%.  This increase in Rp 
translated into an increase of 2,720 ac-ft/month in the monthly regulated flow average at the 
gaging station in Brownsville.  Notice the significant increase in instream flow compliance 
due to the use of the water in the DMI reserve.  As concern increase in Texas and the US 
regarding the protection of instream flows, more pressure has been placed on regulating 
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agencies to provide water for environmental flows in this overappropriated system.  The 
results from this simulation suggest that water for environmental flows could be obtained 
from the reallocation of some portion of the DMI reserve without affecting current uses 
reliabilities. 
 
8.3.3 Drought Management Simulation 
 Drought management is an inherent component of the Lower Rio Grande WAS.  
Basically, the water right system acts as a drought contingency mechanism.  Municipal uses 
receive the greatest protection against shortages by receiving their allotment first.  The 
allocation sequence distributes the entirety of the risks among irrigators. Therefore, 
agricultural uses bear the entire burden by absorbing all the shortages.  Furthermore, the 
current rules for operating Amistad-Falcon Reservoirs function as a drought response 
mechanism in the sense that as storage in the reservoirs fall, irrigation water rights will have 
their storage rights honored only when there is a water surplus after all other rights and 
operational needs of the system have been satisfied. 
 However, as shown in the previous simulations, the degree protection given to municipal 
against shortages is extremely conservative, unnecessarily harming irrigators.  The purpose 
of this simulation is to investigate an alternative drought management strategy that can 
improve the overall efficiency of the system in supplying water to all users. The previous 
simulations showed that irrigation reliabilities can be improved by reducing the DMI reserve 
without affecting municipal reliabilities.  Thus, a less conservative approach is evaluated 
here in which the DMI reserve size is adjusted as a function of relative drought conditions.  
In this application, the water availability state of the system, which is one of the principles 
presented in the WAS framework (section 7.2.8), is adopted for defining drought conditions. 
 The drought contingency provisions on the current water rights system are compared 
with two alternative mechanisms which use reservoir storage as a water availability drought 
trigger for implementing measures that can reduce drought vulnerability, not only for 
municipal uses, like the current system, but also for irrigation uses.  The first alternative 
mechanism establishes storage triggers based on percent conservation storage capacity.    
This strategy reflects the recommendations presented in the Texas Drought Preparedness 
Plan (Drought Preparedness Council 2005) for defining drought stages based on water 
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availability.  Each drought stage has an associated range of values describing reservoir 
conditions.  The lower value serves as a trigger to launch a particular mitigation measure.  
These storage triggers (i.e. % of storage capacity) were determined arbitrarily and may not 
properly reflect the hydrologic conditions of the system.  The mitigation measures associated 
with each stage are determined as part of the local and regional planning process.  For 
reference purposes, Table 8.13 presents a summary of the Amistad-Falcon Reservoirs 
conservation storage capacity data (Year 2000 sediment conditions). 
 
 
Table 8.13. Amistad-Falcon Reservoir System Conservation Storage Capacity Data
Amistad 3,151,306 56.2 43.8 1,771,034 1,380,272
Falcon 2,653,793 58.6 41.4 1,555,123 1,098,670
Combined 5,805,099 57.3 42.7 3,326,157 2,478,942
MX Storage 
Capacity     
(ac-ft)
Conservation 
Storage Capacity 
(ac-ft)
Reservoir
US Storage 
Capacity     
(ac-ft)
US % of 
Storage 
Capacity
MX % of 
Storage 
Capacity
 
 
 
 In the Rio Grande Regional Drought Preparedness Plan, it is suggested that no additional 
mitigation measures are needed besides the current water rights system (RWPG 2001).  
Here, the recommended trigger storage conditions were applied to the Amistad-Falcon 
Reservoir system and a set of mitigation measures (Plan 1) entailing resizing the DMI 
reserve were developed and tested (Table 8.14).  The DMI reserve sizes associated with each 
drought stage were determined based on subjective judgment.  An exceedance frequency 
analysis was performed in order assess how well the storage ranges represent the water 
availability state of the system.  The exceedance frequency (i.e. percent of the time the 
storage value was equaled or exceeded) of the storage triggers was determined based on the 
historical combined end-of-period storages of Amistad and Falcon Reservoirs (Base 
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conditions scenario).  This analysis showed that according to the computed triggers, the 
system would be under some kind of drought condition 95% of the time.  Therefore, these 
triggers may not properly represent the water availability conditions of this system.   
 The second alternative (Plan 2) addresses this problem by developing a set of triggers 
based on the storage contents that are associated with certain exceedance frequency (Table 
8.15).  This proposed set of triggers may be better indicators of what can be considered 
normal (and conversely abnormal) storage conditions of the system.   As with Plan 1, the 
mitigation measures (DMI reserve sizes) associated with Plan 2 triggers were determined 
based on subjective judgment.  The proposed drought alternatives (Plans 1 and 2) were 
modeled with WRAP using the Drought Index option, which can adjust diversions as a 
function of reservoir storages.  Figure 8.3 depicts a portion of the storage traces for the DMI 
reserve and the combined Amistad-Falcon storage resulting from the implementation of 
Plans 1 and 2.  As expected, the size of the DMI reserve increases as storage on the 
reservoirs decreases and vice versa. 
 
 
Table 8.14. Drought Management Plan 1.  Based on Texas Water Availability 
Assessment Criteria
Abnormally 
Dry 70 2,257,466 0 0 95
First-Stage 
Drought 60 1,934,971 0 0 90
Severe 
Drought 40 1,289,981 25 56,250 79
Extreme 
Drought 20 644,990 50 112,500 59
Exceptional 
Drought 10 322,495 100 225,000 15
Storage 
Exceedence 
Frequency 
(%)
Reservoir Storage 
Trigger            
(% of conservation 
capacity)
Drought 
Stage
DMI 
Reserve     
(ac-ft)
Combined 
Amistad-Falcon 
Storage         
(ac-ft)
%        
DMI 
Reserve
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Table 8.15. Drought Management Plan 2.  Based on Storage Exceedence 
Frequency Analysis
First-Stage 
Drought 35 825,850 0 0
Severe 
Drought 55 423,931 25 56,250
Extreme 
Drought 85 323,340 50 112,500
Exceptional 
Drought 99 249,983 100 225,000
DMI 
Reserve     
(ac-ft)
Drought 
Stage
Reservoir Storage 
Trigger             
(% exceedence 
frequency)
Combined 
Amistad-Falcon 
Storage         
(ac-ft)
%          
DMI 
Reserve
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(a)
(b)
    FIGURE 8.3. Storage Traces Sample under Drought Management Plans.
    (a) DMI Traces; and (b) Combined Amistad-Falcon Traces
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 Also notice that in general Plan 1 results in a larger DMI reserve more frequently than 
Plan 2.  The reason for this is that Plan 1 triggers declare drought conditions more often and 
more severe than Plan 2.  Since Plan 2 triggers consider the actual distribution of storages, 
they can be more flexible than both the Base scenario and Plan 1 which adopt more 
conservative approaches for compensating for system uncertainties. 
 Reliability values for the municipal and irrigation water rights for the base scenario, Plan 
1, and Plan 2 are presented in Table 8.16.  As with previous simulations, the results indicate 
that irrigation reliabilities can be improved when implementing measures that reduce the 
DMI reserve without affecting the period and volume reliability for municipal uses.  In these 
 
 
Table 8.16. Comparison of Reliabilities for Drought Management Alternatives
Rv Rp Rv Rp Rv Rp
Base 100 100 61.3 44.6 38.3 21.6
Plan 1 100 100 61.4 48.9 39.7 24.9
Plan 2 100 100 61.7 51.3 39.7 25.6
Notes: Reliabilities are given in percentages.
             Rv = Volume Reliability;   Rp = Period Reliability
Class B Irrigation 
Water RightsScenario
 Municipal Water 
Rights
Class A Irrigation 
Water Rights
 
 
 
simulations, all irrigation reliabilities improve, especially with the less conservative Plan 
2.  The effect of the drought measures are observed more clearly for Class B irrigation 
rights.  Since Class B rights experience more shortages than Class A, they also benefit 
the most from the studied drought mitigation plans. Another interesting finding is that 
some reliabilities, especially period reliabilities, are higher than those obtained by 
eliminating completely the DMI reserve (Scenario 3).  Only Class A volume reliability 
was higher for Scenario 3 than Plan 2.  These changes in reliability values are difficult to 
interpret, but in the simulation of storage allocation to irrigation uses (section 8.3.1.2) it 
was shown that increases in water availability to irrigation uses, being inflows or 
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storage, benefit Class A and Class B differently due to the system’s complex water 
allocation scheme. 
 
8.3.4 Concluding Remarks Regarding Simulation Study 
 The strategies presented in this Chapter’s simulations indicate that there is potential for 
improving the efficiency of the system by the reallocation of portions of the DMI reserve.  In 
addition, it was observed that the primary safeguard of municipal uses is its priority in the 
water allocation sequence.  In addition to this, municipal uses have two additional protection 
mechanisms: the DMI and OR reserves.  The results in this Chapter show that having one of 
these reserves is sufficient for providing extra protection against shortages.   
 Even in a scenario of increase municipal demands, the OR reserve could provide enough 
protection for municipal uses, provided that operational rules are modified to avoid the 
reserve from been emptied.  Making DMI reserve water available for future municipal 
diversions was not found to be an effective reallocation strategy for satisfying the fast-
growing municipal demands without penalizing irrigators.  Market mechanisms were shown 
to be a better alternative for this purpose.  Under the current allocation rules, it was 
demonstrated that market mechanisms can provide water for increased municipal demands 
without decreasing the reliabilities of irrigators.  In fact, under the market strategy, irrigation 
reliabilities improved.  In other words, these market transactions not only benefit the 
municipal users that purchase the water and the irrigators that sell it, but also the irrigators 
remaining in the system.  It functions both as a “new” source of water and a conservation 
measure, liberating more water for the irrigators that remain in the system. 
Even though the reallocation of DMI reserve to increased municipal demands was not 
sufficient, other benefits can be obtained from a multiuse reallocation approach of portions 
the DMI reserve.  For instance, irrigators could benefit from the elimination or reduction of 
the DMI reserve, especially if the reallocation involves increasing irrigation storage.  Also, if 
water for environmental flows is needed, water from the DMI reserve can significantly 
increase instream flows. The results show that an instream flow requirement could 
potentially be incorporated into the system without significantly affecting existing uses 
reliabilities. 
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Due to the administrative and legal constraints of the Lower Rio Grande WAS, it is 
unlikely that the DMI reserve would be eliminated based on simulation models that are not 
without shortcomings and do not represent the entire range of possible inflow sequences.  
The drought management plans tested in this study offer another alternative for improving 
the system reliabilities without completely giving up the security of the DMI reserve while 
lessening drought related damages to irrigators. A myriad of methodologies may be 
developed and strategies tested to determine optimal water availability drought triggers.  The 
DMI reserve sizes associated with each drought stage, although determined arbitrarily, were 
used here to demonstrate the potential and benefits of using a system of increasing levels of 
protection for municipal uses as drought conditions worsen.  On the other hand, as water 
availability conditions improve, water liberated from the DMI reserve can be made available 
to irrigators in order to offset drought impacts. 
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CHAPTER IX 
 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
 
9.1 RESEARCH SUMMARY 
The allocation of water resources is typically accomplished within the framework of 
water allocation systems (WAS).  In general, a WAS sets priorities, applies rules, and 
organizes responses to a range of water allocation scenarios.  This dissertation presents a 
comprehensive study of water allocation strategies and provides a conceptual framework of 
principles and guidelines for designing, assessing, implementing and supporting WAS. 
Water allocation strategies vary at the international, interstate, and intrastate water 
management levels.  The voluminous compilation of international treaties and conventions, 
interstate compacts, intrastate administrative documentation, and scientific/engineering 
literature was reviewed and researched in order to identify different water allocation 
strategies and mechanisms.  The dissertation provides an enhanced understanding of the 
specific mechanisms for allocating water by systematically addressing how water allocation 
is achieved among nations, states, water management entities, and individual users.  The 
dissertation also addresses how computer simulation models can be used to support and 
facilitate water allocation efforts. 
From the aforementioned analysis, eight fundamental areas of WAS were identified: 
water rights, determination of water allotment, administrative systems, reservoir storage 
considerations, system reliability, multiple uses, instream flow requirements, and drought 
management.  The systematic scrutiny of these eight areas at all three management levels 
defined the conceptual framework for assessing WAS. 
The dissertation also provides an in depth review of the Texas WAS.  The two Texas 
water rights system, five interstate compacts, and two international treaties are described in 
detail.  The Texas experience with regard to its Water Availability Modeling (WAM) system 
is also reviewed with particular emphasis on the application of the Water Rights Analysis 
Package (WRAP) model.  The Lower Rio Grande WAS is used as a case study to 
demonstrate how the principles presented in the conceptual framework can be used to assess 
water allocation issues.  Three WRAP simulation studies utilizing several components of the 
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conceptual framework were performed in order to assess the Lower Rio Grande basin WAS.  
The simulations focused on three of the major water allocation issues of the Texas Rio 
Grande: reallocation among uses, instream flow requirements, and drought management.  
The simulations showed several deficiencies in the Lower Rio Grande WAS and proposed 
several strategies that can potentially improve the overall efficiency of the system. 
 
9.2 MAJOR RESEARCH FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS 
9.2.1 General Strategies and Mechanisms to Allocate Water 
9.2.1.1 International Level 
The legal mechanisms within modern international water law pertinent to water 
allocation are defined in the 1997 UN Convention on the Law of the Non-Navigational Uses 
of International Watercourses.  They are the doctrines of equitable utilization and prevention 
of significant harm.  The major controversy revolves around which concept, equitable 
utilization or obligation not to cause significant harm, should have prevalence over the other. 
International conventions on water law have not been able to establish guidelines on how to 
apply these principles in the design of methodologies for water allocation.  Instead, it is left 
to the ability and desire of states to use the Convention principles as a framework to design 
and implement more specific allocation agreements and practices. 
In the absence of detailed and clear water law and adequate enforcing institutions, the 
allocation mechanism that has been used by riparian nations more often and with greater 
success has been bilateral and multi-lateral water treaties. For the most part, these water 
treaties establish general goals of cooperation and equitable apportionment to maintain 
amicable relationships between riparian countries. Yet, specific guidelines for allocation, 
enforcement, and conflict resolution are usually lacking.  
Some of the allocation mechanisms utilized in the treaties are: equal portions, fixed 
annual or daily amounts or flows, storage allocations, minimum flows, allocative schedules 
or formulas dependent on current flows, “needs-based” allocation, and exchange of goods 
for water.  More recently, treaties have established joint commissions with a range of 
responsibilities to manage transboundary basins and determine the allocations and/or 
approving water rights and projects in the transboundary basin. However, the big picture is 
still that the legal management of transboundary waters remains conceptually deficient. 
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9.2.1.2 Interstate Level 
In the US there are three venues for the allocation of water among states: congressional 
apportionment, judicial adjudication, and interstate compacts. In Congressional 
apportionment, members of the Congress vote on which allocation mechanism should be 
implemented. However, it is highly unlikely that Congress members will have the 
specialized knowledge necessary to deal with water disputes, and decisions are mostly based 
on political interests.  Judicial adjudication by the Supreme Court also exhibits significant 
inefficiencies as an allocation mechanism.  The vagueness of allocating standards, the 
Court’s lack of expertise on the subject, and the staggering expenses of litigation and of 
paying a special master, are some of the shortcomings of this allocation approach.   
A more beneficial venue is for the states to reach a voluntary agreement by signing an 
interstate compact. The advantage of compact water allocation lies in its legal and political 
characteristics that allow it to adapt to the unique needs of a particular basin and the regional 
philosophy of water appropriation. They can also be used to create permanent administrative 
entities for the management of the compact and the region’s water resources as a whole.   
Water allocation compacts vary in their terms, from allocating storage to dividing the 
actual flow in the stream.  Flow can be apportioned by determining a percentage of the 
streamflow for each state, requiring the delivery of a fixed quantity of water at a specific 
point on the stream, or some proportion determined from a hydrologic model. The allocation 
mechanisms adopted in these compacts determine the distribution of risks and losses in 
periods of low flows.  Under a percentage allocation rule, states both on the upper and lower 
portions of the basin share the losses and gains during periods of low and high flows.  Fixed 
flow allocation mechanisms are easier to implement.  However, under this mechanism, the 
downstream state absorbs the entire loss during droughts.  
Compacts that follow the proportion rate approach use hydrologic models as the basis of 
their allocation.  The end result is similar to the percentage allocation but the division of 
water obeys a schedule that varies with the streamflow instead of being a fixed percentage.  
The main drawback that has been observed in the application of this approach is the model 
itself.  Even if the model is found to be inadequate, once the compact is in effect, it is 
unlikely that the allocation scheme will be modified. 
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9.2.1.3 Intrastate Level 
Water rights systems (WRS) are the legal and institutional arrangements that define the 
terms and conditions that must be met in order to claim the legal right to use water.  In the 
US, there are three legal systems that define water allocation between individual users 
within a state: prior appropriation, riparianism, and regulated riparianism. 
The riparian doctrine recognizes the right to use water only to the owners of lands 
abutting a watercourse in accordance with the principle of reasonable use.  Rights are 
attached to the ownership of land and cannot be forfeited by non-use.  Reasonable use gives 
flexibility in the face of changing conditions of water use and supply by considering the 
social and economic value of the use. Once a right is recognized, there is a certain degree of 
protection from unreasonable uses of water.  However, some complexities arise due to a lack 
of specificity and its dependency on the outcome of torts.  The fact that the system restricts 
the use of the water to riparian owners ignores the possibility that better use may be made at 
other places by riparian and non-riparian owners. 
Prior appropriation relies on the doctrine of beneficial use to determine who has the right 
to use water.  In contrast to riparianism, the property where the water is applied to beneficial 
use does not need to be adjacent to the natural source.  Prior appropriation enforces the 
conditions of the established rights based on the priority order of the appropriators. If water 
is insufficient to meet all needs, earlier users will obtain all their allotted water while those 
who appropriated later may see their allotment diminished or cutoff completely.  Water 
rights under this doctrine cannot be forfeited save for non-use, which penalizes water 
conservation.  Another shortcoming of this doctrine is that traditionally only consumptive 
uses of water were deemed beneficial and efforts to incorporate non-traditional uses, such as 
environmental flows, are too recent to have a significant impact in instream flow conditions. 
Regulated riparianism relies on a well structure administrative system to determine 
validity of water rights.  Even though it relies on the principle of reasonable use, its 
application is completely different from pure riparianism.  Reasonableness of use is 
determined in accordance with the state’s general water policy and other permitted uses and 
users in non-riparian lands are not considered unreasonable.  One major advantage over pure 
riparianism is the use of permits, which provides security in the case of investments.  In 
addition, since administrative agencies determine the terms of the permits, there is no need 
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to depend on court rulings to determine validity of right.  In contrast to the prior 
appropriation permit system, these permits are not perpetual, which allows for the 
reallocation of water to a potentially more reasonable use once the permit expires. 
 
9.2.2 Systematic Framework for Assessing WAS 
9.2.2.1 Water Rights 
The framework of policies and rules that administer water rights are usually developed at 
the state level.  Two important concepts were used to analyze the different mechanisms that 
define who has the right to use water: certainty and flexibility.  Certainty is the most 
important criteria for water development.  It can be defined as the level of security water 
right holders can have that water will be available to supply their demands.  The degree of 
certainty WRS give to their water rights holders vary with the system and doctrine of 
appropriation.  Some mechanisms for providing certainty to water rights are: priority among 
users or uses, permit systems, and courts rulings.  The permit system is the most efficient 
mechanism for establishing certainty as opposed to systems that are dependent on court 
rulings to determine the validity and terms of a water right.   
 Flexibility refers to the provisions of a WRS that enables it to supply the water needs of 
water right holders under changing water availability and demand circumstances.  For the 
most part, there is a trade-off between providing a high degree of certainty to promote 
progress and enough flexibility to adapt to changing conditions of demand and supply.  Two 
mechanisms used to add flexibility to WAS are market mechanisms and duration of permit 
systems.  Voluntary reallocation or transferability of water rights through water markets is 
driven by economic efficiency, where water is transferred from low valued uses to the 
highest valued use.  However, the value society puts on its water resources cannot always be 
expressed in monetary terms and overseeing institutions are crucial for ensuring the 
protection of non-quantifiable values of water.   
 Water rights permit systems that have a prescribed duration period give a high degree of 
flexibility to the system since they allow accommodating newcomers and reallocating water 
to more desirable uses once a permit has expired.  Nonetheless, care must be taken in 
establishing the duration period since short duration periods may not allow the users 
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sufficient time to payoff capital equipment or recover from losses during dry years, thus 
adding uncertainties that may promote economically inefficient decisions.   
 WRS in interstate rivers can present an administrative challenge in terms of establishing 
priorities and honoring rights that follow different doctrines of appropriation or in the case 
of prior appropriation states, have different appropriation dates.  To avoid this situation 
provision must be made within the interstate agreement to establish clear allocative terms 
that could preserve pre-compact rights. Another approach is to establish watershed 
management and planning agencies with water rights granting capabilities that allow them to 
determine the validity of rights and resolve disputes. 
 International water rights are an evolving concept modeled after the doctrine of equitable 
utilization.  International water rights are defined by vague concepts that in practice have 
little meaning.  The weakness of the definition of water rights is probably the major reason 
for international water law shortcomings in becoming a major factor for stabilizing and 
securing international relations over shared water resources.  Several propositions to address 
this situation have surfaced recently.  The “community property” model evaluates water 
rights regardless of international borders, but has not been implemented in any international 
water project.  Another proposition is the use of needs rather than rights to determine water 
allocation based equitable utilization.  However, allocations based on relative needs present 
a dilemma in regions with great economical and political mismatches where a history of 
unwillingness for cooperation and compromise exist.  Also the lack of strong and impartial 
enforcement institutions makes the application of equitable utilization as impractical as the 
other international doctrines of allocation. 
 
9.2.2.2 Determination of Water Allotment 
At the international level, a nation’s water allotment is governed by the principles of 
equitable utilization and avoidance of significant harm.  However, these principles are often 
contradictory.  To determine an equitable allotment, the 1997 UN Convention identifies 
seven factors that should be considered.  Yet, methodologies are needed to establish 
guidelines for estimating these factors and establishing their relative importance. 
Allotment mechanisms are not explicitly incorporated in interstate compacts.  However, 
two criteria can be inferred: (1) protection of pre-compact levels of beneficial use, and (2) 
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equitability of use.  Typically, water originating in a state belongs to that state, and water 
from shared sections of a stream is divided.  Whatever the underlying principle, the 
allocation mechanism is defined as fixed amounts or percentages of streamflow and/or 
storage. With regard to allocating storage, special considerations to limit storage on 
upstream states must be explicitly addressed in the compact in order to avoid future conflict. 
Three water allotment mechanisms were identified at the intrastate level.  In riparian 
states, courts determine the size of the allotment based on an interpretation of the doctrines 
of reasonable use and equitable utilization.  In regulated riparian states, the methodology 
used usually involves some measure of the use needs, such as operational size or length of 
the riparian front.  In prior appropriation, the size of the allotment is established based on 
beneficial use.  The methodologies that determine allotment based on needs should make 
provisions to avoid over-exploitation by considering additional criteria such as: harm to 
other users, local economic interests, preferred water used, use of conservation technology, 
and environmental concerns. 
 
9.2.2.3 Administrative Systems 
Four key aspects in the administration of water resources were identified from the 
evaluation of administrative water agencies at all management levels. Administrative 
agencies must have the power and capability to conduct and lead efforts in the areas of: (1) 
data collection, (2) planning, (3) resource management and regulation, and (4) conflict 
resolution.  Data collection involves conducting and supporting water resources monitoring 
and research and promoting information sharing and dialogue.  Long-term planning involves 
formulation of alternatives for responding to potential scenarios of water supply and 
demand.  Adopting watershed scale management strategies, in which watershed boundaries 
rather than political boundaries are the basic unit of analysis, may be beneficial as they 
provide a more hydrologically correct view of the water resources of a region.  The agencies 
also need the authority to manage and operate water resources systems and regulate water 
allocations. The extent of this authority should be in accordance with their position within 
the hierarchy of management levels.  Water accounting methodologies are a critical aspect 
of resource management as it provides a mechanism for assessing compliance of agreements 
and the enforcement of regulations.  Finally, these agencies must provide the necessary 
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framework and mechanisms for conflict resolution and define courses of action in the case 
of non-compliance. 
 
9.2.2.4 Reservoir Considerations 
Once water has been allocated, managing and enforcing international treaties or 
interstate compacts must incorporate proper water accounting procedures that allow to 
evaluate if the parties are in compliance with the established agreements and to provide a 
better basis for evaluating and solving conflicts.  Coordination between actual reservoir 
operations and the administration of the treaties or compacts is recommended in order to 
manage the reservoir storage in a manner that reflects the established agreements and meet 
demands more efficiently. 
A critical storage consideration is how to manage the tradeoffs between how much water 
to withhold from immediate use and retaining that water in storage for future use (i.e. 
hedging).  The most common methods for incorporating hedging into a WAS are based on: 
(1) legal specifications (laws, treaties, and compacts) and (2) operational rules. Operational 
rules provide greater flexibility in managing storage and releases since, in contrast to legal 
specifications; it is relatively easy to modify them over time based on experience and 
changing conditions. When hedging rules are incorporated as part of treaties and compacts, 
the allocation process becomes calcified and is unable to readily adapt to changing 
conditions.  Instead, it may be more beneficial that the legal agreements establish 
management agencies (or enable existing ones) with the power to adopt these considerations 
within their operational policies. 
 
9.2.2.5 System Reliability 
Reliability is a measure of dependability and can be used to assess the capabilities of a 
river/reservoir system to satisfy specified water use requirements.  Reliability concepts can 
be used to aid in the planning and design of reservoirs, to assess the water supply capabilities 
of a system, to evaluate the effects of new water right permits on other users, to provide a 
measure of the risks of shortages, and to establish priorities between competing uses, among 
others.  Proper understanding of the relationship between reliability and water availability 
also improves water management strategies as significant quantities of water may be 
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“liberated” for beneficial use by tolerating relatively small risks of shortages.  However, care 
must be taken when interpreting reliability indices as they are subject to modeling 
assumptions and are based on hydrologic data that may not necessarily reflect the entire 
range of possible future inflows. 
Incorporating reliability considerations also require certain flexibility in the 
administration of WAS.  At the international and interstate levels this could be a challenge 
due to the lack of management agencies with enough enforcement and administrative power 
to incorporate these concepts. Typically, no provisions are made within treaties and 
compacts for improving allocation schemes in response to newer and more precise 
hydrological studies or unforeseen changes in water availability.  Moreover, in the case 
where treaties or compacts protect certain uses or users against shortages, any modification 
to the water allocation scheme based on a redistribution of risk of shortages would be illegal.   
Therefore, legal and institutional amendments may be required to incorporate reliability 
considerations at those levels.  Greater applicability can be achieved at the intrastate level 
since water management is more flexible and decisions are typically based on operational 
policies that can be modified in response to experience, new management practices, 
improved hydrologic information, and changes in water demand and availability. 
 
9.2.2.6 Multiple Uses 
Water uses that are considered legitimate vary according to the appropriation doctrine 
and even among states following the same doctrine.  Typically, they are defined based on the 
doctrines of beneficial use and reasonable use.  States following the former must recognize 
as beneficial all uses valued by society and thus they need to include provisions that allow 
adapting to changes in those values.  States following the reasonable use doctrine, all uses 
are considered beneficial and thus no use has precedence over others.  However, under water 
scarcity conditions there is a need to pre-establish which uses are considered more 
reasonable in order to protect the most fundamental water needs. 
In general, water institutions can use several criteria for solving conflicts among the 
different sectors of water usage: pre-established priorities among users and uses, economic 
criteria, equity, and sustainability.  When using the economic criteria, water uses with higher 
economic value can be favored by institutions or market mechanisms can be used to 
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reallocate water from low to high valued uses.  Yet, care must be taken when assigning the 
appropriate value to the use as low values can result in inefficient use of the resource, water 
hoarding, wastefulness and damage to water ecosystems.  Under the equity criterion, all 
water users stand on the same level in right, even if the intended use has a low economic 
value.  In order to ensure equity in the allocation process, government intervention may be 
necessary.  Ecological sustainability recognizes the value of ecological components in 
advancing important public interests. Usually, protecting these uses also requires 
government involvement.  On the other hand, economic sustainability relates to supplying 
current needs while conserving enough resources for future benefit. This requires 
comprehensive planning and proactive measures such as basin development plans and 
integrated water resources management. 
 
9.2.2.7 Instream Flow Requirements 
At the international level, the concept of instream flows is explored only in the more 
recent doctrines of integrated water resources management and community of riparian states.  
However, these concepts are ambiguous and give ample margin for interpretation.  More 
practical applications are found in the study of treaties. Although very few treaties 
specifically address instream non-consumptive uses of water, the few that do have used one 
of two approaches.  Treaties either set very specific allocative provisions and limitations or 
establish an administrative body which, among other duties, will determine how these uses 
are going to be addressed.  Specific mechanisms usually involve the establishment of fixed, 
seasonal, or drought emergency minimum flows. 
Typically, interstate compacts do not make specific provisions for instream 
requirements.  Instead, individual states must provide for them in accordance with their own 
water administration policy.  A more efficient approach has been taken in some Eastern 
states where transboundary commissions have been created with management 
responsibilities that include instream flow regulations. 
 Several mechanisms can be adopted in prior appropriation systems to incorporate 
instream flows.  The first one is regulation amendments to recognize such uses as beneficial, 
which entails granting permits.  Another mechanism is limiting new permits based on their 
effects on environmental flows.  The effectiveness of such practices, however, is dependent 
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on the level of development of the river system. In overappropriated rivers this practice has 
come too late to make any significant impact on ensuring healthy aquatic ecosystems.   
 For these reasons, water markets have become the most effective mechanism for 
accommodating instream needs since organizations interested in ensuring instream flows for 
environmental protection and other non-consumptive uses can purchase rights from more 
senior users.  However, reliance on markets shifts the responsibility of environmental 
protection from the government to the private sector which creates uncertainty.  When 
designing strategies to use this mechanism, provisions must be made for assuring a high 
level of long-term protection and security at least comparable to those obtained by more 
traditional mechanisms such as legislation. 
 
9.2.2.8 Drought Management 
Drought periods are the ultimate test of WAS.  The severity of droughts is dependent not 
only on physical factors but also on administrative efficiency. The manner in which WAS 
define droughts is critical because they determine drought policies and response actions.  
Due to the many intricacies and interconnections between the physical and socio-economical 
aspects of droughts, the more traditional definitions of drought are impractical to integrate 
into water management systems.   
Public declarations of droughts are often triggered by specific and well-defined 
conditions.  These triggers then become the practical definition of drought for a particular 
region or for specific sectors such as agriculture or municipal water supply.  The use of 
drought indexes has become the preferred mechanisms for defining droughts.  Some indexes 
are only applicable for specific regions and those that are more generalized may not be 
appropriate for use in certain regions.  Consequently, care must be taken in selecting both 
the type of drought index and its trigger values. 
International treaties and compacts do not address droughts explicitly.  Some do have 
provisions for allocating water during dry years. These provisions include definitions, albeit 
ambiguous, of drought and some mechanisms for the repayment water debts.  When 
incorporating definitions of droughts on legal agreements, specific provisions must be made 
regarding the parameters that will define the occurrence and severity of droughts.  
Otherwise, conflict can arise on whether drought conditions are applicable.  In addition, 
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mechanisms of credits and debits systems need to be more comprehensive by providing 
alternative solutions under long-term droughts. 
Regional approaches at both the international and intrastate levels are being undertaken 
in order to address droughts in a proactive manner rather than emergency relief.  These 
efforts must involve regional analysis of drought indices, use of consistent technology and 
data, and the development of drought-related regional policies and institutions. 
In the US, most drought preparedness and mitigation efforts occur at the state or local 
level and include: long-term planning, tactical short-term mitigation, and emergency 
response.  The most important mechanism in tactical responses is the use of triggers.  In 
terms of water availability triggers can be defined as a function of reservoir storage and 
streamflows.  Multiple criteria can be used to assign trigger values but in general the 
selected triggers must be defined to represent the water availability state of the system.  
Selected triggers must be paired with corresponding mitigation measures and specified in a 
drought response plan.  Several mechanisms for drought mitigation can include: institutional 
reallocation, rationing, emergency water banking, inter-basin transfers, conjunctive 
management of groundwater and surface water resources, water markets, conditional reservoir 
operation for protection of instream flows, and water pricing. 
 
9.2.3 Conclusions from the Lower Rio Grande WAS Simulation Study 
In the Lower Rio Grande, overappropriation, alarming increase in demands for 
municipal uses, decreased reliabilities of irrigation water, drought susceptibility, and 
international treaty issues are impacting the long-term water availability of the region. The 
assessment of the Lower Rio Grande WAS, utilizing the conceptual framework developed in 
Chapter VII, helped to highlight some of the system’s shortcomings.  The strategies tested in 
Chapter VIII indicate that there is potential for improving the efficiency of the system in 
supplying water more equitably to all users. 
It was observed that the primary safeguard of municipal uses is its priority in the water 
allocation sequence.  In addition to this, municipal uses have two additional protection 
mechanisms: the domestic-municipal-industrial (DMI) and operational (OR) reserves.  The 
results showed that having one of these reserves is sufficient for providing extra protection 
against shortages.  Even in a scenario of increased municipal demands, the OR reserve could 
 215
provide enough protection for municipal uses, provided that operational rules are modified 
to avoid the reserve from been emptied.  Making DMI reserve water available for future 
municipal diversions was not found to be an effective reallocation strategy for satisfying the 
fast-growing municipal demands without penalizing irrigators.  Market mechanisms were 
shown to be a better alternative for this purpose.  Under the current allocation rules, it was 
demonstrated that market mechanisms can provide water for increased municipal demands 
without decreasing the reliabilities of irrigators.  In fact, under the market strategy, irrigation 
reliabilities improved.  In other words, these market transactions not only benefit the 
municipal users that purchase the water and the irrigators that sell it, but also the irrigators 
remaining in the system.  It functions both as a “new” source of water and a conservation 
measure, liberating more water for the irrigators that remain in the system. 
Even though the reallocation of DMI reserve to increased municipal demands was not 
sufficient, other benefits can be obtained from a multiuse reallocation approach of portions 
the DMI reserve.  For instance, irrigators could benefit from the elimination or reduction of 
the DMI reserve, especially if the reallocation involves increasing irrigation storage.  Also, if 
water for environmental flows is needed, water from the DMI reserve can significantly 
increase instream flows. The results show that an instream flow requirement could 
potentially be incorporated into the system without significantly affecting existing uses 
reliabilities. 
Due to the administrative and legal constraints of the Lower Rio Grande WAS, it is 
unlikely that the DMI reserve would be eliminated based on simulation models that are not 
without shortcomings and do not represent the entire range of possible inflow sequences.  
The drought management plans tested in this study offer another alternative for improving 
the system reliabilities without completely giving up the security of the DMI reserve while 
lessening drought related damages to irrigators. A myriad of methodologies may be 
developed and strategies tested to determine optimal water availability drought triggers.  The 
DMI reserve sizes associated with each drought stage, although determined arbitrarily, were 
used here to demonstrate the potential and benefits of using a system of increasing levels of 
protection for municipal uses as drought conditions worsen.  On the other hand, as water 
availability conditions improve, water liberated from the DMI reserve can be made available 
to irrigators in order to offset drought impacts. 
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The Lower Rio Grande water allocation scheme is governed by pre-established legal 
criteria that are intended to provide a high degree of certainty in this arid region.  However, 
the Lower Rio Grande WAS was found to be inflexible, outdated, and very conservative.  
Even though the recent use of market mechanisms (economic criteria) has added some 
flexibility to the allocation process, questions can be raised regarding equity and ecological 
sustainability considerations.  The simulations performed in Chapter VIII demonstrated that 
the water allocation sequence (priority) provides enough protection to municipal uses even 
during the worst drought periods in the historical record.  Therefore, the current water 
allocation scheme places what can be considered as an unjustified and unfair burden on 
agricultural users.  Also, since the system has been declared over-appropriated no water is 
being made available for environmental flows and the ecosystems of the region continue to 
deteriorate.  All this, while water in the DMI reserve remains unused. 
This dissertation sheds light on several areas of the Lower Rio Grande WAS where 
improvements can be made and presented alternative strategies to address them. 
Nonetheless, implementing new strategies and water allocation policies in the Lower Rio 
Grande WAS would require considerable changes in regulation policies. 
 
9.3 FINAL REMARKS 
The conceptual framework developed in this dissertation can assist in the design, 
development, and implementation of WAS.  The conceptual framework provides a format 
that can be used as a guide on how to systematically approach new water allocation issues 
and for future evaluations of existing WAS. Also, this systematic approach can help identify 
areas where policy and institutional reform may be needed.   
The conceptual framework may also be used to guide in the design of new water 
allocation agreements and in the revision of old ones. The review of existing computer 
modeling capabilities provides water management agencies helpful information for 
comparing and selecting an appropriate model to support their WAS.  Managers can also use 
the Lower Rio Grande case study as a model for improving water allocating practices and 
integrating computer models to assist in the various phases of water allocation. 
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